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Summary 
This thesis examined stress and anxiety in sport from a number of different 
perspectives. It is written as a series of research papers (chapters). Before the research 
papers, a critical review chapter is presented on the research and theory relevant to 
stress and anxiety in sport. One of the issues to arise from the review chapter was the 
relative merit of multidimensional anxiety theory and catastrophe models. In 
multidimensional anxiety theory, it is unclear whether cognitive anxiety and self-
confidence are viewed as being conceptually independent or conceptually co-
dependent. In higher-order catastrophe models, self-confidence is viewed as being 
conceptually independent of cognitive anxiety and is expected to moderate the 
interactive effects of cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal upon performance. 
One of the aims of Chapter 3 was to clarify whether cognitive anxiety and self-
confidence were conceptually independent. This was done by means of a meta-
analysis that explored the relationships between cognitive anxiety and performance, 
and self-confidence and performance. The magnitude of the (positive) self-confidence 
mean effect size was significantly larger than the magnitude of the (negative) 
cognitive anxiety mean effect size. This offers evidence for the relatively strong 
influence of self-confidence upon performance. It also provides support for the 
conceptual independence of cognitive anxiety and self-confidence. In Chapter 4, the 
role of self-confidence was explored within a higher-order catastrophe model 
framework. This involved an exploratory segmental analysis designed specifically for 
exploring bias factors in higher-order catastrophe models. This analysis supported the 
moderating role of self-confidence within this framework. More specifically, the 
maximum cognitive anxiety x somatic anxiety interaction effect size was at a higher 
level of somatic anxiety for the high self-confidence condition, when compared to the 
low self-confidence condition. Another of the findings from the meta-analysis was the 
dearth of studies conducted with elite performers. The final research paper was an 
investigation of organizational stress within an elite environment. In view of its 
exploratory nature, this study was conducted within a qualitative framework. The 
major sources of organizational stress to emerge from the interviews with elite 
athletes were: selection, training environment, finances, nutrition, goals and 
expectations, coaches and coaching styles, team atmosphere, roles, support network, 
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and communication. A general discussion chapter follows the research papers. In this 
chapter, implications for future research and applied practice are discussed in relation 
to the project as a whole. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Competitive athletes often have to cope with a great deal of pressure and stress. This 
is particularly true of athletes at the highest level. However, despite these seemingly 
adverse conditions, performers frequently seem able to "rise to the occasion" and 
perform exceptionally well. It is perhaps this apparent paradox that has made the 
topics of stress and anxiety so appealing to researchers in sport psychology. Such is 
the popularity of these topics that it is quite rare for any given volume of a sport 
psychology journal to contain no research articles related to stress or anxiety. 
However, the rate at which journal articles are published on this subject seems rather 
greater than the rate at which our understanding has evolved. 
Previous stress and performance research has been partly hampered by the 
ambiguous and interchangeable use of terms such as arousal, activation, stress, and 
anxiety. Furthermore, at times, researchers have adopted seemingly diametrically 
opposed theoretical standpoints. Consequently, some fundamental issues remain to 
be satisfactorily resolved. For example, do worry (i.e., cognitive anxiety) and self-
confidence represent opposite extremes of a single continuum (cf. Martens, Burton, 
Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990) or do they represent independent constructs (cf. 
Hardy, 1996a)? Does anxiety sometimes help a performer's performance (cf. Jones, 
1995) or does a "negative" emotion always hinder performance (cf. Burton & 
Naylor, 1997)? When a competitor's performance suffers a drop, is the nature of this 
drop always smooth and gradual (cf. Martens et aI., 1990) or is it sometimes large 
and sudden (cf. Hardy, 1996b)? These questions remain to be satisfactorily 
addressed. Finally, past research with elite athletes (e.g., Gould, Jackson, & Finch, 
1993a; Scanlan, Stein, & Ravizza, 1991) has revealed a number of sources of stress 
that are not related to the stress engendered by the competition itself. Thus, an 
important question remains: what are the organizational stressors to which elite 
athletes are exposed? 
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Purpose of the Research Project 
The purpose of the present research project is to address some of the above 
questions. More specifically, the purpose of the project is to investigate the 
relationship between stress and sport performance from two major theoretical 
paradigms. The first is an attempt to elucidate the relationship between cognitive 
anxiety, self-confidence, and competitive performance. The second is an attempt to 
investigate elite performers' sources of stress from an organizational perspective. 
These approaches are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Structure of the thesis 
After a detailed review and critical appraisal of stress and anxiety research, this 
project will attempt to answer the following questions: 
1) What is the relative impact of cognitive anxiety and self-confidence upon 
performance? 
2) Is self-confidence a bias factor within a butterfly catastrophe model 
framework? 
3) What are the sources of organizational stress in elite sport? 
Chapter 2 of the thesis is a review of the literature in the area of stress and anxiety in 
sport. This chapter provides working definitions of the main concepts of interest in 
the thesis. Also, the chapter provides a detailed and critical overview of the research 
conducted to date. The chapter critically appraises theories and models that have 
been proposed in the area. As this chapter was written for publication in the 
Handbook of Sport Psychology, it concludes with future research directions and 
applied implications for best practice. 
Chapter 3 reports a meta-analysis of two relationships: state cognitive anxiety and 
competitive sport performance, and state self-confidence and competitive sport 
performance. The main purpose of this study was to investigate the relative 
importance of cognitive anxiety and self-confidence effects upon performance. 
Another purpose of this meta-analysis was to determine whether cognitive anxiety 
and self-confidence reflected independent or interdependent constructs. 
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Chapter 4 reports an innovative investigation of Hardy's (1996a) butterfly 
catastrophe model. The main purpose of this study was to determine whether self-
confidence might act as a bias factor within a butterfly catastrophe model framework. 
Chapter 5 reports a qualitative case study of organizational stress in elite sport. The 
purpose of this study was to explore organizational stress within an elite environment 
in order to better understand the real-life stress to which elite athletes can be exposed 
during their preparation for major international competitions. 
Chapter 6 provides a summary and discussion of the thesis findings. In particular, 
this chapter discusses the implications of the findings from both applied and 
theoretical perspectives. Finally, future directions are offered for research in the area 
of stress and anxiety in competitive sport. 
The methodological approaches used in this thesis are varied, including a meta-
analysis, an innovative test of higher-order catastrophe models, and a qualitative 
study. This variety has the benefit of training the candidate to conduct research in a 
number of different ways. Also, the thesis is written as a collection of research 
papers. Writing a thesis as a series of research papers serves two important functions. 
First, it trains the candidate for an essential part of an academic career, namely to 
conduct research with a view to publication. The second function is related to the 
first. That is, writing a thesis in this way encourages the development of self-
contained chapters that are easier both to write and read than a magnum opus. 
Furthermore, whereas a magnum opus is likely to be read only by the thesis 
committee, the papers comprising a thesis will directly serve the scientific 
community. It is for these reasons that the School of Sport, Health, and Exercise 
Sciences encourages candidates to submit doctoral theses as a series of research 
papers. 
Chapter 2 
Stress and Anxiety! 
It doesn't take much technique to roll a 1.68-inch ball along a smooth, 
level surface into, or in the immediate vicinity of, a 4.5 inch hole. 
With no pressure on you, you can do it one-handed most of the time. 
But there is always pressure on the shorter putts ... 90 percent of the 
rounds I play in major championships, I play with a bit of a shake ... 
(Jack Nicklaus on golf putting; Patmore, 1986, p. 75). 
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As illustrated in the quote above, athletes who participate in competitive sport 
invariably have to deal with a great deal of pressure. This pressure is most often 
associated with elevated levels of stress and anxiety, which form an integral part of 
high-level sport (Gould, Eklund, & Jackson, 1992a, 1992b; Gould, Jackson, & Finch, 
1993a, 1993b; Patmore, 1986; Scanlan, Ravizza, & Stein, 1989; Scanlan, Stein, & 
Ravizza, 1991). This chapter will review the current state of research in stress and 
anxiety in sport and offer some guidelines for future research in this area. 
One of the problems that has plagued stress and anxiety research has been a lack of 
clarity between terms such as stress, anxiety, arousal, and activation. It is important 
to be clear about what these terms mean with regard to theory, research 
methodology, and conclusions. Consequently, a clarification of these terms forms the 
basis of the first section of this chapter. The second section comprises a brief review 
of the measurement of anxiety in sport. The third section focuses on research that has 
investigated the sources of stress and anxiety. The fourth section discusses theories, 
hypotheses, and models of anxiety and sports performance. In the fifth section, 
measurement issues in competitive anxiety research are revisited in light of the 
research reviewed in section four, while in the sixth section, the mechanisms via 
which anxiety might affect performance are explored using theories from mainstream 
psychology. In the seventh section, the applied implications of the research to date 
are discussed and future research directions and questions are offered. 
1 Based upon Woodman, T., & Hardy, L. (2001a). Stress and Anxiety. In R. N. Singer, H. A. 
Hausenblas, & c. M. Janelle (Eds.), Handbook o/sport psychology (pp. 290-318). New York: Wiley. 
Defining Terms 
Arousal 
Arousal has typically been used by researchers to refer to the intensity of 
behaviour as a unitary construct encompassing both psychological and physiological 
aspects of behaviour. For example, Duffy (1962) defined arousal as "the extent of 
release of potential energy, stored in the tissues of the organism, as this is shown in 
activity or response" (p. 179). Although this definition will be accepted here as a 
working hypothesis, it will be criticized and revised later in the chapter. 
Stress 
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Jones (1990) defined stress as a state in which some demand is placed on the 
individual, who is then required to react in some way in order to be able to cope with 
the situation. This definition implies that stress mayor may not place a 'strain' upon 
the individual (Jick & Payne, 1980; Lazarus, 1966); it will depend upon one's 
perceived ability to cope with the stressor. Thus, it is the individual's cognitive 
appraisal of the situation that is central to the stress process (Cox, 1978; Lazarus, 
1966; Sanders, 1983; Welford, 1973). Ifpeople doubt their ability to cope with the 
stressor, then feelings of anxiety will likely ensue. 
Anxiety 
Anxiety is generally accepted as being an unpleasant emotion. There are two 
rather discordant views on the role of cognition in the generation of emotions. Some 
researchers (e.g., Zajonc, 1980, 1984) argue that the affective evaluation of stimuli 
involves basic processes that do not always require the involvement of the cognitive 
system. Other researchers (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Lazarus, 1982) propose that an 
emotional reaction will be triggered only in the presence of cognitive processing, 
even though such processing might be at differing levels of accessibility to 
consciousness. Espousing such a view, Lazarus (1982) stated, "Cognitive appraisal 
(of meaning or significance) underlies and is an integral feature of all emotional 
states" (p. 1021). If one accepts that anxiety is an emotion, and that some level of 
cognitive processing necessarily precedes emotions, then it is necessary to consider 
cognitive processes to fully understand the mechanisms underlying anxiety. 
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State and Trait Anxiety 
Spielberger (1966) defined state anxiety as "subjective, consciously perceived 
feelings of tension and apprehension, associated with ... arousal of the autonomic 
nervous system" (Spielberger, 1966, p. 17). Such feelings of apprehension are 
normally relatively transitory and relate to a particular event. As such, state anxiety is 
the individual's response to a specific threatening situation. Trait anxiety is a general 
disposition to respond to a variety of situations with high levels of state anxiety. 
Although early researchers investigated anxiety from a unidimensional perspective, 
with no differentiation being made between different components of anxiety (e.g., 
Lowe & McGrath, 1971; Scanlan & Passer, 1978; Simon & Martens, 1977), research 
in mainstream psychology has suggested that anxiety might have at least two 
distinguishable components (e.g., Davidson & Schwartz, 1976; Liebert & Morris, 
1967): a mental component normally termed cognitive anxiety or worry; and a 
physiological component normally termed somatic anxiety or physiological arousal. 
In their development of the Competitive State Anxiety Invetory-2 (CSAI-2), 
Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, and Smith (1990) used Morris, Davis, and 
Hutchings' (1981) definition of cognitive anxiety. Morris et al. (1981) defined 
cognitive anxiety as "negative expectations and cognitive concerns about oneself, the 
situation at hand, and potential consequences" (p. 541). Morris et al. (1981) defined 
somatic anxiety as "one's perception of the physiological-affective elements of the 
anxiety experience, that is, indications of autonomic arousal and unpleasant feeling 
states such as nervousness and tension." (p. 541). In their definition of state somatic 
anxiety (somatic A-state), Martens et al. (1990) stated: 
Somatic A-state refers to the physiological and affective elements of 
the anxiety experience that develop directly from autonomic arousal. 
Somatic A-state is reflected in such responses as rapid heart rate, 
shortness of breath, clammy hands, butterflies in the stomach, and 
tense muscles. (p. 121) 
There appears to be ambiguity as to whether somatic anxiety refers to one's 
perception of one's physiological symptoms (cf. Morris et aI., 1981) or whether 
somatic anxiety refers directly to these physiological symptoms (cf. Martens et aI., 
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1990). It is assumed here that somatic anxiety refers to the perception of one's 
physiological arousal symptoms (Morris et aI., 1981). As such, levels of somatic 
anxiety can be determined with the use of a self-report measure, whereas if Martens 
and associates' (1990) definition were adopted, somatic anxiety could not be directly 
assessed by self-report measures. 
The Measurement of Anxiety 
Since Spielberger's (1966) distinction between trait anxiety and state anxiety, 
researchers have constructed scales to measure these two constructs separately (e.g., 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). Following the lead of researchers who 
developed measures specific to particular settings (e.g., Sarason, Davidson, 
Lighthall, Waite, & Ruebush, 1960; Watson & Friend, 1969), Martens (1977) 
constructed the Sport Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT), a sport-specific measure of 
trait anxiety. Also, Martens and associates developed the Competitive State Anxiety 
Inventory (CSAI; Martens, Burton, Rivkin, & Simon, 1980), a sport-specific measure 
of state anxiety. 
Following the distinction between cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety (e.g. 
Davidson & Schwartz, 1976), sport psychology researchers developed sport-specific 
multidimensional measures of trait and state anxiety. For example, Smith, Smoll, and 
Schutz (1990) constructed the Sport Anxiety Scale (SAS), which contains three trait 
measures: worry, somatic anxiety, and concentration disruption. Also, Martens et aI. 
(1990) developed the CSAI-2, which contains three relatively independent state 
subscales: cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence. The CSAI-2 has 
become almost the sine qua non for researchers undertaking research in pre-
competition state anxiety. 
Sources of Stress and Anxiety 
Sources of Stress 
Many studies on stress and anxiety have included participants from a wide 
range of ability levels. As non-elite populations are typically more accessible for 
researchers, this is not surprising. However, in order to further our understanding of 
elite performance, information must be gleaned from top-level performers. Studies 
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with such individuals are fairly limited. In an attempt to unveil some of the pertinent 
sources of stress and anxiety experienced by elite performers, researchers have begun 
to employ interview methods (Gould, Eklund, & Jackson, 1991; Gould et aI., 1993a, 
1993b; Scanlan et aI., 1989; Scanlan, et aI., 1991; Woodman & Hardy, 2001b). 
Scanlan et aI. (1991) interviewed 26 former national-championship figure skaters in 
order to identify the stressors encountered during the most competitive phase of their 
career. The interviews were analysed for content and the sources of stress were 
categorized under five headings. These were: negative aspects of competition (e.g., 
experiencing competition worries); negative significant-other relationships (e.g., not 
getting along with others); demands/costs of skating (e.g., dealing with family's 
financial sacrifice); personal struggles (e.g., experiencing the consequences of having 
an injury); and traumatic experiences (e.g., having significant others die). Gould et 
aI. (1993a) extended Scanlan et aI.'s (1991) research by interviewing 17 current and 
former US national champion figure skaters. The sample of figure skaters 
interviewed by Gould et aI. included 3 skaters who had won a World Championship 
and 7 skaters who had won a medal either at the World Championships or at the 
Olympic Games. The sources of stress revealed in Gould et aI.'s (1993a) study were 
similar to those revealed by Scanlan and her colleagues (1991). An example of some 
of the pressure with which elite performers can be confronted is illustrated below: 
He could not handle the frustration, and he would really freak out and 
blame me for my injury. That was a really hard thing to deal with. It's 
like, "Yes, of course I know we are supposed to be training hard, and 
yes, I want to defend the title too, but I don't need you putting more 
stress on me." (United States pairs ice-skating champion; Gould et aI., 
1993a, pp. 140-141). 
Interview studies dealing with sources of stress in top-level performers have begun to 
unearth some of the organizational issues that they face. Interviews also formed the 
basis of Woodman and Hardy's (2001b) study of organizational stress in 15 elite 
performers. Their findings, taken together with those of Gould et al. (1993a, 1993b) 
and Scanlan et aI. (1991) suggest that organizational stress might be an important 
issue in preparing for major international competitions. For example, coach and 
team-mate problems, selection procedures, and financial issues that are poorly 
managed will likely result in competition preparation that is far from ideal. To date, 
there is no research directly investigating the effects of organizational stress on 
subsequent performance. Although a challenging area, organizational stress in high-
level sport is likely to be a fruitful area of research in the future. 
The research outlined above suggests that top-level performers can face a wide 
spectrum of stressors. These include: interpersonal problems (with team-mates or 
coaches); financial concerns; injury problems; issues arising from selection 
procedures; lack of social support; traumatic experiences; and other personal issues. 
In view of the vast array of stressful issues that the athlete may face in preparation 
for a major competition, it is likely that sport psychology consultants working with 
elite performers will need to possess skills that go beyond the application of mental 
skills training. Indeed the array of psychological skills that currently form the typical 
sport psychologist's arsenal are not likely to prove particularly useful for addressing 
such issues as a lack of social support, problematic selection criteria, or traumatic 
expenences. 
Antecedents of Anxiety 
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Gould, Petlichkoff, and Weinberg (1984) argued that if the causes of 
debilitating anxiety in a competitive setting could be identified, then sport 
psychologists would be well equipped to help athletes avoid the sources of their 
anxiety. Clearly, research in this area is seriously constrained by the ethical dilemma 
of manipulating variables that are thought to cause anxiety. Researchers have 
typically circumvented this issue by investigating the correlation between factors that 
are thought to cause anxiety and the intensity of the anxiety response. These factors 
have typically been called antecedents of state anxiety. 
In an attempt to identify some of the antecedents of anxiety, most researchers in 
earlier years did not differentiate between the cognitive and somatic components of 
anxiety. Also, many of these earlier investigations included only young samples. For 
example, Scanlan and Passer (1978) reported that trait anxiety, self-esteem, and 
performance expectancies were all significant predictors of state anxiety in a sample 
of competitive female youth soccer players between 10 and 12 years old. 
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Furthermore, Lowe and McGrath (1971) found the importance of a game within a 
season to be significant predictor of physiological arousal. More specifically, the 
critical and important games were associated with higher levels of physiological 
arousal. Finally, Hanson's (1967) study revealed that, when they were at bat, young 
baseball players' physiological arousal was significantly higher than at any other 
phase of the game. 
Investigations of the differential antecedents of cognitive and somatic anxiety in a 
sport setting were first conducted by Gould et al. (1984) in their study with wrestlers. 
Gould et al. reported "years of experience" to be the strongest (negative) predictor of 
cognitive anxiety. Furthermore, they found trait anxiety to be the only antecedent of 
somatic anxiety. Jones, Swain, and Cale (1990) conducted a similar, albeit more in-
depth, study with male middle-distance runners. In Jones et al.'s study, the major 
predictors of cognitive anxiety were: performers' perceptions of readiness; their 
attitude towards previous performances; and their use of outcome goals. However, 
somatic anxiety was not related to any of the variables considered in their study. In a 
follow-up study, Jones, Swain, and Cale (1991) found evidence for different 
cognitive anxiety antecedents between men and women. More specifically, they 
observed that the cognitive anxiety of the women was mainly predicted by their 
readiness to perform and the importance of doing well. However, the cognitive 
anxiety of the men was predicted by their opponents' ability in relation to themselves 
and their perceived probability of winning. 
In determining different antecedents for the different anxiety components, 
researchers have provided further evidence for the need to distinguish between 
cognitive and somatic anxiety. Indeed, if the antecedents of cognitive and somatic 
anxiety are sometimes different, then this would seem to indicate that they are, at 
least partially, independent constructs. 
Investigations of how cognitive and somatic anxiety change over time have typically 
shown that the components of anxiety fluctuate differently prior to a competition 
(Gould et aI., 1984; Jones & Cale, 1989; Krane & Williams, 1987; Parfitt & Hardy, 
1987). More precisely, these studies have typically indicated that cognitive anxiety 
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remains fairly high and stable prior to a competition whereas somatic anxiety 
remains fairly low up to one or two days before a competition and then increases 
steadily up to the competition (e.g., Gould et aI., 1984). Researchers who have used 
physiological arousal as well as somatic anxiety have determined that these two 
variables follow similar temporal patterns (e.g., Parfitt, Jones, & Hardy, 1990). Jones 
and his colleagues (Jones & Cale, 1989; Jones et aI., 1991) concluded that women's 
pre-competition anxiety differed from that of the men in a variety of team sports. 
Whereas men's cognitive anxiety remained stable prior to a competition, women's 
cognitive anxiety increased steadily up to the competition. Furthermore, women's 
somatic anxiety increased earlier than did that of the men. 
In summary, although most early research identified antecedents of unidimensional 
anxiety in youth participants, more recent research has identified differences between 
the antecedents of cognitive and somatic anxiety in wrestlers and middle-distance 
runners. Furthermore, the research just presented shows that the antecedents of 
cognitive and somatic anxiety can be different for male and female middle-distance 
runners. 
State Anxiety and Performance 
In mainstream psychology, Broadhurst (1957) and Hebb (1955) proposed that 
the relationship between arousal and performance would best be explained by the 
inverted-U hypothesis (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). The inverted-U hypothesis 
proposes that the relationship between arousal and performance will be in the form of 
a symmetrical inverted-U, such that increases in arousal will result in increases in 
performance up to a point (optimal arousal) beyond which further increases in 
arousal will result in a gradual decrement in performance (see Figure 1). Sport 
psychology researchers (Anshel, 1990; Cox, 1990; Gill, 1986; Landers, 1994; 
Landers & Boutcher, 1986) adopted the inverted-U as the dominant explanation of 
arousal-performance relationships in sport. Subsequently, many researchers (e.g., 
Gill, 1986) have used the inverted-U as an explanation of the relationship between: 
arousal and performance; stress and performance; and anxiety and performance. 
However, many researchers (e.g., Hardy, 1990; Hockey & Hamilton, 1983; Jones, 
1990; Krane, 1992; Neiss, 1988) have extensively and severely criticized the use of 
the inverted-Vas an explanation of such relationships. 
Performance 
Arousal 
Figure 1. The inverted-V hypothesis. 
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One major problem with the inverted-V hypothesis as an explanation of arousal-
performance relationships lies in the operationalisation of arousal and activation. 
Following Duffy's (1962) definition (see the start of this chapter), arousal has been 
regarded as a unidimensional activation response that prepares the organism for 
action. This response has been viewed as lying on a continuum from deep sleep to 
extreme excitement (Malmo, 1959). Thus, according to this view, arousal is 
conceptualised as a simple unitary construct accounting for behavioural, 
physiological, and cognitive factors. However, many researchers have argued that 
this is a simplistic conceptualisation of more complex relationships (Hardy, 1990; 
Hockey & Hamilton, 1983; Jones & Hardy, 1989; Lacey, 1967; Neiss, 1988). Also, 
research conducted by Lacey (1967) presented strong evidence for three distinct 
forms of activation (arousal): electrocortica1 (electric activity in the cortex measured 
by EEG); autonomic (physiological activity measured by skin conductance, heart 
rate, etc.); and behavioural (overt activity). 
A number of researchers (e.g., Hockey & Hamilton, 1983; Naatiinen, 1973; Neiss, 
1988; Parfitt et al., 1990) have suggested that it is necessary to view arousal in a 
more detailed fashion by investigating the systems that are involved in different 
aspects of performance. According to this position, arousal is best viewed as a 
patterning of various physiological parameters. If this patterning is appropriate for 
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the task at hand, then performance will likely be maintained; if the patterning is not 
appropriate, then performance will likely be impaired (cf. Neiss, 1988). Other 
researchers (e.g., Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996a; Pribram & McGuinness, 1975) 
have advocated a clearer distinction between arousal and activation. For example, 
Pribram and McGuinness (1975) proposed that activation is the cognitive and 
physiological activity that is geared towards preparing a planned response that is 
appropriate to the task; arousal is defined as the cognitive and physiological activity 
that occurs in response to some new and external input to the system. Hardy et al. 
(l996a) provided the example of a gymnast immediately before performing a beam 
routine in an important international competition. If the gymnast has prepared well, 
having performed the routine over 100 times in training and various competitions, 
she probably has the appropriate activation state for performing this routine. 
However, if a balloon bursts loudly the very moment she is about to land on the 
springboard for a complex mount, the gymnast may experience an involuntary startle 
(arousal) response, leading to a disruption of her activation pattern. With this 
different activation pattern, she misses her mount. Thus, activation (e.g., the 
appropriate state for performing a beam routine) refers to the cognitive and 
physiological activity that is geared towards the preparation of a planned response to 
an anticipated situation. Arousal (e.g., an involuntary startle) refers to the cognitive 
and physiological activity that takes place in response to some new input (Pribram & 
McGuinness, 1975). 
The utilization of the inverted-U hypothesis as an explanation of complex 
relationships between, arousal, anxiety, stress, and sport performance has been 
criticized on a number of other points. Perhaps the most salient criticism of the 
inverted-U hypothesis is that it offers no explanation of how arousal affects 
performance. The inverted-U hypothesis has received further criticism, including: it 
does not allow for an individual's cognitive appraisal of the situation and is 
consequently" ... an impediment to the understanding of individual differences" 
(Neiss, 1988, p. 353); and its symmetrical shape is not realistic of a competitive sport 
situation when a performer who has gone "over the top" is unlikely to be able to 
regain an optimal level of performance with only a slight reduction in physiological 
arousal (Hardy, 1990). 
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In summary, the application of the inverted-V hypothesis to sport is a description of 
the relationship between unidimensional arousal and performance. Given that arousal 
and anxiety are distinct constructs, this relationship is unlikely to be useful as a 
description, let alone as an explanation, of the effects of anxiety upon performance. 
In an attempt to address the shortcomings of the inverted-V hypothesis, various 
theorists have formulated alternative hypotheses, theories, and models. These will be 
elaborated upon in the following section. 
Individualized Zones of Optimal Functioning 
The individualized zones of optimal functioning (IZOFs) hypothesis was 
developed by Yuri Hanin in the seventies and published in the English language in 
the eighties (1980, 1986). The central tenet of the IZOF hypothesis is that each 
athlete has hislher own optimal zone of pre-performance anxiety within which he/she 
is more likely to attain optimal performance. If the anxiety level lies outside of this 
zone, performance will be impaired. Contrary to earlier attempts at classifying 
optimal levels of anxiety based upon task characteristics and experience (e.g., 
Oxendine, 1970, 1984), the IZOF approach simply purports that a person's optimal 
level of anxiety is specific to that particular individual. 
Hanin (1986) has claimed that IZOFs can be derived either by direct and repeated 
measurement of anxiety levels and subsequent performance, or by recall of anxiety 
levels prior to a past peak performance. There is some evidence that IZOFs can be 
determined by recall of past optimal levels of anxiety (Hanin, 1986; Morgan, 
O'Connor, Sparling, & Pate, 1987; Raglin & Morgan, 1988). Also, research 
generally supports the contention that anxiety levels that are within individualized 
zones correspond to higher levels of performance (Gould, Tuffey, Hardy, & 
Lochbaum, 1993c; Hanin & Kopysov, 1977, cited in Hanin, 1980; Krane, 1993; 
Randle & Weinberg, 1997; Turner & Raglin, 1991; Woodman, Albinson, & Hardy, 
1997). For example, Turner and Raglin (1991) found that track and field athletes who 
competed with anxiety levels within their estimated IZOF performed significantly 
better than those who competed with anxiety levels outside their estimated IZOF. 
Also, in an investigation employing a multidimensional framework, Woodman et al. 
(1997) observed that 10-pin bowling perfonnance was better when bowlers' 
combined cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety scores were within their IZOF 
compared to when they were outside this multidimensional IZOF. 
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Gould and Udry (1994) proposed that anxiety is unlikely to be the only emotion that 
affects perfonnance and that researchers would do well to consider other emotions 
(e.g., anger, disappointment, frustration, excitement, joy, etc.). Gould and Udry 
suggested that a recipe of emotions for a perfonner is likely to account for larger 
proportions of variance than anxiety alone. Certainly, preliminary investigations that 
have included other emotions to derive IZOFs have supported the applicability of the 
IZOF concept to a wider range of emotions (Hanin & Syrja, 1995a, 1995b). 
From a more theoretical perspective, Gould and Tuffey (1996), and Hardy et ai. 
(1996a), noted that Hanin's IZOF hypothesis lies on barren ground for two reasons. 
First, Hanin's (1980) original hypothesis was based on a unidimensional 
conceptualisation of anxiety. However, this shortcoming has recently been overcome 
by research that has investigated IZOFs within a multidimensional framework 
(Gould et aI., 1993c; Krane, 1993; Randle & Weinberg, 1997; Thelwell & Maynard, 
1998; Woodman et aI., 1997). Second, and more seriously, Hanin's IZOFs comprise 
what is essentially an individual difference "theory" without any individual 
difference variables (Gould & Tuffey, 1996; Hardy et aI., 1996a). Gould and Tuffey 
(1996) offered two possible explanations for accounting for the effects of state 
anxiety upon perfonnance. First, based on Easterbrook's (1959) cue-utilization 
theory, a number of researchers have stated that an athlete's perceptual field will 
narrow as a result of increased anxiety (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Landers & Boutcher, 
1993). In essence, Easterbrook's theory states that an athlete will perfonn optimally 
when he/she is attending to all those cues that are relevant to the task at hand, and to 
those cues only. Any deviation from this optimal focus (i.e., a focus that either takes 
in too many cues or too few cues) will result in SUb-optimal perfonnance. Second, 
Gould and Tuffey (1996) cited research that has shown that increases in anxiety can 
be accompanied by increased muscular tension and co-contraction, which are 
associated with inferior perfonnance (Weinberg & Hunt, 1976). Although both of 
these explanations are fairly tenable, they do not account for the individual 
differences revealed in various IZOF studies. Consequently, despite encouraging 
applied data, IZOF remains an intuitive applied tool, which, as yet, has little 
theoretical value. 
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In summary, the IZOF hypothesis has received some encouraging support. However, 
its theoretical value is limited by a lack of explanation as to why there are differences 
between individuals' IZOFs. 
Multidimensional Anxiety Theory 
Multidimensional anxiety theory hypothesizes that the antecedents of 
cognitive and somatic anxiety are different and that these anxiety components are 
differentially related to performance. More specifically, cognitive anxiety is 
hypothesized to have a negative linear relationship with performance. This 
hypothesis is largely based on early theories of attention (e.g., Wine, 1971, 1980). 
The premise is that cognitive resources are taken up by worrying thoughts and so are 
not available for the task at hand. Consequently, the more athletes are worried, the 
less well they will perform. Somatic anxiety is hypothesized to have a quadratic 
(inverted-U shaped) relationship with performance, whereby performance is 
expected to be optimal at moderate levels of somatic anxiety. The rationale for this 
hypothesized relationship between somatic anxiety and performance is unclear. It 
appears that it is largely an extension of the hypothesized inverted-U shaped 
relationship between arousal and performance (Broadhurst, 1957). In attempting to 
explain why somatic anxiety might affect performance in this fashion, Martens et al. 
(1990) cited the research of Weinberg (1978) suggesting that too much muscular 
tension might lead to a deterioration in performance. If this is the case, it is unclear 
why somatic anxiety, and not physiological arousal, was used in Martens et al.'s 
(1990) theory of multidimensional anxiety. Indeed, if physiological arousal is 
expected to directly affect motor performance, then measuring a performer's 
perception of this physiological arousal might not be the most effective manner in 
which to test for such effects. Certainly, in light of the research that has found no 
significant relationships between perceived physiological arousal and indicators of 
physiological arousal (e.g., Karteroliotis & Gill, 1987; Yan Lan & Gill, 1984), it 
appears that somatic anxiety might well be, at best, only a very crude indicator of the 
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physiological component of anxiety. Clearly, a theory that offers a relationship 
between somatic anxiety and performance, and yet does not offer an explanation of 
this relationship, remains a weak theory. 
Multidimensional anxiety theory also proposes that self-confidence will have a 
positive linear relationship with performance. It is worth explaining here how self-
confidence became part of a theory on multidimensional anxiety. In the factor 
analysis of the items comprising the CSAI-2, Martens et ai. (1990) found that 
cognitive anxiety effectively separated into two factors, one that included negatively 
phrased items and one that included positively phrased items. These factors were 
subsequently labelled cognitive anxiety and self-confidence respectively. Therefore, 
what was originally intended to be an anxiety scale comprising the two subscales of 
cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety ended up also including a self-confidence 
subscale. Given that self-confidence and cognitive anxiety emerged as orthogonal 
(i.e., independent) factors, it is rather surprising that Martens et ai. (1990) should 
appear to view them as interdependent. In the discussion of their factor analyses, 
Martens et ai. stated: 
These findings suggest that cognitive A-state and state self-confidence 
represent opposite ends of a cognitive evaluation continuum, state 
self-confidence being viewed as the absence of cognitive A-state, or 
conversely, cognitive A-state being the lack of state self-confidence. 
(Martens et aI., 1990, p. 129) 
This conclusion has been supported neither in independent research (Gould et aI., 
1984; Jones & Cale, 1989; Hardy, 1996a) nor in Martens et aI.'s (1990) own 
analyses, both of which have demonstrated the relative independence of cognitive 
anxiety and self-confidence. Also, the research conducted by Jones and associates 
(Jones et aI., 1990, 1991) on the antecedents and temporal patterning of cognitive 
anxiety and self-confidence provided additional evidence for their relative 
independence. Finally, Hardy's (1996a) study of golfers revealed that self-confidence 
accounted for performance variance over and above the performance variance 
accounted for by cognitive and somatic anxiety. In light of these findings, it follows 
that cognitive anxiety and self-confidence do not lie at opposite ends of the same 
continuum. 
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Empirical support for multidimensional anxiety theory has been somewhat 
equivocal. Burton's (1988) study with swimmers yielded support for all three 
multidimensional anxiety theory predictions. That is, the relationship between 
cognitive anxiety and swimming performance was negative and linear, the 
relationship between somatic anxiety and performance was in the form of an 
inverted-U, and the relationship between self-confidence and performance was 
positive and linear. However, in Raglin's (1992) review of eight studies reporting 
relationships between CSAI-2 subscales and sport performance, Burton's (1988) was 
the only study that supported all of the predictions of multidimensional anxiety 
theory. Of the seven remaining studies reviewed by Raglin, three provided partial 
support and four provided no support for any of the hypothesized relationships 
between the CSAI-2 components and performance. In a more recent review, Burton 
(1998) classified studies based on the level of support (strong, moderate, or weak) 
that they provided for the predictions of the CSAI-2. Of the 16 studies reviewed, 2 
provided strong support2, 6 provided moderate support, and 8 provided weak support 
for the CSAI-2 predictions. The inconsistencies in these findings might be 
attributable to a number of factors, notably inappropriate performance measures and 
individual differences. 
In order to control for individual differences, Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, and Vevera 
(1987) and Burton (1988) standardized all anxiety and performance scores within 
subjects, such that each individual's anxiety and performance scores were expressed 
relative to his/her mean scores. When utilizing this procedure, Gould et al. identified 
no significant relationship between cognitive anxiety and pistol shooting 
performance, and a negative linear relationship between self-confidence and pistol 
shooting performance. As already stated, Burton (1988) found support for all three 
relationships proposed in multidimensional anxiety theory. In both studies, a 
significant inverted-U shaped relationship between somatic anxiety and performance 
was revealed. In his critique of these intra-individual procedures, Raglin (1992) 
correctly pointed out that median or mean scores do not necessarily reflect moderate 
2 In Burton (1998), presumably due to a typographical error, Burton's (1988) study was not classified. 
It is assumed here that Burton (1998) would have classified his 1988 study as providing strong 
support for the CSAI-2 predictions. 
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scores. Therefore, when transforming raw scores to standardized scores, a high score 
simply reflects a score that is higher than normal for that individual rather than a 
score that is high in absolute terms. The fact that both Gould et aI. (1987) and Burton 
(1988) found a significant quadratic relationship between somatic anxiety and 
performance, despite this potential confound, adds support for the hypothesized 
inverted-U shaped relationship between somatic anxiety and performance in these 
instances. 
Another possible reason for the inconsistent support for multidimensional anxiety 
theory might be the terminology used in the CSAI-2. This is particularly the case for 
cognitive anxiety. Indeed, in an effort to reduce potential social desirability, Martens 
et aI. (1990) replaced cognitive anxiety statements starting with "I am worried" with 
statements starting with "I am concerned." The verb "concern" is clearly less 
evaluative than "worry", and as such, might well be more open to divergent 
interpretation by different performers. This point is not semantic pedantry. Rather, it 
is central to a number of issues that have recently been debated in the competitive 
state anxiety literature (cf. Burton & Naylor, 1997; Hardy, 1997; Jones, Hanton, & 
Swain, 1994). These points will be elaborated upon later in the chapter. 
In summary, multidimensional anxiety theory has allowed researchers to move 
anxiety research beyond the inverted-U arousal-performance hypothesis. 
Multidimensional anxiety theory hypothesizes that athletes will perform their best at 
low levels of cognitive anxiety, high levels of self-confidence, and at moderate levels 
of somatic anxiety. Research in support of these hypothesized relationships has been 
equivocal or, at best, mildly supportive. Furthermore, no theoretical reason has been 
offered for why somatic anxiety should affect performance in the manner 
hypothesized by multidimensional anxiety theory. Finally, the proposition that 
cognitive anxiety and self-confidence are co-dependent has been refuted in a number 
of studies (for a more detailed discussion of this issue, the reader is referred to Hardy 
et aI., 1996a). 
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Catastrophe Models of Anxiety and Performance 
One of the major shortcomings of multidimensional anxiety theory identified 
by Hardy and his colleagues (Hardy, 1990; Hardy & Fazey, 1987; Hardy & Parfitt, 
1991) was that it attempts to explain the potentially complex four-dimensional 
relationship between cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and 
performance in a series of independent two-dimensional relationships. The cusp 
catastrophe model of anxiety and performance was developed and proposed by 
Hardy and associates as a result of their dissatisfaction with such explanations of 
anxiety-performance relationships. As catastrophe models are at least three-
dimensional in nature, they allow for the illustration of interactions between the 
anxiety components and performance. 
The cusp catastrophe model originally proposed by Hardy and Fazey (1987) 
illustrated a three-dimensional relationship between cognitive anxiety, physiological 
arousal, and performance (see Figure 2). In this model, cognitive anxiety is termed 
the splitting factor, and physiological arousal is termed the asymmetry (or normal) 
factor. The splitting factor (i.e., cognitive anxiety) determines whether the effect of 
the asymmetry factor (i.e., physiological arousal) will be smooth and small, large and 
catastrophic, or somewhere in between these two extremes. 
Performance 
t 
\ 
Cognitive 
Anxiety 
Figure 2. The Cusp Catastrophe Model. 
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The cusp catastrophe model predicts that increases in cognitive anxiety will be 
beneficial to performance under conditions of low physiological aro~ (see the left 
edge of Figure 2), but will be detrimental to performance under conditions of high 
physiological arousal (see the right edge of Figure 2). Also, under conditions of low 
cognitive anxiety, changes in physiological arousal should result in small and 
continuous changes in performance in the form of a mild inverted-U (see the back 
face of Figure 2). Under conditions of high cognitive anxiety, physiological arousal 
can either be facilitating or debilitating to performance, depending on the level of 
physiological arousal experienced (see the front face of Figure 2). Furthermore, 
under conditions of high cognitive anxiety, changes in physiological arousal can 
result in large and discontinuous changes in performance in the form of hysteresis. 
That is to say, the path that performance follows is different depending upon whether 
physiological arousal is increasing or decreasing (see Figure 3). Under these elevated 
levels of cognitive anxiety, when physiological arousal increases continually from a 
fairly low level, performance will also increase up to a point. However, if 
physiological arousal increases beyond this point, performance will suffer a large 
drop (i.e., a catastrophe). Once a catastrophe has occurred, a considerable reduction 
in physiological arousal is required before the upper performance surface can be 
regained. 
Performance 
Figure 3. Hysteresis 
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To date, apart from Hardy and his associates, researchers appear to have been fairly 
reticent in testing the catastrophe model of cognitive anxiety, physiological arousal, 
and performance. This may well be due to the perceived complexity of the model 
(Gill, 1994). However, as Hardy (1996b) stated, "complexity is an insufficient reason 
for rejecting any theory or model" (p. 140). Indeed, research in anxiety would not 
have advanced beyond the inverted-U hypothesis had it not been for theorists' 
challenging of simplistic conceptualisations of anxiety (Lacey, 1967; Martens et aI., 
1990; Neiss, 1988). In order to render research on the catastrophe model more 
readily accessible, Hardy (1996b) provided a number of ways of testing the various 
aspects of the model, notably: (a) methods that explore the interactive effects 
between cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal; (b) methods that explore the 
facilitative versus the debilitative effects of cognitive anxiety; (c) surface-fitting 
procedures; and (d) the examination of the frequency distributions of raw data. It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to explore each of these predictions in full and the 
interested reader is referred directly to Hardy (1996b). 
The research that has been conducted to date has generally provided some support 
for the cusp catastrophe model (e.g., Edwards & Hardy, 1996; Hardy, 1996a; Hardy 
& Parfitt, 1991; Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994; Krane, 1990; Woodman et aI., 1997). 
For example, Hardy and Parfitt (1991) found evidence for a hysteresis effect with a 
sample of basketball players. More specifically, they found that the relationship 
between physiological arousal (as measured by heart rate) and performance followed 
a mild inverted-U path under conditions of low cognitive anxiety (during training), 
but a hysteresis path under conditions of high cognitive anxiety (prior to an important 
match). Also, there is some fairly conclusive evidence for interactive effects between 
cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety/physiological arousal (Deffenbacher, 1977; 
Edwards & Hardy, 1996; Hardy et aI., 1994; Woodman et aI., 1997). However, the 
interactions revealed in these studies generally have not been in precisely the form 
predicted by the cusp catastrophe model originally proposed by Hardy and his 
colleagues. Furthermore, those studies that tested the hysteresis effect using direct 
physiological arousal measures (e.g., Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; Hardy et aI., 1994) 
manipulated heart rate by means of physical exercise rather than anxiety. To date 
there have been no studies that have investigated the catastrophe model by 
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manipulating anxiety-induced physiological arousal. This could be a serious 
limitation in the studies that have tested the hysteresis effect, as the mechanisms 
underlying exercise-induced physiological arousal could be quite different to those 
underlying anxiety-induced physiological symptoms. For example, in a study 
conducted by Williams, Taggart, and Carruthers (1978), rock climbers' levels of 
adrenaline were significantly higher after their climb than before. In contrast, there 
were no significant differences in noradrenaline levels before and after the climb. In 
the Williams et al. (1978) study, the climbs "required minimal physical effort, but 
they engendered considerable anxiety owing to the steepness of the rock face and its 
slippery nature caused by rain which continued all day" (p. 126). Considering that 
noradrenaline levels rise as a function of exercise (Wilmore & Costill, 1994), these 
results suggest that noradrenaline secretion differs depending upon whether the 
physiological response is triggered by anxiety or exercise. Thus, although anxiety-
induced physiological arousal might be similar to exercise-induced physiological 
arousal when measured by heart rate, the two states will likely differ when measured 
using other physiological indicators. 
There are two additional points about catastrophe models that are worth mentioning 
at this juncture. First, Hardy and associates' cusp catastrophe model of cognitive 
anxiety, physiological arousal, and performance is a model; it is not a theory. This 
distinction is important because the mechanisms via which cognitive anxiety and 
physiological arousal might interact in their effects upon performance are not 
explained in the model. Theories that might explain the mechanisms underlying 
anxiety-performance relationships and catastrophe models are discussed later (see 
section on Possible Explanations of how Anxiety Affects Performance). Second, the 
nature of catastrophe models is such that they can be rotated, stretched, or bent 
(although not tom) into a variety of different shapes and positions (Zeeman, 1976). It 
follows that the cusp catastrophe model originally presented by Hardy and Fazey 
(1987) reflects only one of a plethora of subtly different forms and shapes that a cusp 
catastrophe model might take. Consequently, it is unlikely to be the only catastrophe 
model of cognitive anxiety, physiological arousal and performance. For example, 
Hardy et al. (1994) suggested that, under certain conditions, the original model 
should be tilted either about the cognitive anxiety axis or the physiological arousal 
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axis. Also, Hardy (1996b) sunnised that the perfonnance surface might be tilted 
forward about the physiological arousal axis for tasks that require more fine motor 
control and touch (e.g., golf putting), but not so for tasks that require more anaerobic 
power (e.g., slam dunking in basketball). Of course, it is likely that individual 
differences will further moderate these models. If the model were tilted far enough 
forward, cognitive anxiety would be detrimental to perfonnance regardless of the 
level of physiological arousal. However, the crucial prediction of the models is that 
this debilitating effect should be greater under high levels of physiological arousal 
when compared to low levels of physiological arousal. 
As Hardy (1996b) has indicated, physiological arousal (rather than somatic anxiety) 
was an astute choice for the asymmetry factor in the catastrophe model. The rationale 
for this choice was that physiological arousal could exert both direct and indirect 
effects upon perfonnance, whereas somatic anxiety can exert only indirect effects. 
This is because somatic anxiety is simply the perception of one's physiological 
symptoms (cf. Morris et aI., 1981). Physiological arousal, on the other hand, can 
affect perfonnance both indirectly (i.e., through one's perception) and directly 
through changes in one's activation state (Hockey & Hamilton, 1983; Humphreys & 
Revelle, 1984; Parfitt et aI., 1990). For example, a gymnast might perceive himself to 
be fairly relaxed physically even though his muscular tension reflects a high level of 
physiological arousal. In such a case, the gymnast's pommel horse routine might 
suffer because of tight shoulders, even though, in tenns of somatic anxiety, he was 
not aware of this tightness, and thus might have reported a low level of somatic 
anxiety. Conversely, if somatic anxiety were used as the asymmetry factor then the 
underlying assumption would be that physiological arousal exerts no direct effects 
upon perfonnance. Only its perception is important. This does not fit at all well with 
our received view of the experiences of high-level perfonners. 
In support of the differentiation between somatic anxiety and physiological arousal, 
Van Lan and Gill (1984) and Karteroliotis and Gill (1987) found no relationship 
between somatic anxiety and physiological arousal as measured by heart rate and 
blood pressure. Furthennore, Parfitt, Hardy, and Pates (1995) found perfonnance on 
an anaerobic task to be more strongly related to physiological arousal than to somatic 
anxiety. Finally, research on individuals' perceptions of their bodily symptoms has 
shown that, unless trained to do so, people can be fairly poor at reading their own 
physiological symptoms to any degree of accuracy (e.g., Yamaji, Yokota, & 
Shephard, 1992). Consequently, it is important to consider both the potential direct 
and indirect effects of physiological arousal upon performance. 
Higher-order Catastrophe Models 
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Although the cusp catastrophe model is the most often cited, there exist 
higher-order catastrophe models of anxiety and performance. The most commonly 
used higher-order catastrophe model is the butterfly catastrophe (cf. Hardy, 1990; 
Zeeman, 1976). This higher-order catastrophe model allows for the incorporation of 
two further control dimensions: a bias factor and a butterfly factor. A detailed 
discussion of higher-order catastrophe models is beyond the scope of this chapter and 
the interested reader is referred directly to Hardy (1990) and Zeeman (1976). 
However, in essence, the addition of a bias factor to a cusp catastrophe model has the 
effect of swinging the front face of the model either to the right or to the left. Fazey 
and Hardy (1988) proposed that task difficulty might act as a bias factor. However, 
Hardy (1990) largely dismissed this proposal and proposed that self-confidence 
would form a better bias factor in a catastrophe model of anxiety and performance. 
According to this proposal, under high levels of cognitive anxiety, highly self-
confident performers might withstand higher levels of physiological arousal before 
suffering a sudden drop in performance than their less self-confident counterparts. 
Using Guastello's (1982) method of dynamic differences to test the catastrophe 
model's fit to putting performance data from eight golfers over 18 holes, Hardy 
(1996a) offered some empirical support for self-confidence acting as a bias factor. 
However, there is a clear need for further research that tests the proposition that self-
confidence might moderate the interactive effects of cognitive anxiety and 
physiological arousal upon performance. 
Although the cusp catastrophe model proposed by Hardy and his associates accounts 
for some of the inconsistencies in the research, it does not offer any theoretical 
explanation for the interactive effects of cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal 
on performance. For example, why does cognitive anxiety sometimes have a positive 
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effect upon perfonnance? Why do perfonners sometimes suffer dramatic drops in 
perfonnance when they are cognitively anxious? It is important for researchers to 
address such questions if further understanding is to be achieved with respect to the 
mechanisms underlying anxiety-perfonnance relationships. 
In summary, research to date generally provides support for an interaction between 
cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety (or physiological arousal). Also, there is 
encouraging support for the notion of hysteresis under high levels of cognitive 
anxiety. However, there are a number of issues that need addressing with regard to 
catastrophe models of anxiety and perfonnance. These include clarifications of: (a) 
the interaction between cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal; (b) the possible 
mediating and moderating variables within catastrophe models; and (c) the 
importance of differentiating between anxiety-induced physiological arousal and 
exercise-induced physiological arousal in tests of the hysteresis effect. Despite these 
limitations, at present, Hardy and associates' catastrophe models are the only models 
of anxiety and perfonnance that predict an interaction between cognitive anxiety and 
physiological arousal and, as such, appear worthy of further investigation. 
Reversal Theory 
Multidimensional anxiety theory (Martens et aI., 1990) proposes that the 
relationship between somatic anxiety and perfonnance is in the fonn of an inverted-
U. As such, high levels of perceived physiological arousal are always associated with 
poor perfonnance. Other theories suggest that high somatic anxiety might not always 
be perceived as detrimental. Reversal theory (Apter, 1982; Kerr, 1990) is one such 
theory. Reversal theory is based upon the concept of "metamotivational states." A 
metamotivational state is a "phenomenological state which is characterized by a 
certain way of interpreting some aspect(s) of one's own motivation." (Kerr, 1990, p. 
129). Reversal theory postulates that there are four possible pairs of 
"metamotivational states." These are telic-paratelic, negativism-confonnity, autic-
alloic, and sympathy-mastery. The telic-paratelic pair has received the most attention 
within a sporting context. In a telic state (i.e., a state in which individuals are goal-
oriented and express purpose), individuals tend to be fairly serious with a preference 
for low arousal. Conversely, in a paratelic state (i.e., a state in which individuals are 
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oriented toward the sensations associated with their behaviour), individuals tend to 
be fairly spontaneous with a preference for high arousal. According to reversal 
theory (e.g., Kerr, 1990), if perfonners are in a telic state, they will interpret high 
physiological arousal as anxiety; if they are in a paratelic state, they will experience 
high physiological arousal as excitement. 
Reversal theory further posits that perfonners can rapidly change (reverse) from one 
metamotivational state to another. Consequently, a perfonner in a telic state who is 
experiencing a high level of arousal as unpleasant (anxiety) might suddenly change 
to a paratelic state and perceive this high level of arousal as pleasant (excitement). In 
reversal theory, this perceived pleasure is known as "hedonic tone". Thus, one's 
hedonic tone can be either pleasant (i.e., perceiving a low level of arousal as 
relaxation and a high level of arousal as excitement) or unpleasant (i.e., perceiving a 
low level of arousal as boredom and a high level of arousal as anxiety). Despite its 
intuitive appeal, the application of reversal theory to sport has been limited by its 
lack of hypothesized relationships with perfonnance. Recent research by Kerr and 
associates (Kerr, Yoshida, Hirata, Takai, & Yamazaki, 1997; Males, Kerr, & 
Gerkovich, 1998) has started to address this limitation. For example, Kerr et al. 
(1997) investigated the effects of the different combinations of meta motivational 
states (telic or paratelic) and felt arousal (high or low) on archery perfonnance. Kerr 
et al. hypothesized that the combined high hedonic tone group (telic-low, paratelic-
high) would perfonn better than the combined low hedonic tone group (telic-low, 
paratelic-high). That is to say, the archers who perceived their arousal (low or high) 
as pleasant were hypothesized to perfonn better than those archers who perceived 
their arousal as unpleasant. Although this hypothesis was not supported, the study 
does offer a method for examining the effects of hedonic tone on perfonnance. 
However, the question still remains: Why should hedonic tone affect perfonnance? 
Indeed, there does not appear to be an obvious theoretical reason for proposing that 
pleasant feelings about one's level of physiological arousal should lead to better 
perfonnance. 
In summary, although the notion of reversals is interesting, reversal theory has been 
limited by its lack of theory in relation to perfonnance. Although recent studies have 
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begun to investigate the relationships between metamotivational states, hedonic tone, 
and performance, the theoretical rationale for this relationship remains unclear. As 
such, reversal theory does not offer a great deal in terms of explaining how and why 
anxiety might affect motor performance. 
Interpretation of Anxiety States 
The proposition that anxiety can be perceived as facilitating is not new. 
Indeed, as early as 1960 in the test anxiety literature, such effects were brought to 
light by Alpert and Haber. Whereas other anxiety instruments measured the 
debilitating component of anxiety, the Achievement Anxiety Test (AAT) introduced 
by Alpert and Haber (1960) measured a facilitating component of anxiety as well as 
a debilitating component of anxiety. This distinction resulted in two fairly simple 
predictions: students with high debilitating anxiety were expected to do poorly in an 
examination setting and students with high facilitating anxiety were expected to do 
well in an examination setting. Alpert and Haber (1960) provided support for this 
prediction with a significant negative correlation between debilitating test anxiety 
and grade point average (GP A) and a significant positive correlation between 
facilitating test anxiety and GP A. In a subsequent examination of the factor structure 
of Alpert and Haber's measure, Couch; Garber, and Turner (1983) found that 
facilitative and debilitative factors could be distinguished for both males and 
females. In this study, Couch et al. revealed that a combined measure of facilitating 
and debilitating test anxiety was a better predictor of GP A than either measure of test 
anxiety alone. 
In the sport psychology literature, Mahoney and Avener (1977) were the first to 
report that performers could interpret their anxiety in different ways. In their study of 
gymnasts, Mahoney and A vener found that the more successful gymnasts (those who 
qualified for the 1976 US Olympic team) tended "to 'use' their anxiety as a stimulant 
to better performance." (p. 140). Conversely, those gymnasts who were less 
successful (those who did not qualify for the Olympic team) seemed "to arouse 
themselves into near-panic states" (Mahoney & Avener, 1977, p. 140). 
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Following research conducted in test anxiety and Mahoney and Avener's (1977) 
observations with gymnasts, Jones and his colleagues (Jones, 1991; Jones & Swain, 
1992) developed the notion of "directional interpretation of anxiety" in sport 
psychology. Jones' (1995) subsequent model of facilitative and debilitative 
competitive anxiety (see Figure 4) was largely based on Carver and Scheier's (1988) 
control model of anxiety, which predicted that perceived control over coping and 
goal attainment was an important mediator of anxiety interpretation. More 
specifically, in Jones' model, anxiety is interpreted as facilitative when expectations 
of control are positive, and as debilitative when expectations of control are negative. 
~ 
i.e. positive expectancies of 
(a) ability to cope 
(b) goal attainment 
~ 
SYMPTOMS 
interpreted as 
FACILITATIVE 
STRESSOR 
CONTROL? 
INDIVIDUAL 
DIFFERENCES 
i.e. negative expectancies of 
(a) ability to cope 
(b) goal attainment 
SYMPTOMS 
interpreted as 
DEBILITATIVE 
Figure 4. A model of facilitative and debilitative competitive anxiety (Jones, 1995) 
In order to measure directional interpretation, Jones and Swain (1992) modified 
Martens et al.'s (1990) CSAI-2 to include a direction scale next to each of the 27 
items. Thus, in this modified version of the CSAI-2, performers are asked to respond 
to their experience of each symptom in the normal fashion from 1 (not at all) to 4 
(very much so). After each response, performers are asked to rate the perceived effect 
of this feeling on an interpretation scale from -3 (very debilitative) to +3 (very 
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facilitative). For example, a performer might respond with a maximum score of 4 to 
the statement "I am concerned about this competition", indicating that she is very 
concerned about the pending competition. If this performer then rates this concern as 
+3 on the interpretation scale, she is essentially saying that she feels that this concern 
is likely to have a beneficial effect on her upcoming performance. 
Using this modified scale, Jones and his colleagues have demonstrated the need to 
differentiate between performers' perceived level of anxiety ("intensity") and the 
concomitant interpretation of these symptoms ("direction"). For example, Jones, 
Swain, and Hardy (1993) reported no significant differences between high-
performance and low-performance gymnasts for cognitive anxiety intensity, somatic 
anxiety intensity, and somatic anxiety direction scores. However, the high-
performance gymnasts' cognitive anxiety was more facilitative than their low-
performance counterparts'. Similarly, although Jones et al. (1994) found no 
significant differences between elite and non-elite swimmers for anxiety intensity, 
the elite swimmers reported both their cognitive anxiety and their somatic anxiety to 
be more facilitative than the non-elite swimmers. This finding is similar to that of 
Perry and Williams (1998) who administered the modified CSAI-2 to advanced, 
intermediate, and novice tennis players. Consistent with Jones et al.'s (1994) results, 
the advanced players reported significantly more positive interpretations for 
cognitive and somatic anxiety than their intermediate and novice counterparts. 
Finally, in attempting to predict basketball performance, Swain and Jones (1996) 
found direction scores to be better predictors of performance than intensity scores for 
both anxiety components. 
Other studies of the antecedents and pre-competition temporal patterning of anxiety 
intensity and direction have also supported the need to differentiate between intensity 
and direction dimensions of anxiety (e.g., Lane, Terry, & Karageorghis, 1995; 
Wiggins, 1998). For example, in Lane et al.'s (1995) path analysis of the antecedents 
of anxiety, state anxiety responses, and triathlon performance, the antecedents of 
anxiety intensity and anxiety direction were determined to be different. More 
specifically, anxiety intensity was predicted by perceived readiness and perceived 
difficulty of race goals, whereas anxiety direction was predicted by perceived 
readiness, coach's influence, and recent form. 
In addition to the interpretations of anxiety, the frequency with which performers 
experience anxiety symptoms has received research interest, albeit to a far lesser 
extent. For example, Swain and Jones (1993) observed that, although cognitive 
anxiety remained stable throughout the pre-competition period in accordance with 
past research (e.g., Jones & Cale, 1989; Parfitt & Hardy, 1987), cognitive anxiety 
symptoms were experienced progressively more frequently as the competition 
approached. 
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Taken together, the findings to date regarding the interpretation of anxiety imply that 
the intensity-alone approach to anxiety-performance relationships in sport is likely to 
be limiting when attempting to account for larger proportions of performance 
variance. It follows from this research that anxiety researchers should employ 
intensity, interpretation, and frequency paradigms in order to investigate the 
mechanisms underlying anxiety-performance relationships. 
11easurementIssues 
As indicated earlier, early research in competitive anxiety used 
unidimensional measures of pre-competitive anxiety. Such measures typically 
developed from Spielberger et aI.'s (1970) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). For 
example, from the state anxiety component of the STAI, 11artens et aI. (1980) 
developed the CSAI. However, as anxiety theorists (e.g., Davidson & Schwartz, 
1976; Liebert & 11orris, 1967) had already started to conceptualise anxiety as a 
multidimensional construct, the CSAI was soon superseded by the CSAI-2 (11artens 
et aI., 1990). Although some researchers continue to argue that anxiety is best 
measured as a unidimensional construct (e.g., Landers, 1994), most theorists accept 
that anxiety contains at least a cognitive and a physiological component. 
Consequently, since 1983 (when 11artens et aI., 1990, originally constructed the 
CSAI-2), research in competitive anxiety has largely employed the CSAI-2 as a 
measure of cognitive and somatic anxiety. In this section the CSAI-2 will be 
discussed in some depth, perhaps to the partial detriment of other measures. There 
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are two main reasons for this. First, although other measures of competitive anxiety 
in sport do exist, the CSAI-2 (Martens et aI., 1990) has been, and continues to be, the 
choice of predilection for most researchers with an interest in competitive state 
anxiety. Second, almost all of the issues associated with the CSAI-2 that will be 
discussed in this section apply equally well to other measures. 
The CSAI-2 (Martens et aI., 1990) was developed as a measure of cognitive anxiety, 
somatic anxiety, and self-confidence. As mentioned previously, Jones and Swain 
(1992) modified the original CSAI-2 to include a "direction" scale, whereby 
performers are asked to rate how debilitating or facilitating they perceive their 
anxiety symptoms to be. The terminology given to this debilitation-facilitation 
continuum has varied between "direction", "interpretation", and "directional 
interpretation". Regardless of the terminology employed, this scale was designed to 
measure the extent to which an individual perceives that hislher state anxiety is either 
debilitating or facilitating to subsequent performance. Since the development of the 
modified CSAI-2, there has been an increasing interest in the concept of "facilitative 
anxiety" (e.g., Burton & Naylor, 1997; Hardy, 1997; Jones et aI., 1994). Indeed, 
many studies have revealed that directional interpretation of anxiety symptoms is a 
better predictor of performance than measures of anxiety "intensity". With respect to 
understanding the effects of anxiety upon performance, there are two fundamental 
questions here. First, can anxiety facilitate performance? Second, does the CSAI-2 
measure cognitive anxiety or some other construct? These two questions will be 
addressed in the next few paragraphs. 
The question "is cognitive anxiety really facilitative?" was the title of a recent article 
by Burton and Naylor (1997). This question formed the basis of a reaction to Hardy's 
(1997) proposal that cognitive anxiety is not always detrimental to performance. In 
line with Jones et aI. (1994), Burton and Naylor (1997) argued that "anxiety" 
symptoms that are perceived as being facilitative are unlikely to be labelled as 
anxiety at all. Indeed, it seems perfectly plausible that a performer who is 
experiencing facilitative anxiety might also feel self-confident for example. 
However, Burton and Naylor (1997) stated that: 
... the challenge confronting anxiety researchers is to develop a 
conceptually more explicit definition of anxiety that separates 
negative affective states (e.g., anxiety) that have debilitating effects 
on performance from positive affective states (e.g., challenge, 
excitement or self-confidence) that facilitate performance. (p. 299) 
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Herein lies an assumption that seemingly has come to be accepted as self-evident. 
That is, a negative emotion will always have a negative effect upon performance. 
The question remains: Why should a negative emotion always have a negative effect 
upon performance? Also, why should a positive emotion always have a positive 
effect upon performance? In fact, Gould et al.'s (1987) study with pistol shooters 
revealed a significant negative correlation between self-confidence and pistol 
shooting performance, thus providing evidence that a positive emotion (i.e., self-
confidence) can, in fact, be negatively related to performance. As the present 
chapter's focus is on anxiety, the assumption that anxiety will always have a negative 
effect upon on performance will be discussed in more detail here. 
In justifying the hypothesized negative relationship between cognitive anxiety and 
performance, Martens et al. (1990) used an explanation based on reduced attentional 
resources (e.g., Wine, 1971). That is, a performer who is worried will use up 
valuable resources that would otherwise be directed towards the task at hand. 
Although this is a reasonable theoretical standpoint for predicting that cognitive 
anxiety will have a negative effect upon performance, there is empirical evidence 
that contradicts it. For example, Hardy and Parfitt (1991) found that basketball 
players' best performance was significantly better, and their worst performance 
significantly worse, when they were cognitively anxious than when they were not. 
Hardy et al. (1994) replicated this finding with crown green bowlers. These results 
provide evidence that a negative emotion (e.g., cognitive anxiety) can have a positive 
relationship with performance. In summary, it appears that a negative emotion does 
not, perforce, debilitate performance. In addition to the studies conducted by Hardy 
and associates, other theories suggest that a negative emotion (e.g., cognitive 
anxiety) might sometimes have a positive influence upon performance. One such 
theory is processing efficiency theory (Eysenck, 1992), which will be discussed later 
(see section entitled Processing Efficiency Theory). 
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A second issue that competitive anxiety researchers need to address is the 
measurement of pre-competition anxiety using the CSAI-2. It is fairly clear from the 
research discussed earlier that performers can interpret statements in the CSAI-2 
quite differently. If this is the case, one has to call into question the construct validity 
of the CSAI-2. In other words, does the CSAI-2 measure what it purports to measure 
or is it possible for two different performers with different cognitive states to report 
the same values? To illustrate this point, let us consider two performers, Performer A 
and Performer B. If Performer A scores 25 (out of a possible 36) on the cognitive 
anxiety subscale and feels worried beyond repair, she is likely to be feeling rather 
differently to Performer B who also scores 25 on the cognitive anxiety subscale and 
yet feels excited about her upcoming event. It is interesting to note that, of the three 
CSAI-2 subscales, it is the cognitive anxiety subscale that has revealed the most 
consistent differentiation between "intensity" and "direction" (cf. Jones et aI., 1993). 
This might well be an artefact of the terminology used for the cognitive anxiety 
statements in the inventory. Indeed, 8 of the 9 cognitive anxiety statements have the 
prefix "I am concerned" or "I'm concerned". It could be argued that "concern" is not 
necessarily a reflection of worry or cognitive anxiety, but rather a perception of the 
importance of the upcoming event. This feature was highlighted in a study conducted 
by Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, and Plake (1986). In their study of college swimmers, 
Barnes et ai. felt obliged to remove the first item from the CSAI-2 because of the 
confusion it created amongst the swimmers. Indeed, the statement "I am concerned 
about this competition" was interpreted in one of two ways: 
1) the swimmer thought it was asking ifhe was worried about the 
competition, or 
2) the swimmer thought it [w]as asking if the event was important to 
him (Barnes et aI., 1986, p. 368). 
It is fairly clear that other statements in the CSAI-2 could as easily be differentially 
interpreted. For example, the statement "I am concerned about reaching my goal" is 
open to the same kind of interpretation. Indeed, Athlete A might interpret this 
statement as, "I am so worried that I will not achieve my goal that I cannot stop 
thinking about failing". Athlete B might interpret the same statement as "I am 
worried about not doing very well in this competition, so I had better get myself up 
for it right now". Athlete C might interpret the same statement as "I have worked 
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really hard to achieve this goal and it means a lot to me". Clearly, the same statement 
can be interpreted quite differently. 
There are two main issues here. First, it is clear that statements in the CSAI-2 can be 
interpreted ambiguously to the point that they might, at times, not be measuring 
anxiety at all. It follows that the construct validity of the inventory as one purporting 
to measure "anxiety" needs further investigation. Second, if one considers the 
interpretations of Athlete A and Athlete B, one can see that seemingly similar 
anxiety states can be interpreted quite differently. These interpretations are not 
dissimilar to those revealed by Mahoney and Avener (1977). The first interpretation 
(Athlete A) is one of impending failure whereas the second interpretation (Athlete B) 
is one that reflects a degree of perceived readiness. In light of the latter 
interpretation, a possible reply to Burton and Naylor's (1997) question "Is anxiety 
really facilitative?" is "Yes, for some people, sometimes". 
Furthermore, as Hardy (1997) pointed out, there is much anecdotal evidence of 
people performing incredible feats under extremely threatening circumstances. For 
example, there are accounts of mothers exhibiting extreme strength in their attempt 
to save their baby's life. In a sport context, the following quote from Hemery (1976), 
an Olympic athlete, illustrates how performers can perform exceptionally well (i.e., 
breaking a World record) even when they are under extreme pressure: 
Standing behind my blocks, I put my hands on my knees and tried to 
take as deep a breath as I could. I could not completely fill my lungs. 
There was a cold constriction between my stomach and my throat. My 
mouth and throat were dry, it was impossible to swallow ... I wished I 
could be anywhere else. Why was I doing this anyway? I had never 
before felt such dreadful pressure. I walked forward to put my hands 
on the track in front of my blocks. Take your marks! No turning back. 
I kicked each leg out and placed it against the block. Still I felt weak. 
Did I feel ready to run the fastest quarter of my life? I was not sure ... 
(David Hemery prior to his World Record and Olympic winning 400-
metre Hurdles run at the Mexico Olympics in 1968; p. 4) 
Other issues with the CSAI-2 appear to warrant further investigation. Indeed, the 
items that were originally chosen by Martens et al. (1990) might not reflect the most 
important aspects of pre-competition anxiety for some athletes. For example, 
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whereas the statement "I have self-doubts" might reflect a particular athlete's worry 
about her upcoming competition, the statement "I am concerned about losing" might 
not appear relevant, particularly for some female athletes (cf. Jones et aI., 1991). 
Similarly, whereas the statement "My heart is racing" might reflect one athlete's 
somatic anxiety, the statement "I feel jittery" might not appear a relevant statement. 
If athletes can interpret their scores on these items as reflecting different states, then 
measurements of pre-competition anxiety utilizing the CSAI-2 are unlikely to 
account for large proportions of performance variance. For example, a 100-metre 
sprinter is likely to respond somewhat more calmly than a gymnast or a rock climber 
to a high score on the statement "My hands are clammy" because the consequences 
of having clammy hands are not the same for these individuals. Indeed, whereas 
"clammy hands" are not likely to (directly) affect a sprinter's performance to a great 
extent, they might well affect a gymnast's or a climber's performance. Such possible 
differences suggest a need for the development of anxiety measures that are specific 
to particular sports if not particular individuals. Furthermore, in light of the fairly 
modest proportion of performance variance accounted for in most anxiety studies, 
Gould and Udry (1994) called for researchers to consider a wider range of emotions 
in order to better understand the relation between different emotions and 
performance. However, apart from IZOF studies (e.g., Hanin & Syrja, 1995a, 
1995b), research in this area has not been particularly forthcoming. 
A recent confirmatory factor analysis of the CSAI-2 (Lane, Sewell, Terry, Bartram, 
& Nesti, 1999) has questioned its structural validity. Lane et aI. split their sample of 
1213 athletes into two samples. The results of Lane et aI.'s analyses revealed that all 
fit indices for the original CSAI-2 model were below the thresholds for acceptable 
fit; this was the case for both samples. For example, the Robust Comparative Fit 
Indices (RCFI) were 0.82 and 0.84 for the two samples. As a result of this 
confirmatory factor analysis, Lane et aI. (1999) concluded that, " ... investigators of 
anxiety responses to sport competition cannot have faith in data obtained using the 
CSAI -2 until further validation studies have been completed and possible 
refinements to the inventory have been made" (p. 511). In light of the results 
obtained by Lane et aI., this conclusion certainly seems reasonable. 
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In summary, although many researchers appear to believe that cognitive anxiety 
necessarily has a debilitating effect upon performance, research suggests that this 
assumption may be misleading. Also, in light of past research, the construct validity 
of the CSAI-2 (in particular the cognitive anxiety measure) has been questioned here. 
The arguments presented here have been strengthened by the results of a recent 
confirmatory factor analysis of the CSAI-2 revealing its relatively weak factor 
structure. Finally, researchers might need to investigate other emotions in order to 
account for larger percentages of performance variance in a sporting context. 
How Anxiety Affects Performance: Possible Explanations 
Humphreys and Revelle's Information Processing Model 
Humphreys and Revelle's (1984) information processing model is an attempt 
to explain the relationship between personality, stress, and performance. More 
specifically, the model proposes that performance (at the level of information 
processing) is predicted by the combined effects of: selected personality dimensions 
(i.e., achievement motivation, trait anxiety, and impulsivity); situational moderators 
(i.e., stressors); and motivational states (i.e., approach motivation, avoidance 
motivation). The model integrates two systems, termed arousal and on-task effort. 
Humphreys and Revelle (1984) used the notion of arousal as " ... a conceptual 
dimension defined as that factor common to various indicants of alertness" (p. 158). 
This is essentially a unidimensional view of arousal similar to that of Duffy (1962). 
Rather than simply "trying hard," on-task effort was defined by Humphreys and 
Revelle (1984) as the allocation of available resources to the task at hand. Although 
Humphreys and Revelle's definition of arousal could be viewed as simplistic, their 
model is included here as it was the first explicitly to include personality, 
motivational, situational, and cognitive variables in a single arousal model. A 
simplified version of Humphreys and Revelle's (1984) model is illustrated in Figure 
5. A detailed discussion of this model would be beyond the scope of this chapter and 
only its central features are discussed here. For a more in-depth discussion of the 
model, the reader is referred either directly to Humphreys and Revelle (1984) or to 
Jones and Hardy (1989) and Jones (1990). 
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Humphreys and Revelle's (1984) model attempts to predict performance on two 
types of task: sustained information transfer (SIT) tasks and short-term memory 
(STM) tasks. SIT tasks involve rapid throughput of information with no attempt at 
retaining this information in memory (e.g., a net rally in tennis). STM tasks require 
information either to be maintained in an available state or to be retrieved when it has 
not been attended to for a short while (e.g., deciding which serve to deliver next in a 
tennis match). One of the major predictions of the model is that performance on these 
two tasks is differentially affected by arousal. Performance on SIT tasks is predicted 
to be a monotonically increasing function of arousal (i.e., the greater the level of 
arousal, the better the performance), whereas performance on STM tasks is predicted 
to be a monotonically decreasing function of arousal (i.e., the greater the level of 
arousal, the poorer the performance). In this way, performance may either be 
enhanced or impaired by arousal, depending on the nature of the task. For example, 
increased arousal might affect tennis performance in different ways depending on the 
demands of the task and different points in the match. If the rally were predominantly 
a fast exchange of volleys at the net, requiring rapid throughput of information, then 
increased arousal would likely help the tennis player. However, if the player were 
serving a second serve, she might have to recall a number of aspects from previous 
returns of serve. As such a task is more dependent on short-term memory, higher 
levels of arousal will more likely be detrimental to performance. Of course, if a task 
contained elements of both SIT and STM, then arousal could either enhance or 
impair performance, possibly accounting for an inverted-U relationship between 
arousal and performance (Humphreys & Revelle, 1984). 
Despite Humphreys and Revelle's (1984) commendable attempt to move beyond 
theories that emphasize the role of worry, their model has three main limitations. 
First, the model adopts a unidimensional view of arousal whereas most researchers 
would accept that arousal comprises at least two components (e.g., Hardy et aI., 
1996a; Pribram & McGuinness, 1975). Second, there is no differentiation between 
arousal and activation (see earlier section on state anxiety and performance). Third, 
the database of knowledge gleaned from research is as yet insufficient to sustain such 
a complex model of interactions between personality variables and task 
characteristics (Eysenck, 1986). 
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In summary, Humphreys and Revelle's (1984) model of information processing 
attempts to explain the relationship between personality, stress, and performance. 
Information processing performance is viewed as comprising the two components of 
sustained information transfer (SIT) and short-term memory (STM). Arousal and on-
task effort comprise two systems within the model that differentially affect 
performance. Arousal is hypothesized to help performance on SIT tasks and to 
impair performance on STM tasks. With its dual-system approach, Humphreys and 
Revelle's (1984) information processing model is quite possibly an advance over 
theories that emphasize worry to the exclusion of other systems. However, the model 
has a number of limitations, particularly the limited database upon which such 
complex interactions might be based. 
Processing Efficiency Theory 
After the initial work ofEysenck (1979, 1982, 1983, 1986), Eysenck and 
Calvo (1992) proposed their processing efficiency theory. Although processing 
efficiency theory was developed in cognitive psychology, it may have important 
relevance for sport psychology. The theory emerged from Eysenck's dissatisfaction 
with theorists' simplistic conceptualisation of anxiety-performance relationships. In 
essence, most anxiety theories are based on anxiety-induced cognitive interference, 
such that anxiety uses up attentional resources. These theories typically predict that 
high-anxious individuals will perform less well than low-anxious individuals (e.g., 
Deffenbacher, 1980; Easterbrook, 1959; Mandler & Sarason, 1952; Sarason, 1984, 
1988). Eysenck (1992) argued that such theories are limited because they exaggerate 
the effects of self-preoccupation and worry. Indeed, Eysenck cited numerous studies 
in which high-anxious individuals did not perform less well than low-anxious 
individuals (e.g., Blankstein, Flett, Boase, & Toner, 1990; Blankstein, Toner, & Flett, 
1989; Calvo, Alamo, & Ramos, 1990; Calvo & Ramos, 1989). For example, 
Blankstein et al. (1989) found support for the notion that high-anxious individuals 
have more negative thoughts about themselves than low-anxious individuals. 
However, no differences were noted between high-anxious and low-anxious 
individuals in performance on an anagram task. 
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Eysenck (1992) argued that cognitive anxiety serves two principal functions. First, 
consistent with cognitive interference theories, worry will consume some of the 
individual's attentional resources, such that the attentional capacity for the task will 
be reduced. Second, worry signals the importance of the task to the individual and, as 
such, serves a monitoring function. In this way, anxious individuals will invest more 
effort if they perceive their performance to be below their expectations. However, 
Eysenck (1982) argued that this increase in effort would occur only when individuals 
perceive that they have at least a moderate probability of succeeding. In other words, 
ifperformers are reasonably confident, they will invest more effort in the task when 
their anxiety increases. Therefore, processing efficiency theory states that cognitive 
anxiety (a negative emotion) can have a negative cognitive effect (reduced 
attentional capacity) whilst serving a positive motivational function (increased 
effort). 
In processing efficiency theory (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), an 
important distinction is made between processing efficiency and performance 
effectiveness. Processing efficiency is the efficiency with which information is 
processed. Performance effectiveness is, in essence, the quality of performance. 
Consequently, increases in anxiety will likely result in a decrease in processing 
efficiency because of the extra effort invested in performance and the reduced 
attentional resources. However, performance effectiveness could be maintained or 
improved as a result of this extra effort, or it could be impaired despite this extra 
effort. 
As cognitive anxiety is hypothesized to tax working memory, the effects of elevated 
anxiety are likely to be fairly positive if the task does not overwhelm working 
memory. However, if the task is cognitively demanding, then performance may be 
impaired by elevated anxiety due to the limited remaining resources available for the 
task at hand. Research on processing efficiency theory has generally been supportive 
of its predictions using various procedures to tax working memory. For example, 
Eysenck (1985) used a letter transformation task to manipulate task difficulty. In 
these tasks, participants are asked to transfer a series of letters into another series of 
letters by converting the letters by a certain amount. For example, a participant might 
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be asked to add 4 to the series ADG. The correct answer would then be EHK (A+4, 
D+4, G+4). When Eysenck (1985) increased the number of letters to be transformed, 
he found no differences between high-anxious and low-anxious individuals on 
performance when the task was fairly simple (one or two letters). However, a 
significant interaction indicated that the differences in performance between the two 
groups increased as a function of task difficulty. That is to say, the high-anxious 
individuals' performance was increasingly worse than their low-anxious counterparts 
as task difficulty increased. As processing efficiency theory predicts that 
performance impairment is caused by overloads to working memory, it follows that 
the performance of tasks that do not tax working memory to any great extent will not 
be affected by anxiety because performers can increase their effort to maintain or 
improve performance. However, if the cognitive demand is beyond a certain 
threshold, performers will lose confidence in being able to achieve the task, effort 
will likely be withdrawn, and performance will suffer. 
Although processing efficiency theory emanated from cognitive psychology, its 
central tenets appear particularly relevant to some of the seemingly conflicting 
findings in competitive anxiety research, particularly the negative and positive 
effects of cognitive anxiety. Despite its natural extension from other theories in 
cognitive psychology (e.g., Wine's, 1971, theory of attention and interference), 
processing efficiency theory differs considerably in its dual-system approach. Indeed, 
rather than viewing the cognitive system as one passive mechanism (i.e., less 
cognitive resources = poorer performance), it allows for a positive moderating 
influence (i.e., effort) that might attenuate the negative effects of reduced resources. 
Although Martens et aI.' s (1990) multidimensional anxiety theory does not allow for 
any such compensatory mechanisms, Hardy and associates' cusp catastrophe model 
(Hardy, 1990, 1996b; Hardy & Fazey, 1987; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991) appears to fit 
well into a processing efficiency theory framework. For example, consider the 
proposed hysteresis effect illustrated earlier (see Figure 3). Under conditions of high 
worry (cognitive anxiety), the cusp catastrophe model proposes that increases in 
physiological arousal will result in increases in performance up to some optimal 
point beyond which further increases in physiological arousal will result in a 
dramatic drop in performance. In processing efficiency theory, individuals are 
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predicted to monitor their performance and when performers are anxious they are 
expected to respond to the possibility of unsatisfactory performance with increases in 
effort in order to maintain performance effectiveness (at the cost of processing 
efficiency). However, if the performance demands are beyond a certain threshold, the 
anxious individual will likely perceive the task demands to be too great, lose 
confidence, and withdraw effort. A withdrawal of effort is likely to be accompanied 
by a significant drop in performance as reflected in the cusp catastrophe model under 
conditions of high cognitive anxiety. 
It is worth giving further consideration to the role that self-confidence and 
expectancies of success might play in processing efficiency theory. For example, 
Carver and Scheier (1988) suggested that anxiety would enhance performance when 
people are able to maintain a favourable expectancy regarding goal attainment. Also, 
Hardy (1990, 1996b) suggested that self-confidence might playa buffering role in 
protecting performers against the potential debilitating effects of elevated cognitive 
anxiety. For example, Hardy (1996b) postulated that high self-confidence might 
result in the front face of the catastrophe model shifting toward the right. The result 
of such a shift would result in higher levels of physiological arousal being tolerated 
before a dramatic drop in performance occurred. Similarly, Hardy (1996b) proposed 
that low levels of self-confidence would result in the front face of the model shifting 
toward the left, such that only fairly low levels of physiological arousal could be 
tolerated before a dramatic drop in performance occurred. If these propositions, in 
the context of processing efficiency theory, are combined, it is quite conceivable that 
anxious performers who are self-confident (and therefore have favourable goal 
attainment expectancies) will increase their effort for a longer period of time in their 
attempt at achieving their goal. This proposition seems to concord with anecdotal 
reports of athletes performing exceptionally well under conditions of extreme 
pressure (e.g., breaking world records at major international events). Conversely, 
anxious performers with relatively low levels of self-confidence are more likely to 
withdraw their effort and "give up". If such a proposition were supported, then one 
would expect highly self-confident performers to exert more effort under conditions 
of elevated cognitive anxiety. This would result in enhanced performance under 
conditions of high (i.e., "higher than normal") cognitive anxiety, but impaired 
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perfonnance if perfonners lost their self-confidence because task conditions changed 
(cf. Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; Hardy et aI., 1994). Based on these propositions, 
exploration of the interaction between cognitive anxiety, effort, and self-confidence 
appears likely to be a fruitful area for future research. 
The majority of research on processing efficiency theory has been conducted in 
laboratory settings using test anxiety measures such as Spielberger et aI.'s (1970) 
STAI. As such, it would be crude to suggest that findings from test anxiety research 
could be applied en bloc to a competitive sport context. However, more recent 
research within a sport environment has also lent credence to processing efficiency 
theory. Hardy and Jackson's (1996) examination of rock climbers is one such 
example. In this study, experienced rock climbers led and seconded high and low 
anxiety rock climbs3. Climbers perfonned better and exerted more cognitive and 
physiological effort when they were cognitively anxious (leading) compared to when 
they were not cognitively anxious (seconding). In another study, with golfers, 
Mullen, Hardy, and Tattersall (1999) also found more effort was exerted when 
perfonners were anxious in a golf-putting task. Interestingly, Mullen et aI.'s study 
did not reveal any significant changes in golf putting perfonnance. Golf putting 
differs from rock climbing in that a golfer is not required to react to a changing 
environment, whereas a rock climber constantly has to make important decisions 
with respect to the changing nature of the climb as it evolves, including the risk of 
injury. In view of the likely different demands on working memory, it is possible that 
a contrived golf putting task will not tax working memory as much as rock climbing. 
Consequently, the stakes might have to be perceived as very high before anxiety 
significantly affects perfonnance. Australian golfer Greg Nonnan's demise4 at the 
1996 Masters is a case where such conditions might apply. 
In summary, processing efficiency theory overcomes the shortcomings of many 
previous theories of anxiety and perfonnance by incorporating a monitoring system, 
whereby anxious individuals will invest more effort if they perceive their 
3 When rock climbers lead a climb, they run the risk of serious injury. When climbers second a climb, 
the technical difficulty remains the same but the risk is largely removed. 
4 Greg Norman had a 6-shot lead going into the fmal round of the 1996 Masters; he eventually lost by 
5. 
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performance to be threatened and they are reasonably confident of achieving their 
goal. A distinction is made between processing efficiency and performance 
effectiveness, such that an increase in effort will allow an individual to maintain 
performance effectiveness albeit at a cost in terms of processing efficiency. 
Processing efficiency theory has received support in test anxiety. Also, recent 
research within a sporting environment suggests that processing efficiency theory 
may be applicable in competitive anxiety research, particularly in those sports that 
tax working memory. However, because of the obvious differences between test 
anxiety and competitive anxiety in sport, further research examining the theory 
within a sporting context is much needed. Processing efficiency theory appears to 
dovetail rather well with catastrophe models, particularly with respect to the role that 
self-confidence might play in buffering the debilitating effects of elevated cognitive 
anxiety. As such, self-confidence might allow anxious individuals to invest more 
effort in their performance due to their elevated anxiety. Consequently, performers 
who enjoy high levels of self-confidence might well be expected to perform better 
under conditions when they feel more anxious. Research investigating the interaction 
between cognitive anxiety, physiological arousal, effort, and sport performance will 
undoubtedly clarify the applicability of processing efficiency theory to a sport 
environment. 
Conscious Processing Hypothesis 
The conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992) states that performers 
who are experiencing increased anxiety attempt to control their performance by 
consciously controlling their movements using explicit "rules" to perform the task, 
rather than simply "doing it automatically" as they would normally. Baumeister 
(1984) suggested that performers have a tendency to focus on the process of 
performing in competitive situations because they are highly motivated to do well. 
Thus, performers who are normally capable of executing a task "without thinking 
about it" will lapse into a conscious monitoring and control of their performance 
under conditions of stress. As conscious control is relatively crude compared to 
automatic control (Keele, 1973; Langer & Imber, 1979), performance should suffer 
when conscious control is exerted over a skill that is normally executed 
automatically. 
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Masters (1992) tested the conscious processing hypothesis with a sample of novice 
golfers. These novices were taught a golf-putting task either under explicit learning 
conditions or under implicit learning conditions. Golfers in the explicit learning 
group were given instructions on the correct method of putting, and they were asked 
to use this technical information during their practice sessions. The implicit learning 
golfers were asked to perform a random letter generation task during their practice 
sessions in order to prevent them from forming or using any explicit rules on how to 
putt a golfball. After an extended practice period, both groups were asked to perform 
the putting task under high stress conditions. These conditions were induced by using 
both social evaluation and financial incentive. Under stressful conditions, the implicit 
learning group continued to improve, whereas the explicit learning group did not. 
Hardy, Mullen, and Jones (1996b) argued that Masters' (1992) results did not 
necessarily support the conscious processing hypothesis because the implicit learning 
group was not asked to continue their random letter generation task in the high stress 
condition. As such, the continued improvement in the implicit learning group could 
be attributable to a decrease in task difficulty. However, when Hardy et al. (1996b) 
controlled for this possible confound, their results also supported the conscious 
processing hypothesis. Bright and Freedman (1998) partially replicated Masters' 
study but failed to produce the same results as Masters (1992) and Hardy et al. 
(l996b). However, Bright and Freedman introduced their stress intervention after 
only 160 putting trials as opposed to Masters and Hardy et al. who made their 
intervention after 400 trials. As such, the lack of significance in Bright and 
Freedman's (1998) study could be attributable to the participants' earlier stage of 
learning. That is to say, the participants in Bright and Freedman's explicit learning 
group were likely still at the cognitive stage of learning when performance is 
normally controlled by conscious processes (cf. Schneider, Dumais, & Shiffrin, 
1984) and so did not experience any decrement in performance when they performed 
under conscious control. 
These investigations in support of the conscious processing hypothesis have 
important practical implications. At present, many practitioners and researchers 
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advocate the use of process goals as important methods of retaining or regaining 
focus during performance (Bull, Albinson, & Shambrook, 1996; Kingston & Hardy, 
1994a, 1997; Kingston, Hardy, & Markland, 1992). It could be argued that process 
goals encourage the use of explicit knowledge to control movements and should 
therefore increase the likelihood of a breakdown in automatic processing. Based on 
our current knowledge, it is plausible that holistic process goals, which encourage a 
focus on global aspects of performance, will be beneficial because they encourage 
automaticity rather than a de-chunking of the skill into parts (Kingston & Hardy, 
1994b, 1997). 
The conscious processing hypothesis could dovetail rather well with Hardy and 
colleagues' cusp catastrophe model, particularly if the basic tenets of processing 
efficiency theory were also included. For example, when performers are cognitively 
anxious, Eysenck (1992) argued that they are likely to invest more effort in the task 
at hand provided that they perceive that they have at least a moderate chance of 
succeeding. Under these conditions of high cognitive anxiety, performance is likely 
to be fairly good. However, ifperformers increase their effort to such a degree that 
they lapse into conscious processing (cf. Masters, 1992), then their performance will 
likely suffer dramatically. Hence, a performance catastrophe (cf. Hardy, 1990) could 
be explained either by a withdrawal of effort or by an effort-induced lapse into 
conscious processing, or both. Thus, under elevated cognitive anxiety, an increase in 
effort might be beneficial to performance up to a point beyond which a further 
increase in effort will lead to a catastrophic drop in performance due to a lapse into 
conscIOus proceSSIng. 
At an applied level, this suggests that any effort invested under conditions of 
elevated cognitive anxiety will be best directed through the use of holistic process 
goals rather than through the de-chunking of an otherwise automatic skill. There is 
some evidence to suggest that some elite performers do tend to use such holistic 
process goals (Jones & Hardy, 1990; Orlick & Partington, 1988). The following 
quote, from an Olympic pairs kayaker, and reported by Orlick and Partington (1988), 
exemplifies such an approach: 
My focus was very concentrated throughout the race. We have a start 
plan, and in it I concentrate only on the first few strokes ... Then I 
concentrate on the next little bit of the race ... Then it's getting to the 
end, we have to really push. Almost every 3 seconds or so towards the 
end I'd have to say, "Relax", and I'd let my shoulders and my head 
relax, and I'd think about putting on the power, and then I'd feel the 
tension creeping up again so I'd think about relaxing again, then 
power, then relax ... (p. 116) 
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In summary, the conscious processing hypothesis predicts that performers whose 
cognitive anxiety is elevated are more likely to lapse into the conscious controlling of 
a normally automatic skill. Although there is a need for more corroborating evidence 
for the conscious processing hypothesis within sport settings, the research to date has 
generally supported its central features both in laboratory and sport settings. At an 
applied level, the hypothesis implies that process goals should be used wisely so as 
not to encourage the breakdown of a normally automated skill. 
Theory of Ironic Processes of Mental Control 
Wegner (1989, 1994, 1997) developed the theory of ironic processes of 
mental control from the observation that it is difficult not to think about something 
when this is one's explicit desire. For example, if one explicitly tries not to think of a 
white horse, one will have difficulty not bringing the image of a white horse to mind. 
Wegner postulated that mental control is accomplished by the interaction of two 
processes: an intentional operating process and an ironic monitoring process. The 
operating process is one that is conscious, effortful, and interruptible. The 
monitoring process is one that is unconscious, less effortful, and uninterruptible. The 
operating process consciously seeks mental components that are consistent with the 
intended state of mind, whereas the monitoring process searches for those mental 
components that signal a failure to create the intended state of mind. Wegner (1997) 
suggested that the operating process and the monitoring process function together as 
a feedback unit in an attempt to produce mental control. For example, prior to a 
tennis player's second serve, the operating process might look for any signs that will 
allow the player successfully to execute the second serve. Such signs might include: 
picking a target spot on the court; reminding oneself of the opponent's weak 
backhand return; or remembering the last successful second serve. At the same time, 
the monitoring process might look for signs that will result in a double fault. These 
might include: recalling where the ball went on one's previous double fault; 
remembering the opponent's powerful forehand return; focusing on the point of 
impact of the first serve. 
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When working in an adaptive fashion, the monitoring process will ensure that threats 
to the operating process are registered and dealt with accordingly. In the example 
above, the monitoring process might register the opponent's strong forehand return 
and, under normal circumstances, the tennis player should be able to concentrate on 
delivering an appropriate serve to the opponent's backhand. However, the 
monitoring process is called an ironic monitoring process because it increases the 
accessibility of those thoughts that are the most undesirable. Under normal 
conditions, the operating process outweighs the monitoring in its consumption of 
processing capacity (Wegner, 1989, 1994, 1997). However, when mental load 
increases (e.g., under various types of pressure including high levels of stress or 
anxiety), the monitoring process begins to outweigh the operating process and mental 
control backfires by attending to those thoughts that are precisely those that are the 
most undesirable. In the case of the tennis player, the place on the net where the last 
double fault was made becomes the fixated thought. The thought, "Whatever you do, 
do not put the ball in the net", results in the player hitting the ball into the net and 
committing a double-fault. As Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987) 
suggested, suppression of a thought induces the monitoring process to search for that 
very thought that is to be ignored. Thus, if the reader is instructed not to pay attention 
to the full stop at the end of this sentence (something one would normally not pay 
attention to), the monitoring process will be primed to attend to it (Wegner, 1989). 
Research that has directly tested the theory of ironic effects has received limited 
attention in sport psychology. However, there is some evidence that supports its 
central thesis. For example, Wegner, Broome, and Blumberg (1997) found that 
people who attempted to relax under conditions of mental load demonstrated an 
increase in symptoms of anxiety and physiological arousal. Also, in their study of 
auto-race simulation, Janelle, Singer, and Williams (1999) found that when 
participants were more anxious, they were more inclined to focus on and process 
irrelevant internal and external information. Finally, in Wegner, Ansfield, and 
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Pilloffs (1998) golf-putting experiment investigating ironic effects, players were 
instructed not to hit the ball past the hole. However, when players were under mental 
load, the propensity to hit the ball past the hole increased significantly. 
Interestingly, it appears rather difficult to discriminate between the theory of ironic 
effects and the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992), particularly in 
terms of the hypothesized effects of stress upon performance. Indeed, under 
increased levels of stress, both the theory of ironic effects and the conscious 
processing hypothesis predict that individuals will focus upon thoughts that will be 
detrimental to their performance. One difference between the two predictions may be 
in the precise way in which these breakdowns in performance occur. For example, 
according to the conscious processing hypothesis, performance might break down in 
a number of ways (i.e., by consciously processing information that is normally 
processed automatically), whereas according to the theory of ironic effects, 
performance will break down in precisely the way that is to be avoided (i.e., by 
focusing on the cues to be avoided). 
At an applied level, there are likely countless instances where ironic processes might 
be responsible for poor performance. For example, a golfer might think, "whatever 
you do, don't hit the ball in the lake," and subsequently proceed to hit the ball into 
the centre of the lake (Janelle, 1999). Despite initial research in support of the theory, 
there has been little encouragement with respect to changing or preventing ironic 
processes (Shoham & Rohrbaugh, 1997). Janelle (1999) suggested that one way to 
interrupt ironic processes would be to render the functioning of the monitoring 
process useless or irrelevant through paradoxical interventions. Such interventions 
encourage a person to focus upon the threatening situation thus rendering the 
monitoring process less debilitative. For example, an athlete who is experiencing 
debilitative pre-competition anxiety might choose to focus upon these feelings. As a 
consequence of focusing on these negative feelings, the monitoring system would 
search for cues that are incompatible with the anxious state, and the athlete should be 
able to reduce the level of debilitative anxiety through the identification of anxiety-
reducing cues. Of course, as Janelle (1999) and Hall, Hardy, and Gammage (1999) 
pointed out, such paradoxical interventions should probably be viewed with great 
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caution in view of their counterintuitive quality and the lack of research that supports 
them. If such interventions were revealed as sometimes being helpful, the question 
remains: When should an athlete abandon attempts at mental control in favor of the 
ironic monitoring process? Indeed, presumably such a threshold exists (Wegner, 
1997). If this were the case, then the skilful intervention would be in deciding 
whether this threshold had been crossed: If so, then the athlete should probably 
abandon attempts at mental control in favour of the ironic monitoring process; if not, 
then the athlete should attempt to redeem mental control with astute rebuilding of the 
operating process. However, these points remain conjectural until further research 
has been conducted on the theory of ironic processes. 
In summary, the theory of ironic processes of mental control (Wegner, 1989, 1994, 
1997) suggests that mental control is achieved via the interaction of an intentional 
operating process and an ironic monitoring process. When mental load is elevated, 
the monitoring process outweighs the operating process and leads the individual to 
focus upon that aspect of behaviour that he/she precisely intended to avoid. Although 
initial research on the theory of ironic processes has been encouraging, the 
implications for applied interventions are yet to be elucidated. 
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Applied Implications 
Antecedents of Stress and Anxiety 
The sources of stress and anxiety revealed in the research include: readiness 
and performance problems; interpersonal problems with team-mates and coaches; 
financial and time constraints; selection procedures; lack of social support; injury 
struggles; traumatic experiences; and other personal issues. The coach can influence 
many of these areas. For example, if coaches encourage athletes to have attainable 
goals, and to prepare sufficiently well to perceive these goals as attainable, these 
athletes are likely to maintain a reasonably positive pre-competition affective state. 
Conversely, if coaches try to pressure them to goals that are not really attainable, 
then negative pre-competition affective states might well follow. 
Useful strategies will likely be those that encourage automatic responses with respect 
to mental and physical preparation for competition. One such strategy that is widely 
used, particularly in team situations, is to have athletes generate "What if ... " 
scenarios (e.g., "What ifmy sports bag is stolen?"). In such cases, the coach, sport 
psychologist, and athlete can work together to come up with contingency plans when 
the competition does not run as smoothly as planned. Personal experience and 
discussions with coaches, athletes, and practicing sport psychologists suggest a 
competition rarely runs as smoothly as planned. Consequently, strategies that prepare 
one for numerous (not necessarily positive) eventualities will likely be beneficial. 
State Anxiety and Performance 
The relationship between state anxiety and performance arguably has been 
one area in sport psychology that has received a great deal of attention. However, the 
research to date allows only for informed speCUlations to be made about how state 
anxiety might affect performance. Consequently, any implications for best practice 
can only reflect this relatively limited state of knowledge. 
Based on the evidence presented in this chapter, there appears to be fairly sound 
evidence that cognitive anxiety can be either detrimental or beneficial to 
performance. If physiological arousal is not too high, and if performers perceive that 
they have a fairly reasonable chance of achieving their goal, then cognitive anxiety is 
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likely to act as a motivator before and during performance. Conversely, if 
physiological arousal is elevated, and if athletes perceive that they have little chance 
of achieving their goal, then cognitive anxiety is likely to be detrimental to 
performance. Furthermore, when athletes suffer a decrement in performance under 
high levels of cognitive anxiety, this is likely to be large, sudden, and difficult to 
recover from. Ideally, performers will not suffer such a drop. One way to reduce the 
chance of such occurrences is by establishing truly attainable goals in conjunction 
with the coach. However, if a large drop in performance occurs, and if athletes are 
competing in a sport where recovery time is possible, then a combination of physical 
relaxation and cognitive restructuring might be helpful. More specifically, in relation 
to the cusp catastrophe model, athletes could physically relax and then cognitively 
restructure in order to regain the upper performance surface. Only then would 
recommencing one's pre-performance routine (e.g., mental rehearsal) be 
recommended. Of course, in view of the relatively limited amount of research 
directly investigating catastrophe models of anxiety and performance, these 
recommendations remain fairly speculative. 
In summary, from the research to date, the applied implications for coaches and 
athletes are: 
1) "Psyching up" strategies should be employed with great caution, as it is 
difficult for athletes to recover from a large drop in performance. 
2) Stress management strategies that enable athletes to target cognitive 
anxiety and physiological arousal separately should be learned and 
practiced. 
3) Truly attainable goals should be agreed between the coach and the 
athletes. If the goal is unrealistic (regardless of perceptions), then the 
athletes will start to fail sooner or later. Once this failure has occurred, the 
impact upon self-efficacy will likely be disastrous because they were 
previously convinced that the goal was attainable. 
4) Athletes should have well-practiced and effective self-talk and cognitive 
restructuring strategies. For athletes who typically experience anxiety as 
debilitative, such cognitive restructuring strategies might include changing 
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their cognitive appraisal to a more facilitating state such as excitement or 
challenge. 
Summary and Future Directions 
This chapter has included a review of research on: the antecedents of competitive 
anxiety; the effects of anxiety upon performance; and various hypotheses, models, 
and theories that can be used to describe and explain the effects of anxiety upon 
performance. Despite the criticism that has been levelled at multidimensional anxiety 
theory here and elsewhere, it is fairly clear that this theory has allowed researchers to 
progress from the rather simplistic inverted-U hypothesis. 
Researchers in mainstream psychology have long accepted the interaction between 
cognition and emotionality or physiological arousal (Deffenbacher, 1977; Marafion, 
1924; Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962), whereas researchers in sport 
psychology, perhaps rather surprisingly, have been slower to examine this notion. 
Future researchers interested in the effects of anxiety or other emotions upon 
performance (or performance-related variables) will need to adopt interactive 
paradigms if they are to take the sport psychology field to "the next level". Some 
research questions that are particularly worthy of attention are: 
1) What are the organizational issues that impinge upon athletes' preparation 
for competition and how can these be best addressed and, at least partially, 
resolved? 
2) How do cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal (or somatic anxiety) 
exert their influence upon performance (or performance-related variables)? 
3) What role, if any, does effort play in delaying drops in performance or in 
curtailing the magnitude of such decrements? 
4) Does effort moderate the effects of cognitive anxiety upon performance? 
5) Which personality and individual variables influence Individualized Zones 
of Optimal Functioning? 
6) What moderating role, if any, does self-confidence play in the effects of 
cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal upon performance? 
7) How do other emotions (e.g., excitement and anger) affect performance? 
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Conclusions 
Sport psychology research on anxiety has made significant advances over the last 
couple of decades. The inverted-U hypothesis is now discussed in most textbooks 
only as an introduction and to bring attention to its limitations. Although 
multidimensional anxiety theory has undoubtedly allowed anxiety research to move 
beyond simplistic notions of arousal, anxiety, and performance, the research on the 
interpretation of anxiety suggests that current operationalisations of anxiety need to 
be reconsidered and that anxiety and other emotions need to be investigated through 
different viewpoints. Even though the cusp catastrophe model is probably not the 
model of anxiety and performance, it has encouraged an understanding of the 
interactive effects of different anxiety components upon performance. Also, with the 
possibilities that processing efficiency theory, the conscious processing hypothesis, 
and the theory of ironic effects can offer, these are exciting times for those who are 
eager to embrace the challenge. 
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Chapter 3 
The relative impact of cognitive anxiety and self-confidence upon sport 
performance: A meta-analysis5 
Abstract 
This meta-analysis (n = 42) investigated 2 relationships in competitive sports: state 
cognitive anxiety with performance, and state self-confidence with performance. The 
cognitive anxiety mean effect size was r = -0.12 (p < 0.05). The self-confidence 
mean effect size was r = 0.28 (p < 0.001). A paired-samples t-test revealed that the 
magnitude of the self-confidence mean effect size was significantly greater than the 
cognitive anxiety mean effect size. The only moderator variable for the cognitive 
anxiety - performance relationship was sex. The mean effect size for men (r = -0.19) 
was significantly greater than the mean effect size for women (r = -0.00). The 
significant moderator variables for the self-confidence - performance relationship 
were sex and skill level. The mean effect size for men (r = 0.27) was significantly 
greater than the mean effect size for women (r = 0.12). The mean effect size for 
high-level athletes (r = 0.32) was significantly greater than the mean effect size for 
low-level athletes (r = 0.16). 
5 Based upon Woodman, T, & Hardy, L. (200Ic). The relative i.mpact of. cognitive an~ie~ and self-
confidence upon sport performance: A meta-analysis. Manuscnpt subrmtted for publIcatIon. 
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Introduction 
The relationships between anxiety, self-confidence, and sport perfonnance have 
attracted much research attention over the past twenty years, and researchers have 
attempted to clarify these relationships by advancing a number of models and 
theories. These include: catastrophe models (Hardy, 1990, 1996b); multidimensional 
anxiety theory (Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990); reversal theory 
(Apter, 1982; Kerr, 1990); and zones of optimal functioning models (Hanin, 1980, 
1986). 
In multidimensional anxiety theory, Martens et al. (1990) proposed a series of two-
dimensional relationships between cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, self-
confidence, and perfonnance. Cognitive anxiety was defined as "negative 
expectations and cognitive concerns about oneself, the situation at hand, and 
potential consequences" (Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981, p. 541). Somatic 
anxiety was conceptualised as the perceptions of one's physiological arousal. Self-
confidence was conceptualised as one's belief that one can meet the challenge of the 
task to be perfonned. In multidimensional anxiety theory (Martens et aI., 1990) 
cognitive anxiety is hypothesized to have a negative linear relationship with 
perfonnance; somatic anxiety is hypothesized to have a quadratic (inverted-U 
shaped) relationship with perfonnance; and self-confidence is hypothesized to have a 
positive linear relationship with perfonnance. 
A number of investigations have been conducted to test these proposed effects. For 
example, Burton (1988) found a negative linear trend between cognitive anxiety and 
swimming perfonnance and a positive linear trend between self-confidence and 
perfonnance. In the two samples investigated in this study, cognitive anxiety 
accounted for up to 46% of swimming perfonnance variance, and self-confidence 
accounted for up to 21 %. Gould et al. (1984) also found a significant negative linear 
relationship between cognitive anxiety and perfonnance, although no significant 
trend between self-confidence and perfonnance was revealed. Conversely, Martin 
and Gill (1991) found self-confidence to be significantly and positively related to 
distance running perfonnance, but no significant relationship between cognitive 
anxiety and running perfonnance. Similarly, in their study of pistol shooters, Gould 
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et aI. (1987) found no significant relationship between cognitive anxiety and 
perfonnance. However, in this study, a significant negative relationship between self-
confidence and perfonnance was revealed. Other studies have revealed no significant 
relationships between cognitive anxiety and perfonnance (Hammenneister & Burton, 
1995; Maynard & Cotton, 1993; Vadocz et aI., 1997), or between self-confidence 
and perfonnance (Maynard & Cotton, 1993; Williams & Krane, 1992). Thus, the 
relative impact of cognitive anxiety and self-confidence upon competitive sport 
perfonnance remains unclear. 
The inventory derived from multidimensional anxiety theory was the Competitive 
State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens et aI., 1990). The CSAI-2 was 
originally intended to be an anxiety scale comprising two subscales, cognitive 
anxiety and somatic anxiety. However, in the exploratory factor analysis of the items 
comprising the CSAI-2, Martens et aI. (1990) found that cognitive anxiety effectively 
separated into two factors, one that included negatively phrased items and one that 
included positively phrased items. These factors were subsequently labelled 
cognitive anxiety and self-confidence respectively. Thus, a self-confidence subscale 
was also included in the CSAI-2. In the discussion of their factor analyses, Martens 
et aI. stated: 
These findings suggest that cognitive A-state and state self-confidence 
represent opposite ends of a cognitive evaluation continuum, state 
self-confidence being viewed as the absence of cognitive A-state, or 
conversely, cognitive A-state being the lack of state self-confidence. 
(Martens et aI., 1990, p. 129) 
Given that cognitive anxiety and self-confidence emerged as orthogonal (i.e., 
independent) factors in these factor analyses, it is surprising that Martens et aI. 
(1990) should view them as interdependent (bipolar). This said, when a 
psychological rating scale contains positively and negatively worded items, the factor 
analyses of its item responses often reveal two apparently distinct factors, one that 
reflects the positive items and one that reflects the negative items. However, in such 
instances, the two factors might not in fact be meaningfully distinct. They might 
simply reflect the positively and negatively worded items of the same construct (cf. 
Marsh, 1996). This explanation allows the possibility that cognitive anxiety and self-
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confidence lie at opposite extremes of a single dimension despite Martens et aI.' s 
findings that they were independent factors. Also, Burton (1988) found a significant 
negative linear relationship between cognitive anxiety and swimming performance, 
and a significant positive linear relationship between self-confidence and 
performance. This is consistent with the proposition that cognitive anxiety and self-
confidence are interdependent. 
Despite these possible explanations of the results reported by Martens et aI. (1990), 
and the research reported by Burton (1988), there appears to be sufficient evidence to 
suggest that cognitive anxiety and self-confidence are meaningfully distinct 
constructs (Burrows, Cox, & Simpson, 1977; Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera, 
1987; Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg, 1984; Jones & Cale, 1989; Hardy, 1996a; 
Hardy & Whitehead, 1984; Parfitt & Pates, 1999; Thayer, 1978). For example, 
although Gould et aI. (1984) found a significant negative linear relationship between 
cognitive anxiety and performance, they found no significant trend between se1f-
confidence and performance. Also, in their work on the antecedents and temporal 
patterning of cognitive anxiety and self-confidence, Jones, Swain, and Cale (1990, 
1991) provided more evidence for the relative independence of cognitive anxiety and 
self-confidence. Furthermore, in their study of basketball players, Parfitt and Pates 
(1999) found that self-confidence accounted for significant proportions of 
performance variance over and above those accounted for by cognitive anxiety. 
Multidimensional anxiety theory (Martens et aI., 1990) is an attempt to explain the 
relationship between cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and 
performance in a series of two-dimensional relationships. It has been argued that this 
is a limitation if one is fully to understand the potentially complex relationship that 
might exist between these variables (e.g., Hardy, 1990). In an attempt to overcome 
this limitation, Hardy and associates (Hardy, 1990, 1996b; Hardy & Fazey, 1987; 
Hardy & Parfitt, 1991) proposed a cusp catastrophe model of cognitive anxiety, 
physiological arousal, and performance. Hardy and his associates chose 
physiological arousal rather than somatic anxiety as one of the predictor variables. 
This is because physiological arousal could have both direct and indirect effects upon 
performance, whereas somatic anxiety could only have an indirect effect. The cusp 
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catastrophe model depicts the relationship between cognitive anxiety, physiological 
arousal, and performance as an interactive process, whereby cognitive anxiety has 
either a positive effect or a negative effect upon performance, depending upon the 
level of physiological arousal (see Hardy, 1996b, for further details). Hardy (1990, 
1996a) also proposed a higher-order catastrophe model in which self-confidence acts 
as a bias factor. In this model, the bias factor (i.e., self-confidence) moderates the 
relationship between cognitive anxiety, physiological arousal, and performance. 
More specifically, higher levels of self-confidence swing the cusp of the catastrophe 
model to the right. In practical terms, this suggests that self-confidence might 
"protect" an individual from a catastrophic drop in performance under high levels of 
cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal. Of course, one of the assumptions 
underlying this proposition is that cognitive anxiety and self-confidence are at least 
partially independent. In a study of golfers aimed at comparing the amount of 
performance variance accounted for by multidimensional anxiety theory and 
catastrophe models, Hardy (1996a) found that self-confidence accounted for 
performance variance over and above the performance variance accounted for by 
cognitive and somatic anxiety. These results suggest that cognitive anxiety and self-
confidence are, at least partially, independent constructs. 
The somewhat equivocal findings revealed in studies investigating the relationships 
between cognitive anxiety, self-confidence, and sport performance reflect the need 
for an objective and systematic synthesis of the research in this area. The meta-
analysis reported in this paper is intended to provide such a synthesis. More 
precisely, the meta-analysis aims to investigate the relative importance of cognitive 
anxiety and self-confidence in relation to competitive sport performance. 
Method 
Literature Search 
Computer-based literature searches were conducted to locate published and 
unpublished research in the areas of cognitive anxiety, self-confidence, and 
performance. The databases used for this search were: Applied Social Sciences Index 
and Abstracts (ASSIA), Bath Information and Data Services (BIDS), PsycINFO, 
PsycLIT, Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), and Sport Discus. The last search 
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was conducted at the end of September 2000. Keywords used for the searches were: 
"cognitive anxiety", "confidence", "sport", and "performance". A number of "wild 
card" searches were also conducted to ensure that the search did not miss studies 
containing related words such as "anxiety", "worry", and "competition". The 
reference lists of the located studies were examined for further possible articles that 
might fulfil the criteria for inclusion. Studies were included in the meta-analysis if 
they fulfilled the following criteria: 
1) A measure of state cognitive anxiety or state self-confidence was taken prior 
to a competitive sport situation. 
2) Competitive sport performance was measured in a field setting. 
Statistical methods 
The meta-analytic procedures used in the present study are described in 
Rosenthal (1991). Effect sizes were calculated for those studies that satisfied the 
criteria for inclusion. The correlation coefficients (r) between cognitive anxiety and 
performance and between self-confidence and performance were used to compute 
effect sizes. As the population value of r gets further from zero the distribution of r' s 
becomes more and more skewed (Rosenthal, 1991). Fisher's (1928) transformation 
converts r to Zr, which results in a more normal distribution. Hence, the present study 
employed Zr as an estimate of effect size. The transformation from r to Zr is: 
Zr = 0.5 In [(1 + r)/(1 - r)] 
In order to calculate the significance of the effect sizes, the standard normal deviate Z 
was used. The transformation from r to Z is: 
Z = r --.j n where n = sample size 
The cognitive anxiety Zs were reversed to reflect the expected (negative) direction of 
the effect. For example, ifr = -0.20 and n = 100, then Z = 2. Ifno data were available 
to calculate the effect size (r) or the significance level (p, one-tailed), the primary 
author of the study in question was contacted by telephone or electronic mail. 
Omitting studies that report non-significant results can artificially inflate the effect 
size. Hence, if clarification of the data was not obtained from the primary author, p 
was assumed to be 0.50 and r was assumed to be 0.00. However, this procedure is 
conservative and can result in effect size estimates being too low. Following 
Rosenthal's (1995) recommendations, both procedures are presented in the present 
study. A summary of all the studies included in the meta-analysis is presented in 
Table 1. 
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The following methods (Rosenthal, 1991) were used for transforming a t statistic to 
r, or an F ratio to r, respectively: 
r = [t2 / (t2 + df)]o.5 
where df= nl + n2 -2, and 
r= {F(1, -)/[F(1, -)+dferror]}O.5 
where F( 1, -) represents any F with one degree of freedom in the numerator. 
If more than one effect size estimate was available from one study, the method of 
mean result (Rosenthal, 1991) was employed. That is, each r from the study was first 
converted to Zr before calculating the mean of these transformed effect sizes. In order 
to calculate the standard normal deviate Z, the mean Zr was converted back to r using 
the following equation: 
r = (e2Zr - 1)/( e2zr + 1) 
where e is the base of the system of natural logarithms (e;:::; 2.71828) 
Table 1. Summary of the studies (n = 42} included in the meta-analysis. 
Cognitive anxiety Self-confidence 
Authors Measures Sl!..ort n r Z r Z 
Barnes et al. (1986) CSAI-2 Swimming 14 -0.39 1.46 0.19 0.71 
Bejek & Hagtvet (1996) CSAI-2 Artistic Gymnastics 69 -0.09 0.76 0.09 0.72 
Bird & Hom (1990) CSAI-2 Softball 161 0.21 -2.63 0.05 0.58 
Burton (1988) CSAI-2 Swimming 98 -0.39 3.85 0.30 2.97 
Chapman et al. (1997) CSAI-2 TaeKwon-Do 142 -0.37 4.36 0.43 5.10 
Duesing (1984) CSAI-2 Middle/long distance running 40 0.31 -1.97 
Edwards & Hardy (1996) CSAI-2 Netball 45 0.10 -0.67 -0.17 -0.12 
Gayton & Nickless (1987) SSeI Marathon 35 0.36 2.13 
Gould et al. (1987) CSAI-2 Pistol shooting 39 0* 0.00 -0.27 -1.67 
Gould et al. (1984) CSAI-2 Wrestling 37 -0.29 1.74 0.02 0.09 
Gould et al. (1993a) CSAI-2 Middle/long distance running 11 -0.07 0.23 
Gould et al. (1981) Wrestling Wrestling 49 0.20 -1.42 0.52 3.64 
questionnaire 
Hammermeister & Burton (1995) CSAI-2 Endurance Sports 293 -0.08 1.37 
Hardy (1996a) CSAI-2 Golf 8 0.10 -0.27 0.16 0.44 
Highlen & Bennett (1979) Wrestling Wrestling 39 0.56 3.47 
questionnaire 
Jones et al. (1993) CSAI-2 Artistic Gymnastics 48 -0.01 0.07 0.29 2.01 
Krane (1993) CSAI-2 Soccer 16 0* 0.00 0* 0.00 
Krane & Williams (1987) CSAI-2 Golf & Gymnastics 80 0* 0.00 0* 0.00 
Krane et al. (1992) CSAI-2 Golf 100 0.04 0.07 
Martin & Gill (1991) CSAI-2 & Middle/long distance running 86 -.10 0.86 0.57 4.83 0\ w 
SSCI 
Maynard & Cotton (1993) CSAI-2 Field Hockey 20 0* 0.00 0* 0.00 
Maynard et al. (1995) CSAI-2 Soccer 24 -0.14 0.66 0.40 1.94 
Maynard & Howe (1987) CSAI-2 Rugby 22 -0.20 0.93 -0.01 -0.05 
McAuley (1985) CSAI-2 Golf 7 -0.11 0.28 0.01 0.02 
McCann et al. (1992) CSAI-2 Road Cycling 23 -0.42 2.01 0.37 1.77 
McKay et al. (1997) CSAI-2 Golf 15 0.50 -1.94 0.07 0.27 
Moraes (1987) CSAI-2 Judo 70 0* 0.00 0* 0.00 
Parfitt & Pates (1999) CSAI-2 Basketball 12 -0.07 0.26 0.49 1.69 
Perreault & Marisi (1997) CSAI-2 Wheelchair basketball 37 -0.02 0.23 -0.02 -0.15 
Prapavessis et al. (1992) CSAI-2 Rifle shooting 1 -0.92 0.92 0.96 0.96 
Rodrigo et al. (1990) CSAI-2 Soccer 51 -0.52 3.71 0.16 1.14 
Swain & Jones (1996) CSAI-2 Basketball 10 -0.18 0.57 0.34 1.07 
Taylor (1987) CSAI-2 Mixture 84 0.35 -2.09 0.34 2.05 
Terry et al. (1996) CSAI-2 Tennis 100 -0.12 1.15 0.42 4.20 
Terry & Slade (1995) CSAI-2 Karate 208 -0.46 6.49 0.42 5.92 
Thelwell & Maynard (1998) CSAI-2 Cricket 20 -0.32 1.43 0.64 2.86 
Vadocz et al. (1997) CSAI-2 Roller skating 57 0* 0.00 0.51 4.48 
Wiggins & Henson (2000) CSAI-2 Tennis 7 0.05 -0.13 
Williams & Krane (1992) CSAI-2 Golf 83 -0.22 2.00 0* 0.00 
Woodman et al. (1997) CSAI-2 Bowling 25 0.05 -0.25 
Yang (1994) CSAI-2 Mixture 56 -0.76 5.69 0.49 3.67 
Zhu & Fang {1998} CSAI-2 Distance running 88 0.39 -3.69 0.26 2.39 
* Not significant, effect size assumed to be zero, p = 0.50, one-tailed. 
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Study characteristics 
Of the 42 studies included in this meta-analysis, 40 contributed a cognitive 
anxiety effect size estimate and 37 contributed a self-confidence effect size estimate. 
Thirty-five of the 42 studies contributed both cognitive anxiety and self-confidence 
effect size estimates to the meta-analysis. Twenty-seven studies were reported 
between 1991 and 2000, 14 studies were reported between 1981 and 1990, and one 
study was reported in 1979. Thirty-eight studies were reported injoumals and three 
studies were reported in theses (two master's theses and one doctoral thesis). 
Results 
Outliers 
The meta-analysis was conducted with all studies included in the data set. A 
second meta-analysis was run with outliers deleted from the data sets. This is 
because visual inspection of the data revealed that some effect size estimates 
appeared to represent "wild scores". For example, in the cognitive anxiety data, the 
effect sizes of -0.92 and + 0.50 did not seem representative of the cognitive anxiety 
data set. Similarly, in the self-confidence data, the effect sizes of -0.27 and +0.96 did 
not seem representative. Consequently, following the recommendations of Tukey 
(1960) and Huber (1980), 10% of extreme data points were deleted from the data set. 
Thus, four studies - the two studies with the highest effect sizes and the two studies 
with the lowest effect sizes - were deleted from each data set. The deletion of these 
effect sizes resulted in 36 studies being included in the cognitive anxiety data set, and 
33 studies being included in the self-confidence data set. This second meta-analysis, 
with the outliers excluded, did not reveal any marked differences in the results. Thus, 
for the sake of clarity, only the first set of results (with all the studies included) is 
presented here 6. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 displays a stem-and-Ieafplot of the cognitive anxiety effect sizes 
included in the meta-analysis. Table 3 displays a stem-and-Ieafplot of the self-
confidence effect sizes included in the meta-analysis. Table 4 contains information 
6 For the sake of completion, results with the outliers removed from the data set are presented in 
Appendix A and Appendix B. 
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with regard to central tendency, variability, significance tests, and confidence 
intervals for the cognitive anxiety data. This table presents two sets of results: one 
with all cognitive anxiety studies included, the other with those studies where r was 
assumed to be zero omitted. Table 5 contains this information for the self-confidence 
data. 
Table 2. Cognitive anxiety Stem-and-LeafPlot 
Stem Leaf (with all studies Stem Leaf (excluding r = 0 
included). n = 40 results). n = 34 
+0.5 0 +0.5 0 
+0.4 +0.4 
+0.3 149 +0.3 149 
+0.2 00 +0.2 00 
+0.1 0 +0.1 0 
+0.0 0000003559 +0.0 3559 
-0.0 126789 -0.0 126789 
-0.1 001379 -0.1 001379 
-0.2 1 8 -0.2 1 8 
-0.3 2689 -0.3 2689 
-0.4 26 -0.4 26 
-0.5 2 -0.5 2 
-0.6 -0.6 
-0.7 6 -0.7 6 
-0.8 -0.8 
-0.9 2 -0.9 2 
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Table 3. Self-confidence Stem-and-LeafPlot 
Stem Leaf (with all studies Stem Leaf (excluding r = 0 
included). n = 37 results). n = 32 
+0.9 6 +0.9 
+0.8 +0.8 
+0.7 +0.7 
+0.6 4 +0.6 
+0.5 1267 +0.5 1267 
+0.4 022399 +0.4 022399 
+0.3 04467 +0.3 04467 
+0.2 69 +0.2 69 
+0.1 669 +0.1 669 
+0.0 00000125779 +0.0 125779 
-0.0 1 2 -0.0 1 2 
-0.1 7 -0.1 
-0.2 7 -0.2 
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Table 4. Statistical summary of the cognitive anxiety studies (n = 40) included in the 
meta-analysis. 
Statistic 
Central tendency (r) 
Unweighted mean 
Weighted mean 
Significance tests 
Combined Stouffer Z 
(I,Z/-Vn) 
t-test for mean Zr 
Variability (r) 
Maximum 
Quartile 3 (Q3) 
Median 
Quartile 1 (Ql) 
Minimum 
Q3-Ql 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Standard error (SDI-Vn) 
Confidence intervals (r) 
90% 
95% 
99% 
Value (including assumed Value (excluding 
r = 0 results), n = 40 assumed r = 0 results), n 
=34 
-0.12 -0.14 
-0.11 -0.13 
4.04,p < 0.001 4.39,p < 0.001 
2.11,p < 0.05 2.12,p < 0.05 
0.50 0.50 
0.05 0.06 
-0.07 -0.10 
-0.27 -0.33 
-0.92 -0.92 
0.32 0.39 
0.29 0.31 
0.05 0.05 
-0.05 to -0.20 -0.06 to -0.23 
-0.03 to -0.21 -0.04 to -0.25 
-0.01 to -0.24 -0.01 to -0.28 
Table 5. Statistical summary of the self-confidence studies (n = 37) included in the 
meta-analysis. 
Statistic Value (including assumed Value (excluding 
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r = 0 results), n = 37 assumed r = 0 results), n 
Central tendency (r) 
Unweighted mean 
Weighted mean 
Significance tests 
Combined Stouffer Z 
('L.Z/-Yn) 
t-test for mean Zr 
Variability (r) 
Maximum 
Quartile 3 (Q3) 
Median 
Quartile 1 (Ql) 
Minimum 
Q3-Ql 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Standard error (SDI-Yn) 
Confidence intervals (r) 
90% 
95% 
99% 
0.28 
0.25 
9.67,p < 0.001 
4.70,p < 0.001 
0.96 
0.42 
0.26 
0.00 
-0.27 
0.42 
0.26 
0.04 
0.21 to 0.35 
0.19 to 0.36 
0.17 to 0.39 
Effect sizes and significance testing 
=32 
0.32 
0.28 
10.40,p < 0.001 
4.93, p < 0.001 
0.96 
0.47 
0.32 
0.07 
-0.27 
0.40 
0.26 
0.05 
0.24 to 0.39 
0.23 to 0.41 
0.20 to 0.44 
Cognitive anxiety. Of the 40 studies reporting a relationship between 
cognitive anxiety and performance, 58% (n = 23) reported a negative relationship, 
15% (n = 6) reported non-significant results (so r was assumed to be zero), and 28% 
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(n = 11) reported a positive relationship. The mean effect size was -0.12. When 
studies were weighted for degrees of freedom, the mean effect size was -0.11. When 
those studies where the effect size was assumed to be 0 were omitted from the 
analyses, the mean effect size was -0.14 and the weighted mean effect size was -0.13. 
The Stouffer Z associated with the mean effect size was statistically significant (Z = 
4.04,p < 0.001). The t-test for the mean Zr was also significant (t(39) = 2.11,p < 
0.05). 
Self-confidence. Of the 37 studies reporting a relationship between self-
confidence and performance, 76% (n = 28) reported a positive relationship, 14% (n = 
5) reported non-significant results (so r was assumed to be zero), and 11 % (n = 4) 
reported a negative relationship. The mean effect size was 0.28. When studies were 
weighted for degrees of freedom, the mean effect size was 0.25. When studies where 
the effect size was assumed to be 0 were omitted from the analyses, the mean effect 
size was 0.32 and the weighted mean effect size was 0.28. The Stouffer Z associated 
with the mean effect size was statistically significant (Z= 9.67,p < 0.001). The t-test 
for the mean Zr was also significant (t(36) = 4.70,p < 0.001). 
File drawer analysis 
Non-significant results are less likely to be published and more likely to 
remain in the file drawers of researchers' laboratories (Rosenthal, 1991). Rosenthal 
suggested some simple calculations for determining the extent to which a meta-
analysis is robust to the file drawer problem. The two questions that are addressed 
here are: (1) How many non-significant studies (where r = O,p = 0.50) would have to 
be unearthed in order to make the probability of meta-analysis non-significant? (2) 
What constitutes an unlikely number of unearthed non-significant studies? The 
following figures for cognitive anxiety and self-confidence are based on fairly 
conservative calculations suggested by Rosenthal (1991). 
Cognitive anxiety. For the probability of this meta-analysis to become non-
significant (p > 0.05), 202 studies with mean probability of 0.50 would have to be 
stored away in researchers' file drawers. A figure of 21 0 would have been considered 
robust to the file drawer problem. Thus, the cognitive anxiety data are marginally 
short of being fully robust to the file drawer problem. 
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Self-confidence. For the probability of this meta-analysis to become non-
significant, 1,242 studies with mean probability of 0.50 would have to be stored 
away. A figure of 195 would have been considered robust to the file drawer problem. 
Thus, the self-confidence data are highly robust to the file drawer problem. 
The relationship between cognitive anxiety and self-confidence 
If cognitive anxiety and self-confidence lie at opposite ends of the same 
continuum, then their effects upon performance should mirror each other. That is, the 
strength of the relationship between self-confidence and performance should be 
similar to the strength of the relationship between cognitive anxiety and 
performance, only in the opposite direction. If cognitive anxiety and self-confidence 
are independent constructs, the strength of these relationships will likely be different. 
Thus, a paired samples t-test was run between the cognitive anxiety effect sizes and 
the self-confidence effect sizes to determine whether cognitive anxiety and self-
confidence reflected independent constructs. In order to make meaningful 
comparisons between cognitive anxiety and self-confidence, cognitive anxiety effect 
sizes were first transformed using y = -x. 
The paired samples t-test revealed a significant difference between cognitive anxiety 
and self-confidence effect sizes (t(34) = 2.21,p < 0.05). Equally, when non-
significant effect sizes (i.e., those effect sizes where r = 0 was assumed) were 
removed, there was still a significant difference between cognitive anxiety and self-
confidence effect sizes (t(27) = 2.39,p < 0.05). When the outliers were removed 
from the analyses, this difference fell marginally short of conventional significance 
(t(27) = 1.96, P = 0.06). When both the non-significant effect sizes and the outliers 
were removed from the analyses, again the difference fell marginally short of 
conventional significance (t(21) = 1.90,p = 0.07). 
In order to test the degree of co-dependence between cognitive anxiety and self-
confidence, correlation coefficients were calculated between the effect sizes for 
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cognitive anxiety and self-confidence. When all studies were included, the 
correlation between the effect sizes for cognitive anxiety and self-confidence was r = 
-0.44,p < 0.01. When the non-significant effect sizes (i.e., those effect sizes where r 
= 0 was assumed) were removed from the analyses, the correlation was r = -0.47, p < 
0.05. When the outliers were removed from the analyses, these correlation 
coefficients were insignificant (r = -0.09,p = 0.65; and r = -0.05,p = 0.84, 
respectively). 
Moderator variables 
Heterogeneity tests revealed that the effect sizes were highly heterogeneous 
for cognitive anxiety (X2(39) = 163.51,p < 0.001) and self-confidence (X2(36) = 
122.19,p < .001). This suggests that other factors were moderating the relationships 
between cognitive anxiety and performance, and between self-confidence and 
performance. Sport type and individual difference variables were considered as 
possible moderator variables. The results of these analyses are given below, and a 
summary is presented in Table 6. 
Sport type. Three comparisons between types of sport were made: individual 
versus team sports; subjectively versus objectively scored sports; and contact versus 
non-contact sports. In the analyses reported by Martens et al. (1990), cognitive 
anxiety was higher in individual sports, subjectively scored sports, and contact 
sports. Also, self-confidence was lower for athletes involved in these sports. This is 
likely to be due largely to the greater pressure and exposure associated with these 
types of sport. Thus, cognitive anxiety and self-confidence are likely to affect 
athletes' performance in these sports more than in team sports, objectively-scored 
sports, and non-contact sports. Consequently, it was hypothesised that the cognitive 
anxiety and self-confidence effect sizes would be larger for individual sports, 
subjectively scored sports, and contact sports. 
Separate t-tests revealed no significant differences between the cognitive anxiety 
effect sizes for individual and team sports (t(35) = O.Ol,p = 0.50), objectively and 
subjectively scored sports (t(34) = 0.50,p = 0.31), or contact and non-contact sports 
(t(38) = -1.03, p = 0.15). Also, separate t-tests revealed no significant differences 
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between the self-confidence effect sizes for objectively and subjectively scored 
sports (t(31) = 0.71,p = 0.24), or contact and non-contact sports (t(35) = -0.18,p = 
0.43). The mean effect size for individual sports was greater than that for team 
sports, although this difference fell short of conventional significance (t(33) = 1.33, p 
< 0.10). 
Individual differences. Two individual-difference comparisons were made: 
high- versus low-level athletes, and men versus women. The high- versus low-level 
comparison reflects level of competition rather than the skill level of the athlete. 
Studies were classified as "high-level" if the sample studied was competing at 
national or intemationallevel. Studies were classified as "low-level" if the sample 
was competing at a competitive level that was less than national (e.g., regional, state, 
etc.). Specific individual-difference hypotheses are difficult to formulate with regard 
to the relationships considered in this meta-analysis. For example, one might predict 
that the relationship between cognitive anxiety and performance would be stronger 
for high-level athletes. Such a hypothesis would be made on the basis that high-level 
competition is associated with increased pressure. Cognitive anxiety might reflect 
athletes' inability to deal with this pressure, and hence would likely play an 
important role in subsequent performance. However, one might propose the opposing 
hypothesis (i.e., that the effect sizes would be stronger for low-level athletes) on the 
basis that athletes who compete at a high level are more likely to have practised 
anxiety control and cognitive restructuring strategies. In this way, they would be less 
likely to be affected by cognitive anxiety. With these considerations in mind, 
hypotheses were made largely on the premise that increased pressure is likely to play 
an important moderating role in the relationships between cognitive anxiety, self-
confidence, and competitive performance. Thus, it was hypothesised that the 
cognitive anxiety and self-confidence effect sizes would be greater for high-level 
athletes, when compared to comparatively low-level athletes. Once the degrees of 
freedom had been corrected for heterogeneous variances, the difference between the 
mean cognitive anxiety effect sizes of high- and low-level athletes fell short of 
conventional significance (t(35) = 1.46, p < 0.09). Independent t-tests also revealed 
that the self-confidence effect sizes for high-level athletes were significantly larger 
than the effect sizes for low-level athletes (t(31) = 1.89, p < 0.05). 
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As women typically experience higher levels of cognitive anxiety and lower levels of 
self-confidence than men (cf. Martens et aI., 1990), their ability (or inability) to deal 
with competitive pressure is more likely to affect subsequent performance. Thus, it 
was hypothesised that the cognitive anxiety and self-confidence effect sizes would be 
greater for women than for men. Contrary to the hypothesised direction, the effect 
sizes for men were significantly larger than the effect sizes for women (t(24) = -2.11, 
p < 0.05). Also contrary to the hypothesised direction, the self-confidence effect sizes 
for men were significantly larger than the effect sizes for women (t(24) = -3.54, p < 
0.01). 
Finally, cultural differences were explored as a possible individual-difference 
moderating variable. The vast majority of the studies included in the meta-anlysis 
were conducted with samples from North America or Europe. Thus, the investigation 
of cultural differences as a possible moderating variable was limited to the 
comparison of these two cultures. As no specific hypotheses were postulated for this 
potential moderating variable, two-tailed independent t-tests were conducted. No 
significant differences were revealed either for cognitive anxiety (t(32) = 0.88, p = 
0.39) or for self-confidence (t(29) = 1.17,p = 0.25). 
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Table 6. Summary of the moderator variables considered. 
Cognitive anxiety mean Self-confidence mean effect size 
effect size 
Sport type 
Individual Team Individual Team 
-0.10 -0.10 0.29a 0.17a 
Objectively Subjectively Objectively Subjectively 
scored scored scored scored 
-0.09 -0.14 0.21 0.29 
Contact Non-contact Contact Non-contact 
-0.07 -0.17 0.24 0.25 
Individual 
differences 
High level Low level High level Low level 
-0.22a -0.05a 0.32* 0.16* 
Men Women Men Women 
-0.19* -0.00* 0.27** 0.12** 
North Europe North Europe 
America America 
-0.05 -0.12 0.19 0.29 
a p < 0.10, * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01 
Discussion 
The focus of this meta-analysis was on two relationships: (1) the relationship 
between cognitive anxiety and competitive sport performance, and (2) the 
relationship between self-confidence and competitive sport performance. The mean 
effect size for cognitive anxiety was r = -0.12. The mean effect size for self-
confidence was r = 0.28. Both of these mean effect sizes were significant. The results 
of the paired samples t-test revealed that self-confidence was significantly more 
related to sport performance than was cognitive anxiety. Sex was the only significant 
moderating variable for the cognitive anxiety-performance relationship. Sex and skill 
level were the significant moderating variables for the self-confidence-performance 
relationship. 
The significant negative mean effect size between cognitive anxiety and competitive 
sport performance, and the significant positive mean effect size between self-
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confidence and sport perfonnance, are consistent with the predictions of 
multidimensional anxiety theory (Martens et aI., 1990). However, the significant 
difference in the magnitude of these two mean effect sizes runs contrary to the 
proposition that cognitive anxiety and self-confidence may be viewed as a bipolar 
continuum. Rather, the significant difference between the mean effect sizes of 
cognitive anxiety and self-confidence is consistent with past research (e.g., Gould et 
aI., 1984; Hardy, 1996a; Jones & Cale, 1989; Jones et aI., 1990, 1991; Martens et aI., 
1990) suggesting that cognitive anxiety and self-confidence are orthogonal 
constructs, which do not lie at opposite ends of the same continuum. 
Both sets of effect sizes (cognitive anxiety and self-confidence) were heterogeneous. 
This begs the question: what is moderating the relationships between cognitive 
anxiety and perfonnance, and between self-confidence and perfonnance? The only 
significant moderating variable of the cognitive anxiety-perfonnance relationship 
was sex, the mean cognitive anxiety effect size being significantly greater for men (r 
= -0.19) than for women (r = -0.00). For the self-confidence data, the only significant 
moderating variables were sex and skill leveL The mean self-confidence effect sizes 
were significantly greater for men (r = 0.27) and for high-level athletes (r = 0.32) 
than for women (r = 0.12) and lower-level athletes (r = 0.16), respectively. 
The differences between the sexes for the cognitive anxiety and self-confidence 
mean effect sizes suggest that pre-competitive cognitive anxiety and self-confidence 
have a greater impact upon the perfonnance of men than that of women. This does 
not seem to sit very well with anecdotal evidence that both women and men tend to 
perfonn well when confident. Similarly, there does not seem to be any obvious 
reason why women would be less affected by any detrimental effects of cognitive 
anxiety upon perfonnance. For example, previous research has shown that, compared 
to men, women experience higher levels of cognitive anxiety (Martens et aI., 1990; 
Russell, Robb, & Cox, 1998), lower levels of self-confidence (Krane & Williams, 
1994; Martens et aI., 1990), and less stability prior to competing (Jones & Cale, 
1989; Jones, Swain, & Cale, 1991). Thus, one might expect women to be more 
affected by anxiety than men. Perhaps women are more likely to openly express their 
pre-competitive anxiety, and this expression might largely protect them against any 
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potential negative effects. In light of the insignificant cognitive anxiety effect size for 
women revealed in this meta-analysis, this seems a worthwhile avenue for future 
research. 
The self-confidence mean effect size was greater for high-level athletes compared to 
lower-level athletes, and this difference approached significance for cognitive 
anxiety. One possible reason for this difference is that high-level performance is 
typically associated with lower levels of "random effects". That is, high-level 
athletes typically operate within a more controlled personal environment than their 
comparatively low-level counterparts. In other words, athletes competing at a higher 
level are more likely to "control the controllables" (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996a). 
As such, it seems reasonable to expect that the effect of self-confidence (and 
cognitive anxiety) upon performance will be clearer with elite athletes. In the present 
meta-analysis, truly high-level (international) performers were investigated in one 
study only. The other studies comprising the "high-level" group consisted of national 
level athletes. This lack of studies involving truly elite athletes poses a fairly serious 
problem in terms of generalisation of research findings to elite performers. For 
example, the stress that elite athletes endure may be rather different to that endured 
by relatively low-level athletes. Certainly, recent research (Gould, Guinan, 
Greenleaf, Medbery, & Peterson, 1999; Woodman & Hardy, 1998, 2001b) suggests 
that elite performers may be exposed to various kinds of relational and organizational 
stress before and during major international competitions. Thus, generalisations of 
findings with lower-level sport performers to elite performers might be inappropriate 
(cf. Balague, 1999; Hardy et aI., 1996a). Certainly, further research with elite 
performers is likely to further our understanding of the effects of stress, anxiety, and 
self-confidence in an elite environment. 
Apart from sex differences, no significant moderating variables were revealed for the 
cognitive anxiety - performance effect size. However, sex differences are unlikely to 
be the sole moderating variable of this relationship. Other potentially important 
moderating variables were not investigated in the majority of the studies included in 
the meta-analysis. One theory that appears worthy of future research in this respect is 
Eysenck and associates' processing efficiency theory (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck & 
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Calvo, 1992). This theory postulates that increases in cognitive anxiety will likely 
result in increased effort on the task, provided that there is at least a moderate chance 
of success. One would expect the relationship between cognitive anxiety and 
performance to be positive when effort is invested in the task and negative when less 
effort is invested in the task (or when effort is withdrawn). Although much of the 
research supporting processing efficiency theory has been conducted in laboratory 
settings, there is some evidence for the theory's application in a sport field setting. 
For example, Hardy and Jackson (1996) found that rock climbers performed better 
and exerted more cognitive and physiological effort when they were cognitively 
anxious compared to when they were not cognitively anxious. Also, Mullen, Hardy, 
and Tattersall (1999) found that golfers exerted more effort when they were anxious, 
although changes in anxiety did not induce any significant changes in performance. 
Thus, effort could be an important moderating variable within the anxiety-
performance relationship, and this seems a particularly fruitful area for future 
research. 
The vast majority of studies included in this meta-analysis used the CSAI-2 (Martens 
et aI., 1990) as a measure of cognitive anxiety and self-confidence. Thus, it was not 
possible to test whether the different instruments used to measure cognitive anxiety 
and self-confidence moderated the relationships with performance. In the CSAI-2, 8 
of the 9 cognitive anxiety items use "concern" as an expression of cognitive anxiety 
(e.g., "I'm concerned about reaching my goal"), and it has been argued that the 
expression "I am concerned" can be interpreted positively or negatively (Barnes, 
Sime, Dienstbier, & Plake, 1986; Jones 1991; Jones & Swain, 1992; Woodman & 
Hardy, 2001a). These differences in interpretation led Jones and his colleagues 
(Jones, 1991; Jones & Swain, 1992) to add an interpretation scale to the CSAI-2, 
which measures the extent to which performers interpret their anxiety symptoms as 
either facilitative or debilitative. Research using this modified scale suggests that 
interpretation may be an important moderating variable in the relationship between 
cognitive anxiety and performance. For example, Jones, Swain, and Hardy (1993) 
found that high- and low-performance gymnasts did not differ in levels of cognitive 
anxiety intensity. However, the high-performance gymnasts reported their cognitive 
anxiety to be more facilitative than did the low-performance gymnasts. Similar 
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findings have been reported in other studies (e.g., Jones, Hanton, & Swain, 1994; 
Perry & Williams, 1998; Swain & Jones, 1996). An important issue here is whether 
the cognitive anxiety subscale of the CSAI-2 does in fact measure cognitive anxiety 
or some other construct (cf. Burton & Naylor, 1997). Certainly, there seems to be 
scope for the development of a questionnaire that measures the construct of cognitive 
anxiety more precisely. 
The difference in magnitude between the cognitive anxiety and self-confidence mean 
effect sizes suggests that future researchers would do well to consider cognitive 
anxiety and self-confidence either independently or as an interactive dyad. It is the 
interaction between cognitive anxiety and self-confidence that seems likely to yield 
the most fruitful findings (Hardy, 1996a). For example, the combination of high 
cognitive anxiety with high self-confidence could be a desirable state for elite 
athletes. Certainly, from an anecdotal perspective, it seems that many exceptionally 
fine performances are achieved when athletes are both anxious ("I am so nervous, 
this is the biggest competition of my life") and self-confident ("I know I can do well, 
I have prepared so well for this competition,"). Also, from a theoretical perspective, 
both processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and higher-order 
catastrophe models (Hardy, 1996a) would support this view. More precisely, as 
stated earlier, processing efficiency theory predicts that individuals will invest more 
effort in the task at hand if they perceive they have a reasonable chance of success. 
Also, within a higher-order catastrophe model framework, Hardy (1990, 1996a) has 
proposed that high levels of self-confidence might protect cognitively anxious 
performers from catastrophic drops in performance. Thus, both processing efficiency 
theory and catastrophe models seem worthy of further research with respect to 
investigating the interaction between cognitive anxiety and self-confidence. 
In summary and conclusion, this meta-analysis has revealed that both cognitive 
anxiety and self-confidence are significantly related to competitive sport 
performance. Also, in view of the significant difference in magnitude between the 
two mean effect sizes, researchers should view cognitive anxiety and self-confidence 
as distinct constructs, rather than two extremes of a single construct. The mean effect 
sizes for cognitive anxiety and self-confidence were significantly stronger for men 
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than for women. Also, the mean self-confidence effect size was significantly stronger 
for high-level athletes. In order to increase the proportion of performance variance 
accounted for by cognitive anxiety and self-confidence, other moderator variables 
should be investigated. Effort seems particularly worthy of attention in this respect. 
Furthermore, the development of a questionnaire that measures cognitive anxiety 
more directly is likely to help clarify our understanding of the anxiety-performance 
relationship. The interaction between cognitive anxiety and self-confidence is likely 
to be a fruitful avenue for future research, and the current theoretical paradigms that 
seem the most amenable to investigation of this interaction are processing efficiency 
theory and higher-order catastrophe models. 
Chapter 4 
Is Self-confidence a Bias Factor in Higher-order Catastrophe Models? An 
Exploratory Analysis 7 
Abstract 
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This paper examines Hardy's (1990, 1996a) proposition that self-confidence might 
act as a bias factor in a butterfly catastrophe model. Male golfers (n = 8) participated 
in a golftoumament and self-reported their cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and 
self-confidence prior to the tee shot of each hole. All anxiety, self-confidence, and 
performance scores were standardized within subjects in order to control for 
individual differences. The data were then collapsed across subjects and categorized 
into a high self-confidence condition and a low self-confidence condition by means 
of a median split. A series of two-way (cognitive anxiety x somatic anxiety) 
ANOV As was conducted on each of these self-confidence conditions in order to flag 
where the maximum cognitive anxiety x somatic anxiety interaction effect size lay 
along the somatic anxiety axis. These ANOV As revealed that the maximum 
interaction effect size between cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety was at a higher 
level of somatic anxiety for the high self-confidence condition than for the low self-
confidence condition, thus supporting the moderating role of self-confidence within a 
catastrophe model framework. The results are discussed in light of these findings and 
future directions for research in this area are offered. 
7 Based upon Hardy, L., Woodman, T., & Carrington, S. (2001). Is Self-confidence a Bias Factor in 
Higher-order Catastrophe Models? An Exploratory Analysis. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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Introduction 
The cusp catastrophe model proposed by Hardy and associates (Hardy, 1990, 1996a, 
1996b; Hardy & Fazey, 1987; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991) resulted largely from 
dissatisfaction with interpretations of Yerkes and Dodson's (1908) inverted-U 
hypothesis (e.g., Broadhurst, 1957; Oxendine, 1970, 1984) and with Martens, 
Burton, Vealey, Bump, and Smith's (1990) multidimensional anxiety theory. 
Detailed discussions of the major criticisms of the inverted-U hypothesis and 
multidimensional anxiety theory have been provided by Jones (1990) and Hardy 
(1990), respectively, and they will not be revisited here. However, one of the major 
criticisms that has been levelled at multidimensional anxiety theory is the proposition 
that cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety affect sport performance independently of 
each other. In contrast with multidimensional anxiety theory, the cusp catastrophe 
model (see Figure 2 in Chapter 2) proposes that cognitive anxiety and physiological 
arousal affect performance in an interactive fashion (Hardy, 1990, 1996a, 1996b; 
Hardy & Fazey, 1987; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991). More specifically, the model proposes 
that: under conditions of low physiological arousal, cognitive anxiety will have a 
positive relationship with performance (see the left hand edge of Figure 2); but under 
conditions of high physiological arousal, cognitive anxiety will have a negative 
relationship with performance (see the right hand edge of Figure 2). Also, under 
conditions of low cognitive anxiety, the relationship between physiological arousal 
and performance will follow a smooth continuous inverted-U path (see the back edge 
of Figure 2) whereas, under conditions of high cognitive anxiety, this relationship 
will follow a discontinuous hysteresis path, whereby, at some critical level, a small 
increase in physiological arousal will result in a large drop in performance (see the 
front edge of Figure 2). Once performance has dropped to the lower performance 
surface under high cognitive anxiety, physiological arousal needs to return to levels 
below those at which the catastrophe occurred before the upper performance can be 
regained. In other words, under these hysteresis conditions, the path that performance 
follows is different depending upon whether physiological arousal is increasing or 
decreasing. In the catastrophe model, cognitive anxiety is termed the splitting factor, 
and physiological arousal is termed the asymmetry (or normal) factor. The splitting 
factor (cognitive anxiety) determines whether the effect of the asymmetry factor 
(physiological arousal) will be small and smooth, large and catastrophic, or 
somewhere in between these two extremes. 
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To date, researchers appear to have been fairly reticent in testing catastrophe models 
of anxiety, physiological arousal, and performance, possibly due to the perceived 
complexity of these models (Gill, 1994). However, research testing the central 
features of the cusp catastrophe model has been fairly supportive of its predictions. 
For example, support has been provided for the hysteresis hypothesis with samples of 
basketball players (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991) and crown green bowlers (Hardy, Parfitt, 
& Pates, 1994). In these studies, consistent with cusp catastrophe model predictions, 
hysteresis was revealed under conditions of high cognitive anxiety, but not under 
conditions of low cognitive anxiety. Also, maximum performance was significantly 
higher and minimum performance was significantly lower in the high cognitive 
anxiety condition than in the low cognitive anxiety condition. Again, this is 
consistent with the predictions of the cusp catastrophe model. Other studies have 
provided some fairly conclusive evidence for the interactive effects between 
cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety/physiological arousal (Deffenbacher, 1977; 
Edwards & Hardy, 1996; Woodman, Albinson, & Hardy, 1997) although the details 
have not always been consistent with the cusp catastrophe model. 
The three-dimensional cusp catastrophe is arguably the simplest of the seven 
elementary catastrophes (Thorn, 1975; Zeeman, 1976). The butterfly catastrophe 
model (Hardy, 1990, 1996a; Zeeman, 1976) is essentially an extension of the cusp 
catastrophe model and contains two further factors (dimensions): a bias factor and a 
butterfly factor. The bias factor has the effect of swinging the cusp at the front edge 
of the model to the left or to the right. The butterfly factor promotes the growth of a 
pocket containing a new fold in the performance surface. This pocket produces a 
third stable performance surface between the upper and lower surfaces (see Zeeman, 
1976, for further details). Hardy (1990, 1996a) suggested that self-confidence might 
act as a bias factor in a butterfly catastrophe model of sport performance. That is, 
self-confidence will moderate the interaction between cognitive anxiety and 
physiological arousal by swinging the fold at the front of the model to the right under 
high levels of self-confidence and to the left under low levels of self-confidence. In 
practical terms, this suggests that high levels of self-confidence will allow 
performers to tolerate higher levels of physiological arousal when they are 
cognitively anxious before suffering a performance decrement. 
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Using Guastello's (1982) method of dynamic differences to test the catastrophe 
model's fit with golfers' putting performance, Hardy (1996a) offered some empirical 
support for self-confidence as a bias factor. However, the statistical properties of the 
time series used in the method of dynamic differences are neither well known nor 
well understood. Furthermore, this method has been strongly criticized by Alexander, 
Herbert, DeShon, and Hanges (1992). Although these criticisms were refuted by 
Guastello (1992), there remains a clear need to explore other methods of testing the 
central features of catastrophe models. In particular, in terms of Hardy and 
associates' (Hardy, 1990, 1996a; Hardy & Fazey, 1987; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991) 
catastrophe models of sport performance, there is a need for further research that 
tests the proposition that self-confidence moderates the interactive effects of 
cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal upon performance. 
In order to render research on the catastrophe model more readily accessible, Hardy 
(1996b) proposed a number of ways of testing its various features. One of Hardy's 
proposals was the use of moderated hierarchical regression to explore the interactive 
effects of cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal upon performance. However, 
due to the discontinuous nature of catastrophe models, this method may not be the 
most appropriate. Indeed, by its very nature, the catastrophe process predicts 
discontinuity in the dependent variable (e.g., where the performance surface flips 
from the upper performance surface to the lower performance surface under 
conditions of high cognitive anxiety), whereas the multiplicative (interactive) term in 
a regression equation represents a continuous change in the relationship between the 
primary independent variable and the dependent variable. Other problems associated 
with the use of regression as a method of testing catastrophe models include 
violations of the assumptions ofhomoscedasticity and normality. Indeed, 
homoscedasticity is necessarily violated within a catastrophe model framework 
because of the increased variance in the dependent variable (e.g., performance) under 
high levels of the splitting factor (cognitive anxiety). Also, the assumption of 
nonnality will be violated because of the bimodal distribution of data under high 
levels of the splitting factor. More precisely, for a certain range of values in the 
independent variables (i.e., corresponding to the bifurcation set), there are two 
possible values for perfonnance, depending upon the level of cognitive anxiety. In 
such circumstances, the data are bimodal (Cobb, 1978; Gilmore, 1981; Zeeman, 
1976) and will not satisfy the nonnality assumption. 
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Hardy (1996b) also suggested quadrant analysis as a possible method for exploring 
the interactive effects of cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal. Using median 
splits to perfonn such a quadrant analysis, Edwards and Hardy (1996) found that 
cognitive anxiety and perfonnance were positively related under conditions of low 
physiological arousal and negatively related under conditions of high physiological 
arousal. Thus, consistent with the cusp catastrophe model, it was shown that 
cognitive anxiety could have either a facilitative or a debilitative effect upon 
perfonnance, depending upon the level of physiological arousal. Although intuitively 
appealing for exploring interactive effects, the use of median splits for perfonning a 
quadrant analysis is unlikely to be the most subtle means of analysing catastrophe 
data. Indeed, depending on the level of self-confidence, the front edge of the model 
could be farther to the right or to the left of the median. That is, the level of 
physiological arousal at which the relationship between cognitive anxiety and 
perfonnance shifts from positive to negative will depend upon the level of self-
confidence possessed by perfonners. Thus, in order to perfonn an effective quadrant 
analysis on the interactive effects between cognitive anxiety and physiological 
arousal, it would be judicious to split the data at precisely that point along the 
physiological arousal continuum where the point of discontinuity occurs. One 
method of investigating such discontinuous changes would be to split the data at the 
point of maximum cognitive anxiety x physiological arousal effect size and then 
analyse differences between the resulting quadrants. If Hardy's (1990, 1996a) 
contention that self-confidence acts as a bias factor in catastrophe models is to be 
supported, then the maximum interaction effect size between cognitive anxiety and 
somatic anxiety will occur at a lower level of physiological arousal for conditions of 
low self-confidence than for conditions of high self-confidence. This is the 
hypothesis of the present study. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 8 male golfers who were members of a private golf club in 
the United Kingdom. The mean age of the golfers was 34.88 (SD = 18.12). All 
golfers were medium handicapped (M= 12.13, SD = 5.08), thus increasing the 
likelihood of inducing a meaningful anxiety effect. Highly experienced golfers were 
not included as it was felt that the seriousness of the competition used and the 
magnitude of incentive offered by the present study were unlikely to induce a 
meaningful anxiety effect with such performers. Golfers with higher handicaps (less 
experience) were not used as it was thought that other (essentially random) factors 
associated with their level of expertise might mask anxiety effects. 
Participants were informed of the general nature of the study. That is, they 
were informed that anxiety can sometimes facilitate and sometimes debilitate 
performance and that the study was an attempt to elucidate these issues. All 
participants volunteered for the study and provided written informed consent. 
Measures 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2). The CSAI-2 (Martens et al. 
1990) contains three subscales: cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-
confidence. Each of the three subscales in the CSAI-2 comprises nine items. 
Consequently, there are a total of 27 items in the inventory. The cognitive anxiety 
subscale includes statements such as "I am concerned about this competition"; the 
somatic anxiety subscale includes statements such as "My body feels tense"; and the 
self-confidence subscale includes statements such as "I'm confident about 
performing well". Participants are asked to rate each statement on a scale of 1 (not at 
all) to 4 (very much so). The CSAI-2 has been shown to have good construct validity 
and good internal consistency with alpha coefficients ranging from. 79 to .90 
(Martens et aI., 1990). In line with Martens et aI.'s (1990) recommendations, it was 
emphasized that participants should answer as honestly as possible, and that 
individual data would be treated in confidence. Following Hardy (1996a), 
participants were trained to report single-integer scores for each of the three 
subscales of the CSAI-2 and these were used as the measure of cognitive anxiety, 
somatic anxiety, and self-confidence (see procedure). 
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Somatic anxiety (as measured by the CSAI-2), rather than physiological arousal, was 
used as a physiological approximation of anxiety. Physiological arousal reflects the 
somatic symptoms of anxiety, and its indicators typically include heart rate, skin 
conductance, and levels of adrenaline. Somatic anxiety is the perception of one's 
physiological arousal (Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981) and is typically measured 
by self-report questionnaire. In Hardy and associates' catastrophe models, 
physiological arousal (not somatic anxiety) was chosen as the asymmetry factor 
because of its potential direct and indirect effects upon performance. Thus, in terms 
of testing the predictions of the catastrophe model, physiological arousal would 
normally be preferred over somatic anxiety. However, direct measures of 
physiological arousal can be intrusive in a field setting. Also, if a heart rate measure 
(for example) was to be taken, the participants would have needed familiarisation 
sessions to become adept at measuring their physiological arousal. For these reasons, 
and as past research has revealed similar relationships for somatic anxiety and other 
estimators of physiological arousal with performance (e.g., Parfitt, Hardy, & Pates, 
1995), somatic anxiety was deemed an appropriate approximation of physiological 
arousal for the purpose of this study. 
Performance. Two assessors who operated independently of each other 
measured golf driving performance subjectively. One of the golf assessors was one 
of the experimenters and an experienced golfer; the other was a very experienced 
golfer (handicap of four). Several factors were considered when evaluating the 
quality of golf drives. First, tempo, swing length, swing plane, and body rotation 
were used as an indicator of the quality of the swing. These components of the swing 
were then condensed into a composite measure of swing performance. Second, 
distance, accuracy (position of the ball), and trajectory of the ball were considered as 
separate measures of driving performance. Thus, four aspects of golf driving 
performance were used: quality of swing, distance, accuracy (position of the ball), 
and trajectory of the ball. Each of these aspects was measured on a 10-point Likert-
type scale relative to each individual's ability (1 = much poorer than usual to 10 = 
much better than usual), yielding a score between 4 and 40. The mean of the two 
assessors' scores was used as the overall performance measure. One of the assessors 
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had played with the players for a number of years and hence had good knowledge of 
each individual's ability. In order to enable the second assessor to familiarize himself 
with the golfers' driving ability, he observed each golfer perfonning 20 practice 
shots on the golf club practice ground. The assessors then compiled brief notes on 
each golfer's driving perfonnance in order to enable a more accurate recollection and 
assessment of each golfer's perfonnance during the competition. 
Procedure 
Two workshops and a golf tournament were run over two consecutive days. 
The first workshop was conducted on the first day; the second workshop and the golf 
tournament were conducted on the second day. 
Workshops. In the workshops prior to the golftoumament, participants were 
taught how to self-report the subcomponents of the CSAI-2 on a single-integer scale 
from 0 to 27 (the same range of possible scores for each subcomponent in the CSAI-
2; 9-36). In the first workshop, participants were introduced to the concepts of 
cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence. Each participant was then 
asked to complete the three subscales of the CSAI-2 with respect to three 
hypothetical scenarios: "how you felt prior to a previously very good golfing 
perfonnance," "how you felt prior to a previously very bad golfing perfonnance," 
and "how you felt prior to any other (good or bad) sporting perfonnance." 
Immediately after completing the three subscales for each scenario, participants were 
asked to self-report a single score between 0 and 27 for cognitive anxiety, somatic 
anxiety, and self-confidence corresponding to each of the scenarios previously 
described. After each set of ratings, participants were provided with both sets of 
scores (CSAI-2 and single-integer scores) for each scenario so that they could see the 
accuracy of their single-integer scores8• 
The second workshop commenced with a review of the concepts of cognitive 
anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence. Participants were then asked to 
complete the original CSAI-2 (Martens et aI., 1990) with respect to four scenarios. 
8 Direct comparisons between the two measures were made possible by subtracting nine from each 
CSAI-2 subscale score. 
89 
These scenarios were: "How you felt prior to another competition in another sporting 
situation"; "How you think you will feel immediately prior to the forthcoming 
competition"; "How you felt after a very poor hole as you approached the next tee 
area"; and "How you felt after a very good hole as you approached the next tee area." 
Participants were asked to report single-integer scores for each subscale with respect 
to these scenarios. Again, after each set of ratings was obtained, participants were 
shown their scores so that they could ascertain the accuracy of their single-integer 
scores in relation to those of the inventory. 
The two workshops aimed at increasing the accuracy of participants' self-reporting 
of their cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence with single-integer 
scores rather than the more lengthy and intrusive process of completing a 27-item 
inventory. This was deemed necessary to avoid over-intrusive measures during the 
golf tournament that participants were to participate in. During both workshops, 
participants were encouraged to ask any questions that might aid their understanding. 
Golf tournament. The golf tournament was conducted on day two after the 
second workshop. It was held in two parts with each participant playing a single 
round of golf in a group of four (a "four ball"). Participants were instructed to score 
their round in accordance with Stapleford rules. In Stapleford rules, golfers are 
awarded points for each hole played with a higher number of points reflecting better 
performance. For each hole, points are awarded as follows: Nett Albatross = 5 points; 
Nett Eagle = 4 points; Nett Birdie = 3 points; Nett Par = 2 points; Nett Bogey = 1 
point; and worse than a Bogey = 0 points. In this way, if a player scores a level par 
for the round, he scores 36 points. The players were informed that prize money 
would be awarded based on Stapleford rules as follows: £15 for first place; £10 for 
second place; and £5 for third place. 
Prior to each tee shot, players were asked to score their cognitive anxiety, somatic 
anxiety, and self-confidence as single-integer scores directly on their scorecard, 
which was modified for this purpose. Thus, each player wrote down three numbers 
before the tee shot for each hole he played: one for his cognitive anxiety; one for his 
somatic anxiety; and one for his self-confidence. After the player had played his tee 
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shot, the two assessors scored the driving performance on their own separate cards. 
These scores were derived based on the criteria mentioned previously relative to each 
individual's ability. The assessors were "blind" with respect to the performers' 
anxiety and self-confidence scores. At the end of the competition, prize money was 
given to the three players with the highest scores based on the Stapleford rules. 
Results 
Reliability of the self-report measures 
In order to assess the reliability of the single-integer measures of cognitive 
anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence, correlation coefficients were 
calculated between the single-integer scores and the CSAI-2 scores for each of these 
variables. The data were first standardized within participants in order to control for 
potential individual differences in inventory response sensitivity. The data were then 
pooled across participants. This yielded 56 observations (seven scenarios x eight 
participants ). 
Pearson's correlation coefficients were r = 0.59 (p < 0.01) for cognitive anxiety, r = 
0.56 (p < 0.01) for somatic anxiety, and r = 0.68 (p < 0.01) for self-confidence. 
Closer inspection of the participants' data revealed that one individual's single-
integer scores correlated poorly with the CSAI-2 scores. Consequently, this 
participant's data were removed from the data set for all subsequent analyses. As a 
result of this removal, there were 49 observations rather than 56. The resulting 
Pearson's correlation coefficients were: r = 0.67 (p < 0.01) for cognitive anxiety; r = 
0.72 (p < 0.01) for somatic anxiety; and r = 0.80 (p < 0.01) for self-confidence. For 
the purpose of the present study, these correlation coefficients were considered high 
enough to justify the use of the single-integer scores in the subsequent analyses. 
Data analysis 
All anxiety, self-confidence, and performance scores were standardized 
within participants using z-score transformations and then collapsed across subjects 
yielding a total of 126 data points. The dependent variable was subjective golf 
performance as measured by the golf assessors. Objective golf performance scores 
were not deemed an appropriate measure of performance, as distance alone is not a 
very good indicator of quality. Also, a biomechanical analysis was not practical in 
such a field setting. 
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In order to test the hypothesis that self-confidence acts as a bias factor in the 
catastrophe model, the data were first split into two subsets: high self-confidence and 
low self-confidence. This was done by means of a median split. At-test confinned 
that there was a significant difference in self-confidence scores between the "high" 
and "low" conditions (t (124) = 15.27,p < .001). The two resulting sets of data (high 
self-confidence and low self-confidence) were treated separately from this point 
forward. All of the procedures described hereafter in this section were applied 
separately to both sets of data. 
The median was detennined for cognitive anxiety and for somatic anxiety. The data 
were then coded as either low (below the median) or high (above the median) for 
each of these two variables. In the low self-confidence subset, separate t-tests 
confinned that significant differences existed between the "high" and "low" 
conditions for cognitive anxiety (t (65) = 13.45,p < .001) and for somatic anxiety (t 
(65) = 10.19,p < .001). In the high self-confidence subset, separate t-tests also 
confinned that significant differences existed between the "high" and "low" 
conditions for cognitive anxiety (t (57) = 7.75,p < .001) and for somatic anxiety (t 
(57) = 9.21,p < .001). These median splits resulted in four possible conditions: high 
cognitive anxiety/high somatic anxiety; high cognitive anxiety/low somatic anxiety; 
low cognitive anxietyihigh somatic anxiety; and low cognitive anxiety/low somatic 
anxiety. Cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety were subsequently treated as 
independent variables in two-factor analyses of variance (ANOVAs) in which the 
standardized perfonnance scores were the dependent variable. 
Although median splits allow data sets to be split in half at the median, there is no 
reason to believe that the maximum interaction effect size between cognitive anxiety 
and somatic anxiety will lie precisely on the somatic anxiety median. In fact, the 
butterfly catastrophe model predicts that perfonnance decrements will occur at 
different levels of somatic anxiety (or physiological arousal) depending on the level 
of self-confidence. Consequently, the somatic anxiety data were subsequently split at 
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various points below and above the median. More specifically, the somatic anxiety 
data were split at regular intervals of 0.1 SD below and above the somatic anxiety 
median. The fairly small gradation of 0.1 SD was chosen in order to allow for the 
emergence of a precise point or points (corresponding to the bifurcation set) along 
the somatic anxiety continuum where the maximum interaction effect size lay. If the 
hypothesis were to be supported, then these points would be at a lower level of 
somatic anxiety for the low self-confidence group than for the high self-confidence 
group. That is, the fold at the front edge of the catastrophe surface would be farther 
to the right for high self-confidence and farther to the left for low self-confidence. In 
order to test this hypothesis, separate two-factor (cognitive anxiety x somatic 
anxiety) ANOV As were conducted for the low self-confidence group and for the 
high self-confidence group with that data split into high and low somatic anxiety, at 
the median +0.7, the median + 0.6, the median +0.5, etc. down to the median -0.7. 
Beyond the highest and lowest points, one of the resulting quadrants was too small to 
allow a meaningful ANOV A to be performed. For each ANOV A, the magnitude of 
the cognitive anxiety x somatic anxiety interaction effect size was noted. 
Analysis of Performance Data 
As mentioned previously, the performance data were split at the self-
confidence median. This yielded two conditions: high self-confidence (above the 
median) and low self-confidence (below the median). These two conditions will be 
discussed separately here. 
Low self-confidence. Two-factor (cognitive anxiety x somatic anxiety) ANOVAs 
were conducted with somatic anxiety splits ranging from [median - 0.7 SD] to 
[median + 0.7 SD] in increments of 0.1 SD. This resulted in a total of 15 ANOVAs 
being performed, a different one for each different split in the somatic anxiety data. 
The range of somatic anxiety splits ([median - 0.7 SD] to [median + 0.7 SDn either 
side of the somatic anxiety median was determined by the range of scores for which 
there were enough data points to perform a cognitive anxiety x somatic anxiety 
ANOV A. These ANOV As revealed two significant interactions between cognitive 
anxiety and somatic anxiety corresponding to splits in the somatic anxiety data at the 
median and at [median - 0.1 SD]. No significant main effects were revealed for either 
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cognitive or somatic anxiety. The interaction F ratios and corresponding effect sizes 
are displayed in Table 7. The maximum eta-squared interaction effect size was .094. 
This interaction is illustrated in Figure 6. The corresponding standardized value for 
somatic anxiety at this level was z = -0.55. 
Table 7. Golfers' low self-confidence condition. F ratios and effect sizes for the 
interaction between cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety for different splits in the 
somatic anxiety data. 
Somatic anxiety split Standardized value for Interaction Eta-
Somatic Anxiety F{I,63} sguared 
Median +.7 0.25 0.17 0.003 
Median +.6 0.15 0.32 0.005 
Median +.5 0.05 0.32 0.005 
Median +.4 -0.05 0.32 0.005 
Median +.3 -0.15 0.30 0.005 
Median +.2 -0.25 0.30 0.005 
Median +.1 -0.35 1.53 0.024 
Median -0.45 4.60* 0.068 
Median - .1 -0.55 6.52* 0.094 
Median - .2 -0.65 3.61 0.054 
Median - .3 -0.75 2.66 0.041 
Median - .4 -0.85 2.96 0.045 
Median -.5 -0.95 .70 0.011 
Median -.6 -1.05 1.41 0.022 
Median -.7 -1.15 0.44 0.007 
* p < 0.05 
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Figure 6. Low self-confidence. Interaction between cognitive anxiety and somatic 
anxiety. 
94 
High self-confidence. Two-factor (cognitive anxiety x somatic anxiety) 
ANOV As were conducted with somatic anxiety splits ranging from [median - 1.3 
SD] to [median + 0.6 SD] in increments of 0.1 SD. This resulted in a total of20 
ANOV As being performed, a different one for each different split in the somatic 
anxiety data. The range of somatic anxiety splits ([median - 1.3 SD] to [median + 0.6 
SDn either side of the somatic anxiety median was determined by the range of scores 
for which there were enough data points to perform a cognitive anxiety x somatic 
anxiety ANOV A. There were three significant interactions between cognitive anxiety 
and somatic anxiety. These corresponded to splits in the somatic anxiety data 
between [median - 0.3 SD] and [median - 0.1 SD]. The interaction Fratios and 
corresponding effect sizes are displayed in Table 8. It should be noted here that the 
data did not change for these three values. That is, changing the split in the somatic 
anxiety data from z = 0.03 to z = 0.23 did not result in any data points moving from 
the high somatic anxiety subset to the low somatic anxiety subset. Thus, the eta-
squared effect size for all of these interactions was .073. The nature of this 
interaction is illustrated in Figure 7. The corresponding standardized value for 
somatic anxiety at this level ranged from z = 0.03 to z = 0.23. At these three splits in 
the somatic anxiety data, the ANOV As also revealed significant main effects for 
cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety. These main effects are not reported here as 
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they are not of primary interest in this study and they are potentially confounded by 
the significant interactions, which are of primary interest. 
Table 8. Golfers' high self-confidence condition. F ratios and effect sizes for the 
interaction between cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety for different splits in the 
somatic anxiety data. 
Somatic anxiety split Standardized value for Somatic Interaction Eta-
Anxiety F (1, 55) squared 
Median +.6 0.93 0.16 0.003 
Median +.5 0.83 0.02 0.000 
Median +.4 0.73 0.02 0.000 
Median +.3 0.63 0.02 0.000 
Median +.2 0.53 0.27 0.005 
Median +.1 0.43 0.50 0.009 
Median 0.33 0.34 0.006 
Median - .1 0.23 4.35* 0.073 
Median -.2 0.13 4.35* 0.073 
Median -.3 0.03 4.35* 0.073 
Median -.4 -0.06 3.65 0.062 
Median -.5 -0.16 0.98 0.018 
Median -.6 -0.26 0.34 0.006 
9Median - 1.3 -0.96 0.34 0.006 
*p < 0.05 
9 For splits in the somatic anxiety data between [median -0.6] and [median - 1.3], changes ~ the 
somatic anxiety split did not change the resulting quadrants. Hence the F-values and effect SIZes were 
identical for these splits in the somatic anxiety data. 
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Figure 7. High self-confidence. Interaction between cognitive anxiety and somatic 
anxiety. 
Comparison of high and low self-confidence conditions 
Figure 8 depicts the cognitive anxiety x somatic anxiety interaction effect 
sizes as a function of the split in the somatic anxiety data for both self-confidence 
conditions (i.e., low and high). This clearly illustrates that the maximum interaction 
effect size occurs at a higher level of somatic anxiety for the high self-confidence 
condition than for the low self-confidence condition. 
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high self-confidence as a function of somatic anxiety. 
Discussion 
The segmental quadrant analysis employed in this study offers an effective method 
for investigating the proposed role of self-confidence as a bias factor within Hardy's 
butterfly catastrophe model (Hardy, 1990, 1996a). Certainly, as confirmed in this 
study, there is no reason to expect the maximum interaction effect size between 
cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety to lie precisely at the median of somatic 
anxiety. However, by splitting the somatic anxiety data at various points below and 
above the median, one can ascertain the precise point at which the maximum 
interaction between cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety occurs. 
The results of the present study provide support for the proposition that self-
confidence moderates the interactive effects of cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety 
upon performance. That is, the maximum interaction effect size between cognitive 
anxiety and somatic anxiety was at a higher level of somatic anxiety for the high self-
confidence condition than for the low self-confidence condition (see Figure 8). This 
is consistent with the prediction that self-confidence might act as a bias factor within 
a butterfly catastrophe model (Hardy, 1990, 1996a). 
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In the low self-confidence condition, the nature of the interaction between cognitive 
anxiety and somatic anxiety was as predicted by the catastrophe model. That is, when 
somatic anxiety was low, cognitive anxiety was positively related to performance, 
and when somatic anxiety was high, cognitive anxiety was negatively related to 
performance. This is similar to the interaction between cognitive anxiety and 
physiological arousal revealed by Edwards and Hardy (1996) with netball players 
(although Edwards and Hardy's interaction was a crossover interaction, not a 
diverging interaction). However, under conditions of high self-confidence, the 
interaction between cognitive and somatic anxiety was somewhat different: cognitive 
anxiety was more positively related to performance when somatic anxiety was high 
than when it was low. At first, this may seem to contradict catastrophe model 
predictions. However, as self-confidence swings the front edge of the catastrophe 
model to the right then the "high" somatic anxiety condition may still lie within the 
bifurcation set. Thus, performance in the high somatic anxiety condition could stay 
on the upper performance surface at (or near) the cusp, and would therefore be better 
than performance in the low somatic anxiety condition. However, the generally 
highly depressed performance scores that were obtained throughout the high self-
confidence data are extremely difficult to explain. This is counterintuitive and 
contrary to most published research (e.g., Burton, 1988; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 
1993). One exception was reported by Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, and Vevera 
(1987) whose analyses revealed a significant negative trend between self-confidence 
and pistol shooting performance. It is interesting to note that both pistol shooting 
performance and golf are relatively fine motor skills. However, quite how this might 
result in self-confidence having a negative impact upon performance is not at all 
clear and this is an avenue that needs further research. 
It is worth saying something at this juncture about the distinction between somatic 
anxiety and physiological arousal. The present study used somatic anxiety as an 
indicator of perceived physiological arousal. Hardy and associates (Hardy, 1990, 
1996a; Hardy & Fazey, 1987; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991) argued for the use of 
physiological arousal (as opposed to somatic anxiety) as the asymmetry factor in 
catastrophe models of anxiety and sports performance. This was because 
physiological arousal can affect performance both directly (e.g., heart rate, skin 
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conductance, adrenaline levels, etc.) and indirectly (i.e., via the perception of one's 
physiological arousal). In tenns of testing the catastrophe model, the present study is 
limited by the sole investigation of indirect effects (i.e., somatic anxiety), and the fact 
that discrepancies between golfers' actual physiological arousal and their perceptions 
of that physiological arousal could not have been detected. This limitation might be 
important because, for example, a golfer might perceive himself to be fairly relaxed 
despite a high level of physiological arousal reflected in muscular tension. In such an 
instance, the golfer's swing might suffer because of tight shoulders, even though he 
might have reported a low level of somatic anxiety. Certainly, some past research 
(e.g., Karteroliotis & Gill, 1987; Yan Lan & Gill, 1984) has revealed poor 
correlations between somatic anxiety and physiological arousal as measured by heart 
rate and blood pressure. Also, Parfitt et al. (1995) found perfonnance on an 
anaerobic task to be more strongly related to physiological arousal than to somatic 
anxiety. Consequently, future researchers would do well to consider both the 
potential direct and indirect effects of physiological arousal upon perfonnance. 
It is interesting to note that the poorest perfonnances in the high self-confidence 
condition were in the quadrant representing high cognitive anxiety and low somatic 
anxiety. Of the four possible quadrants (high and low cognitive and somatic anxiety), 
the high cognitive anxiety/low somatic anxiety appears to be the most unlikely 
combination (i.e., "I am confident and worried but my body is relaxed"). Perhaps 
such a condition is indicative of some fonn of repression reflecting internal 
contradiction. For example, researchers have found that repressors (high-anxious 
individuals who report low levels of anxiety) report low levels of distress despite 
experiencing high levels of physiological arousal (Asendorpf & Scherer, 1983; 
Derakshan & Eysenck, 1997; Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). Also, a 
study on female golfers (Williams & Krane, 1992) revealed that repressors reported 
higher self-confidence and similar state anxiety when compared to truly low-anxious 
individuals. Furthennore, when the repressors were deleted from Williams and 
Krane's analyses, the CSAI-2 subscales accounted for more than twice as much 
perfonnance variance than when the repressors were included (14% vs. 5.9%). This 
suggests that repression may be an important confound in anxiety research in sport 
making it an area that is worthy of future research. At an applied level, it is possible 
that repressors invest so many resources to effectuate such a repression (either 
consciously or subconsciously) that their performance subsequently suffers from a 
lack of available resources to attend to the task at hand. 
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There are a number of other limitations associated with the present study. The first 
concerns the use of multiple ANOV As. One could argue that conducting a series of 
ANOV As increases the likelihood of obtaining significant results and that a 
correction factor (e.g., Bonferroni) should have been employed to correct for this 
potential bias. This argument is sound when one is hypothesis testing. However, the 
use of multiple ANOV As is not a major limitation in the present study because the 
ANOV As were not used to test one particular hypothesis but rather to locate (along a 
somatic anxiety continuum) the maximum cognitive anxiety x somatic anxiety effect 
SIze. 
A second limitation concerns the cell sizes in segmental quadrant analysis. As the 
split in the data is moved from the median towards the end of the somatic anxiety 
continuum the cell sizes become more imbalanced. This imbalance in cell sizes could 
be problematic for two reasons. First, any wild scores in cells with a small number of 
observations could increase the likelihood of obtaining spurious significant 
interactions in this type of analysis. Clearly this was not a problem in the present 
study, as significant interactions emerged near the somatic anxiety median only (i.e., 
where the cell sizes are fairly equal). The second way that the unequal cell sizes 
might affect the results of this analysis is the converse of the first problem. That is, 
the relatively small size of the cells at the ends of the somatic anxiety continuum 
might inhibit the emergence of significant interactions. Thus, significant interactions 
would be limited to those analyses where the cell sizes were relatively large (i.e., 
near the median). At first sight, this seems to provide an alternative explanation for 
the results of the present study, as for both the high self-confidence and the low self-
confidence conditions, the significant interactions occurred near the somatic anxiety 
median. However, there were also a large number of cases where relatively large cell 
sizes did not result in significant interactions between cognitive anxiety and somatic 
anxiety. Rather, significant interactions occurred only in line with the hypotheses. 
Furthermore, the present analyses focused on effect sizes, not F-ratios, and effect 
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sizes are not so affected by cell size as are F-ratios. In light of all these arguments, 
the authors would argue that this alternative explanation of the results is not the most 
parsimomous one. 
A third criticism that could be levelled at this study is a limitation of catastrophe 
model research in general. That is, although catastrophe models do have defining 
characteristics, catastrophe surfaces are rubberised surfaces that can be bent or 
stretched to meet the precise theoretical or empirical needs of models. As such, one 
could argue that they are difficult to disprove and are thus of limited practical value 
(cf. Gill, 1994). Having said this, the present results have provided further evidence 
that cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety/physiological arousal need to be 
investigated as an interactive system and, at present, catastrophe models are the only 
models that offer interactive predictions between cognitive anxiety, physiological 
arousal, self-confidence, and performance. Furthermore, although tests of catastrophe 
models are limited within a surface-fitting framework, Hardy (1996b) has offered 
other, fairly straightforward, means of testing the various predictions of the models. 
These include: cognitive anxiety x physiological arousal interactive effects; the 
facilitative and debilitative effects of cognitive anxiety; and the hysteresis hypothesis 
(see Hardy, 1996b, for further details). 
In conclusion, the present results provide evidence for the moderating role of self-
confidence upon the combined effects of cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety upon 
performance within a butterfly catastrophe model framework. With further evidence 
of the interactive effects of cognitive and somatic anxiety upon performance, the 
present study suggests that research that explores anxiety, self-confidence, and sport 
performance as an interactive process is likely to further advance our knowledge in 
this area. 
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Chapter 5 
A Case Study of Organizational Stress in Elite SportlO 
Abstract 
This paper is an investigation of organizational stress in elite athletes. Fifteen elite 
athletes were interviewed with regard to potential sources of organizational stress in 
preparation for major international competitions. Four main organizational stress 
issues were examined: environmental issues; personal issues; leadership issues; and 
team issues. The main environmental issues that were revealed were: selection; the 
training environment; and finances. The main personal issues were: nutrition; injury; 
and goals and expectations. The main leadership issues revealed were: coaches; and 
coaching styles. The main team issues were: team atmosphere; support network; 
roles; and communication. The results are presented largely in the form of direct 
quotes to convey the intricate nature of the issues. The results are discussed in terms 
of the important practical and theoretical implications of organizational stress in elite 
sport, particularly for those researchers and practitioners who wish to gain a better 
understanding of elite performers as they prepare for major international 
competitions. Also, some possible strategies for coping with organizational stress in 
elite sport are discussed. 
\0 Based upon Woodman, T., & Hardy, L. (2001b). A Case Study of Organizational Stress in Elite 
Sport. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 13,207-238. 
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Introduction 
Organizational stress has been defined as "work-related social psychological stress" 
(Shirom, 1982, p. 21). Organizational stress is conceptualised as an interaction 
between the employee and the work environment to which he/she is exposed 
(Shirom, 1982). In line with Lazarus's (1966) conceptualisation of stress, 
organizational stress resides neither in the work environment nor in the individual. 
Rather, it is the individual's cognitive appraisal of the situation within the work 
environment that is central to this organizational stress process. It is not surprising, 
given this definition, that research in organizational stress has been driven 
predominantly by professional settings such as business, medicine, and education. 
Indeed, organizational stress has been investigated in a number of settings including: 
medical professions (Flett, Biggs, & Alpass, 1995; Florio, Donnelly, & Zevon, 1998; 
Jamal, 1984; Singh, 1990); police departments (Buunk & Verhoeven, 1991; GuIle, 
Tredoux, & Foster, 1998); military organizations (Rogers, Li, & Shani, 1987); 
schools (Cox, Boot, Cox, & Harrison, 1988; Mazur & Lynch, 1989); government 
agencies (Rogers, Li, & Ellis, 1994); banks (Seegers & van Elderen, 1996); and 
various corporations (Cangemi & Khan, 1997; Fried, Tiegs, Naughton, & Ashforth, 
1996; Singh, 1991; Srivastava, 1991). 
Sources of organizational stress in these settings include: work load, work design, 
job qualifications, performance evaluation, organization structure, responsibility and 
authority ambiguities (e.g., Rogers et aI., 1994; Rogers et aI., 1987); role ambiguity, 
role conflict, role overload (e.g., Jamal, 1984, 1985); and lack of knowledge, and 
lack of responsibility (e.g., Seegers & van Elderen, 1996). These factors have been 
found to have an effect on both job satisfaction (Hendrix, Ovalle, & Troxler, 1985; 
Kemery, Mossholder, & Bedeian, 1987) and job performance (Jamal, 1984, 1985; 
Rabinowitz & Stumpf, 1987). 
Organizational stress in sport can be conceived as an interaction between the 
individual and the sport organization within which that individual is operating. Jones 
(1990) defined stress as a state in which some demand is placed on the individual, 
who is then required to react in some way in order to be able to cope with the 
situation. By extension, organizational stress can be defined as the stress that is 
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associated primarily and directly with an individual's appraisal of the structure and 
functioning of the organization within which he/she is operating. Consequently, 
issues that are not normally directly related to the sport organization (e.g., parents, 
school) are not viewed as potential sources of organizational stress (although they 
might be sources of stress). However, those issues that are directly related to the 
sport organization (e.g., coaches, selection criteria) are viewed as potential sources of 
organizational stress. 
In their study of Canadian National Sport Organizations, Chelladurai and Haggerty 
(1991) found administrators' perceptions of decision-making (i.e., whether decisions 
within the organization were made in an appropriate fashion) and personnel relations 
to be positively associated with levels of job satisfaction. Although Chelladurai and 
Haggerty's study was not an investigation of organizational stress, it was, to the best 
of our knowledge, the first to show that organizational factors can have a significant 
effect on member satisfaction in a sport organization. 
A number of researchers have examined sources of stress in elite sport performers 
(Gould, Hom, & Spreeman, 1983; Gould, Jackson, & Finch, 1993a; Scanlan, 
Ravizza, & Stein, 1989; Scanlan, Stein, & Ravizza, 1991). For example, Scanlan et 
al. (1991) found five major sources of stress in elite figure skaters: negative aspects 
of competition (e.g., worries about the competition); negative significant-other 
relationships (e.g., interpersonal conflict, skating conflicts); demands/costs of skating 
(e.g., financial demands, time demands); personal struggles (e.g., physicaVmental 
difficulties, self-doubts about talent); and traumatic experiences (e.g., family 
disturbances, death of a significant other). The Gould et al. (1993a) study of national 
champion figure skaters revealed similar sources of stress to those found by Scanlan 
et al. (1991). While studies that have examined sources of stress are valuable in that 
they encompass a wide spectrum of athletes' stressful experiences, they often do not 
necessarily investigate the origins of these stressors. Clearly, some of these stressors 
will be beyond the level of the sport organization (e.g., family disturbances), but 
others could be a result of the organizational setting within which athletes find 
themselves. For example, a negative relationship between two team-mates might 
well be caused or exacerbated by the situation in which they have been placed within 
the sport organization (e.g., living together for a long time at a residential national 
training centre). 
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Despite the clear importance of organizational stress in a number of working 
environments, the sport arena seems to have been somewhat overlooked by 
researchers. However, the research on sources of stress mentioned above (e.g., Gould 
et aI., 1983; Gould et aI., 1993a; Scanlan et aI., 1991) does suggest that 
organizational factors might play an important part in athletes' preparation for 
competition. Consequently, the present study is an attempt to investigate the issues 
that underlie organizational stress as athletes prepare for major international 
competitions. 
In view of our rather scant knowledge of organizational stress in sport, this 
investigation is best suited to a qualitative methodology (cf. Steckler, McLeroy, 
Goodman, Bird, & McCormick, 1992). One of the main advantages of qualitative 
research is that it allows researchers to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
participants. Thus, if interview transcriptions are simply reduced into textual 
summaries and subsequently inserted into a hierarchical tree, the very essence of 
qualitative research would largely be lost. If the reader is to share an in-depth 
understanding of the participants, then comprehensive portions of the interview 
transcriptions should be available. Therefore, while the present investigation will 
report the traditional hierarchical trees in order to illustrate the array of issues 
involved, a considerable amount of data will be reported in the form of direct quotes. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixteen international elite performers (eight women and eight men) were 
selected for interview in this study. One of the participants did not complete the 
interview due to time constraints. Only the results from the remaining 15 interviews 
are reported here. When selecting participants, the major consideration was that they 
had been to an Olympic Games or a World Championships. Furthermore, the authors 
attempted to select participants who had had different experiences of the sport 
organization (e.g., athletes who trained at a national centre and athletes who trained 
at their club). This was possible thanks to the second author's experience as a 
consultant with some of the athletes within this organization. The selected 
participants were first contacted by telephone to inform them of the nature of the 
study and to elicit their participation. At this point, the potential participants were 
told that the purpose of the project was to gain an in-depth understanding of their 
experience of major international competitions in order to help make future 
recommendations to the organization. All athletes agreed to take part in the study. 
Upon meeting the interviewer, participants were reminded that any information 
discussed would remain anonymous. 
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Participants were either current, or recently retired (less than four years), national 
squad members 11. Changes in coaching staff, athletes, managers, and administrators 
increase the likelihood of a change in the organizational climate. Consequently, in 
order to set the present study within a relatively short time frame, it was decided to 
include only those athletes who were still involved in elite international competition 
or had retired less than four years previously. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 
30 (M= 23.9; SD = 3.6). 
The Sport Organization 
Given that the authors have chosen to report the results of this study 
anonymously, a detailed description of the organization is not possible. However, 
most qualitative researchers would recognize the importance of setting a study of this 
kind in the context of the sport organization. In light of these considerations, a fairly 
general description of the organization is provided here. 
The present sample was drawn from an individual sport in the UK. Athletes trained 
either at their club or at a national centre. When they trained at their own club, their 
personal coach largely governed their training regimen. When the athletes lived and 
trained at a national training centre, national coaches largely directed their training. 
Prior to travelling to major international competitions, athletes were normally 
brought together at a national training centre for two to six weeks. Although the 
11 Due to the often-sensitive nature of organizational stress, the sport and its corresponding 
organization will remain anonymous for the purpose of this report. 
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men's and women's training programmes were separate, the athletes shared the same 
national training centre. At the time of the interviews, apart from individual and team 
sponsorships, the athletes were not paid. However, if they accepted the invitation to 
train at a national training centre, their living expenses were paid for. 
Interview Guide 
There is, at present, no theoretical framework on which to base organizational 
stress research in sport. However, it seems likely that one of the sources of 
organizational stress is sub-optimal group dynamics in the sport organization as a 
whole. For example, organizational stress will likely be more prominent in a setting 
where directors, managers, administrators, coaches, and athletes do not form a 
cohesive group than in a setting where such group dynamics are better. In view of 
this, the interview questions were broadly based on Carron's (1982) model of group 
cohesion. The participants were asked to discuss their experiences of "major 
international competitions such as World Championships and Olympic Games" as 
they related to: environmental issues, personal issues, leadership issues, and team 
issues (cf. Carron, 1982). 
In their work as practising sport psychologists, the authors had some knowledge of 
the organizational stress that the participants might have experienced. In particular, 
the second author had worked as a sport psychology consultant within international 
sport for over twenty years. Consequently, the interview questions were developed 
through discussion between the two authors based on the second author's experience 
of international sport. These questions were then integrated into Carron's (1982) 
framework of sources of group cohesion. 
Upon meeting the interviewer, participants were reminded that the purpose of the 
study was to gain insight into their experience of the sport organization as they 
prepared for major international competitions. Participants were also reminded that 
any information discussed would remain anonymous and that they could stop the 
interview at any time. 
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The interview started with general questions to ensure that the participants were free 
to discuss any issues that they felt were important in preparation for a major 
international competition. These general questions included: (a) the team's 
psychological preparation for the competition, (b) the structure of training, and (c) 
any change in training sessions. The four subsequent sections were: (1) 
Environmentalfactors, including: (a) training scholarships and bursaries, (b) the 
selection process, and (c) the training environment; (2) Personal factors, including: 
(a) different people's roles within the team, and (b) people's goals and expectations; 
(3) Leadership factors, including: (a) coaches, and (b) coaching styles; and (4) Team 
factors, including: (a) the team atmosphere, (b) the team's goals, (c) people's 
contributions to the team, (d) the support received, and ( e) communication within the 
team (see Appendix B for complete interview guide). 
Open questions such as "Can you tell me about the team's psychological preparation 
for these competitions?" were followed by questions such as "What effect did that 
have?" until saturation was deemed to have occurred on a particular issue (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Clarification and elaboration probes were used to ensure an accurate 
and in-depth understanding of what the participants were describing. Before 
proceeding to the next section, participants were asked whether there was anything 
else they could tell the interviewer concerning what had just been discussed. 
Participants were asked to take their time to respond to questions and to tell the 
interviewer if they could not remember something rather than guess (Hindley, 1979; 
Moss, 1979). 
The first author, who was trained in qualitative research methods and had four years' 
experience in sport psychology consultancy, conducted all interviews. Each 
participant was asked the same questions with similar prompts in order to obtain 
responses that were as consistent as possible in terms of depth and complexity 
(Patton, 1990). Although efforts were made to ensure that the sequencing of 
questions was similar for each participant, the order of presentation of the questions 
varied to allow the athletes to pursue the interview in the direction that they deemed 
appropriate. This has the advantage of allowing participants to express themselves in 
their preferred manner while retaining the systematic nature of data collection 
between participants (Patton, 1990). 
Interviews ranged in duration from 50 minutes to 150 minutes. This range reflects 
the athletes' different ways of expressing themselves. One athlete was particularly 
elaborate during the interview. Most interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. 
All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. This resulted in 491 
pages of single-spaced text. 
Pilot Study 
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A former elite performer, recently retired from the sport under investigation, 
was interviewed using the interview guide described above. This interview was 
recorded using a video camera. The aim of this interview was twofold: first, to 
ensure that the questions in the interview guide enabled the performer to discuss all 
the issues that she felt were pertinent with regard to her preparation for major 
international competitions; second, to enable the interviewer to gain advice on his 
interview techniques, body language, and clarification and probing techniques. Two 
researchers, who had a sound understanding of qualitative methods and had 
conducted qualitative research in the past, gave this advice. As a result of the 
interview and subsequent discussion between the interviewer, the interviewee, and 
the aforementioned researchers, the interview was modified to include two further 
questions (about injury and nutrition). Throughout the study, advice on interviewing 
techniques (e.g., effective open-ended questioning) was also provided by the second 
author who had considerable experience in qualitative research. 
Methodological Considerations 
Proponents of grounded theory (e.g., Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Pidgeon & 
Henwood; 1997; Strauss & Corbin, 1997) would acknowledge that a study of this 
kind could not develop from a theoretical tabula rasa, thus recognizing that the 
researchers bring their knowledge to the research process, and that questions will be 
based on a subjective view of the world. Most of the interview questions were based 
on the researchers' past experience and knowledge of sport organizations, broadly 
structured around Carron's (1982) group dynamics framework. The pilot study 
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allowed for the emergence of further issues related to organizational stress. The 
interview guide was subsequently modified to accommodate these issues and the 
resulting guide was used for all subsequent interviews. Thus, although there was not 
a constant "flip flop" (pidgeon & Henwood, 1997, p. 255) between data and the 
researchers' conceptualisations, there was at least some interplay. In summary, this 
study employed both traditional inductive/deductive content analysis (Weber, 1985) 
and inductive grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) approaches. 
Data analysis 
All 15 transcribed interviews were formatted for analysis in the QSR 
NUD*IST 4 statistical package (1997). The hierarchical content analysis yielded 
meaningful segments of text that were related to organizational stress, and these were 
labelled under one of the four general categories: environmental issues, personal 
issues, leadership issues, and team issues. Environmental issues were defined as 
those issues pertaining to the sport environment in which the athlete was operating or 
used to operate. Personal issues were defined as those issues pertaining directly to 
the individual. Leadership issues were defined as those issues pertaining directly to 
the coaches and managers. Team issues were defined as those issues pertaining 
directly, and for the most part, to the team. 
Reliability criteria were met through numerous and regular discussions between the 
two authors. Using QSR NUD*IST 4 (1997), the first author extracted raw quotes 
(i.e., quotes representing a meaningful point) and categorized the data into raw 
themes and first-order themes. Discussion between the two authors resulted in either 
a consensus with regard to a category or changes in categorization until such 
consensus was attained between the two authors. Also, a third researcher who was 
trained in qualitative methods was given a random selection of the raw quotes (30; 
5%) and was asked to categorize these quotes into their raw themes and first-order 
themes. This researcher correctly categorized 90% (27 out of 30) of the quotes into 
their raw themes, and 99% (96 out of 97) of the raw themes into their first-order 
categories. 
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Results 
The organizational stress pertaining to environmental issues, personal issues, 
leadership issues, and team issues are displayed in Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 
respectively. Although these trees display the full range of issues, the true intricate 
and complex nature of organizational stress would mostly be lost if the presentation 
of the data were restricted to such trees. For this reason, the authors have reported the 
results based on a substantial selection of direct quotations 12. This has the 
considerable advantage of allowing the quotes to "speak for themselves," thus 
enabling the reader to understand fully the issues involved. 
Environmental Issues 
The full range of environmental issues is illustrated in Figure 9. The main 
environmental issues were: selection; finances; and training environment. 
7 Late selection 
4 Lengthy selection process 
9 Unclear selection criteria Selection 
9 Perceived unfairness in selection process r--- I--
3 Inappropriate selection process 
1 Inappropriate selectors 
2 Perceived financial favouritism 
1 Lack of financial support for treatment of injuries Finances 
7 Lack of financial support r--- I--
12 Differential financial support 
4 Money used as power "to control" the athlete Environmental 
r- Issues 
2 Monotonous training 
3 Inappropriate training regime at a national centre 
2 Not used to training as a team 
5 Pressure of competition training Training 
r-- I--5 Boredom-isolation at a national training centre Environment 
1 Training too taxing 
4 Differences between athletes in training 
1 Unfamiliar kit at competition 
1 Tense training environment 
1 Noisy hotel at competition site Accommodation 
Figure 9. Organizational Stress: Environmental Issues (the number of athletes 
mentioning each raw theme is listed in the first column). 
12 All names have been changed. 
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Selection. All participants mentioned selection criteria and procedures as a 
source of organizational stress. The main selection issues were: late selection (i.e., 
too close to the competition), a lengthy selection process, unclear selection criteria, 
and perceived unfairness in the selection process. Selection appears to be a 
particularly sensitive issue in that any lack of clarity increases the likelihood of bad 
feelings within the squad. The following quote from a female athlete illustrates the 
frustration that athletes can experience from perceived favouritism on behalf of the 
selectors: 
I was just like, "well, what's the point? You know who you want to 
take, you know who's going to go, you know where you want them to 
be ranked, so therefore you fix it. So why am I going through this? 
Why can't I do my normal training to make me compete well at the 
competition instead of having these stupid fI<**ing trial things." 
While perceived favouritism in selection is clearly frustrating to the athlete, a late 
selection can result in poor preparation for major competitions, as is illustrated in this 
quote by another female athlete: 
They didn't pick the team for the World Championships in Santiago 
until we got to Santiago ... they didn't tell us who was competing 
[until] like the day before the competition ... I think it made 
everybody really tense and nervous and it didn't do a lot for the team 
motivation or team spirit. 
Selection for a major international event is extremely important to athletes as it is 
often seen as a "gateway" to a peak in their career. For some of the participants in 
this study, selection was so important that it became the peak rather than the 
gateway. This is apparent in the quote below: 
The worst thing was that we hadn't had a break ... we did four control 
comps a week and we couldn't cope, we peaked too early ... We were 
working really hard to get selected and we'd peak for control comps 
and by the time the Worlds came we'd gone down. 
Selectors keen to ensure that they select the best and/or most consistent athletes 
might be tempted to expose athletes to a number of competitions prior to a major 
event. However, if this process is too lengthy, athletes are more prone to fatigue and 
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injury and will likely not be optimally prepared for a major international competition. 
The following quote illustrates the problems associated with a lengthy selection 
process: 
I think the method of selection for the Olympic Games was 
ridiculous ... because we did the national championships, that 
counted ... I went straight off to Italy for an InternationaL .. That's 
where I actually injured my foot. .. so I was actually training with the 
injury all through the trials for the Olympics. Then I had to go to the 
European Championships, I had a really good competition there ... so 
I was really pleased with that, but while I was out there I got a stress 
fracture in my back. Then we came back ... we had a few trials at [a 
specific training centre] ... Then we flew to Norway, we had a two-
day competition there which was absolutely awful. .. and then straight 
from there we had to get a train to Denmark where we trained ... with 
the Danish national squad for a week, so that was really tough. And at 
the end of it we had another two-day competition and then ... that was 
the final decision. And then we got told [if we were selected for the 
Olympics] and then we came home and it was just like (sigh). But 
then you couldn't relax because I knew I was going to the 
Olympics ... I had to train. 
Training Environment. The main training environment issues were: 
monotonous training; difficulties training at a national training centre; not used to 
training as a team; pressure of competition training; and differences between athletes 
in preparation. Because of the sometimes different loyalties towards one's personal 
club and towards one's national team, difficulties can arise if the two environments 
are not compatible. For those athletes used to training at their personal clubs, it can 
be rather difficult to adjust to national training as the following quote from a male 
athlete suggests: 
... a lot of us trained at different places, so you didn't get a team 
training over a length of time, so psychologically you were just doing 
your own thing in your own club with your personal coach. And then 
maybe a week, or two weeks, before a major competition you're all 
put together at [a specific training centre] which in some cases 
destroyed some people that you compete against all the time. And 
some people are together because they train together and you're sort 
of out of that little clique ... So psychologically sometimes it boosted 
you because you were ... wanting to beat somebody else ... and in 
other cases it destroyed you. 
/ 
The difficulties of creating the "right" training environment over a period of time 
before travelling out to a major competition are well illustrated in this quote: 
I think it [training at a specific training centre for a month] might have 
drained us. We just wanted to go to the World Championships, get 
everything over with and get back to nonna!. But you can't say what's 
wrong and what's right because maybe if the team hadn't come 
together then you wouldn't have got a team atmosphere, but I don't 
know whether the right one was created, so it's difficult. 
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Finances. The main financial issues were: not having enough money; 
differential financial support; and the perception of money being used "to control" 
the athlete. Elite athletes commit many years of their life to their sport and many 
often do not have time to earn money outside training for their sport. Consequently, 
they rely on their family, sponsorship, or their sport organization to provide them 
with sufficient funds to pursue their career in elite sport. When this financial support 
is not forthcoming or is poorly managed, athletes will often feel discarded and might 
retire prematurely. The following quote illustrates this: 
The more money you [have] the easier it is to organize training 
sessions and training camps ... It affects [you] a lot really. I mean if 
you have more money, then I think our sport would be a lot higher. .. 
in the world than we are today. A lot of the girls struggle, the guys 
struggle ... I mean some of them were asked to live at [a specific 
training centre] but couldn't because they couldn't find the money, so 
they had to stay in their own clubs and they slowly fizzled out, 
because all the guys that were at [a specific training centre] were 
getting better and they weren't because they didn't have their 
financial support. 
Differential financial support for athletes, particularly if it is not well justified, has 
the potential to create bad feelings within national squads. Indeed, when athletes 
perceive that they are unjustifiably receiving less financial support than other athletes 
in the national squad, they are likely to feel rather despondent as the following quote 
shows: 
It's not fair ... if we're all together in the same team we should get the 
same amount of money. I don't think anybody should be singled out 
because that's when there's a bit of friction towards everyone ... 
There's some people in the national team, because they're at a 
different club ... they get sponsored by [brand name], they can get free 
[kit] and Janet. .. and Jane, they get all free [kit]. But then when we 
come we have to pay for ours, or we get [it] half price which I don't 
think is fair. I think if we're members of the national squad like them, 
we should be allowed the same opportunities. It's stupid. 
Personal Issues 
The full range of personal issues is illustrated in Figure 10. The major 
personal issues were: nutrition; injury; and goals and expectations. 
4 Poor provision of food 
2 Disordered eating H Nutrition }-2 Importance placed on diet 
1 Guilty feelings towards food 
1 Feeling discarded because of injuries 
2 Frustration at own injury 
2 Too much pressure because of injury Injury 
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5 Training despite injury H ~ H Personal 2 Fear of being seen to be injured Issues 
5 Lack of structure reo injury treatment 
1 Pressure from others reo expectations 
4 Lack of direction with goals H Goals and 1-2 Unrealistic goals for the team Expectations 
2 Tension because of personal goals within the team 
Figure 10. Organizational Stress: Personal Issues (the number of athletes mentioning 
each raw theme is listed in the first column). 
Nutrition. The main issues with respect to people's nutrition were: poor 
provision of food; disordered eating; and the importance placed on diet. Nutrition 
was most often an issue for the female athletes in this study. This comment by a 
female athlete highlights the importance of diet: "I'd say 90% of our sport is about 
diet. .. Diet is my worst subject." Although diet can be a major issue in itself, the 
following quote shows that a lack of sensitivity on behalf of coaches can exacerbate 
the problem: 
We were weighed twice a day, and he [a national coach] used to not 
threaten us but he used to like make you ... , "you've got to watch your 
weight. If you're heavier then you won't train today" and you knew 
that that would be the worst thing ... He tried different tactics by 
putting it up on a wall so everyone could see how much we weighed 
and that. It was embarrassing. 
I 
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The female athletes' experiences with regard to nutrition suggest that problems can 
arise from a number of sources, notably coaches' attitudes, a lack of education on 
nutrition, and a lack of support following a serious injury. The quote below shows 
the complexity of this issue: 
The pressure on people is far, far too much ... I made myself ill over it 
through losing too much weight because I wasn't educated enough on 
it, and I saw Jane being taken to the hospital because she was so ill. 
And there was me, I was taking up to 60 laxatives a day ... That was 
mainly after my foot operation when I had been told that I was grossly 
overweight. I had no sort of support ... nothing to sort of aim at. I 
think it's a big mixed up problem. 
As mentioned previously, nutrition and weight control were predominantly issues for 
the female athletes in this study. The following quote shows a contrasting attitude 
from a male athlete: 
It didn't bother me in the slightest [being called fat], because you look 
at somebody who's fat and then you look at yourself and you think, "I 
can cope with that," and then you can go and do your sport. You're 
like, "well, if I was fat, I wouldn't be able to do this." I wasn't even 
bothered at all. 
Injury. The main issues with regard to injury were: frustration at one's own 
injury; too much pressure because of injury; training despite injury; fear of being 
seen to be injured; and lack of structure reo injury treatment. Injury can be a 
particularly devastating aspect of an athlete's career (Brewer, 1994; Evans & Hardy, 
1995; Pederson, 1986; Udry, Gould, Bridges, & Beck, 1997) and the following quote 
suggests that an organization that is not extremely sensitive to these issues will likely 
engender negative feelings from its athletes. 
Ijust feel like there's ... no routine to anything with the 
[ organization]. There should be a routine ... If one of the squad 
[athletes] is injured ... they're just left to it. No one cared, no one even 
knew what state I was in, no one even knew how I was recovering, 
and no one even gave a damn that I wasn't going to be in the World 
Championships. 
Although major injuries most often preclude an athlete from competing, athletes in 
many sports compete with injuries. The athletes interviewed in this study were no 
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exception. The following quote illustrates the difficulty for athletes who are faced 
with the dilemma of either competing while injured or not competing because of the 
InJury: 
I was at the Worlds in Berlin and I had to compete on it [my ankle] so 
the physio taped it up. But apparently afterwards I found out that no 
amount of taping would do any good. I just had to do it, because that 
was what I was there for. I hurt my ankle before the Europeans and 
Jerry [a national coach] said to me, "if you don't train, then you don't 
compete" so what could do I do? My ankle was like a balloon, I 
couldn't even see the bone, and it was blue all over from the swelling 
and the bruising. I had to compete on that; I had it taped up and I had 
to train on it. The physio just kept putting this piece of ... card on the 
anklebone and he said that it'd press out the swelling. And I still had 
to compete on it, just for myself. I mean I could've just said, "all right 
then, I'm not doing it," but I wanted to do it. 
Goals and Expectations. The main issues with respect to goals and 
expectations were related to: lack of direction with goals; unrealistic goals; and 
tension because of personal goals within the team. Goals are widely accepted as 
being an important aspect of an athlete's preparation for competition, which can 
either have a negative or a positive influence on athletes (Beggs, 1990; Hardy, Jones, 
& Gould, 1996). Despite studies that have shown the benefits of appropriate goal-
setting (Anderson, Crowell, Doman, & Howard, 1988; Burton, 1989; Kingston & 
Hardy, 1997), it appears that some coaches do not implement such psychological 
skills in their training programmes. The quote below suggests that coach education 
remains an important aspect of consultancy work: 
It was ... kind of, "oh, in training we'll do this" ... It was much better 
working it out with Sam [a sport psychologist] ... it was my goal 
settings as opposed to Harry's [a national coach] ... When I sat with 
Harry it was, "well, you've got the World Championships coming up 
there, but in May you've got this international," but I mean basically 
he was just giving me a calendar. .. he wasn't giving me proper goal-
setting. 
In the sport under study here, the national team needs to be ranked in the top 12 at 
the World Championships prior to the Olympic Games in order to qualify a full team 
for the Olympic Games. Because of this, directors and coaches might have a 
tendency to emphasize the importance of qualifying in the top 12 even if such an 
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expectation might appear unrealistic to the performers. An example of this is evident 
in the quote below: 
The team goal for ... the Belgium World Championships was ... , I 
would have said top 15, that would have been a realistic goal, but the 
goal that was set down was still top 12. I mean we ended up 18th or 
19th. 
Leadership Issues 
Coaches. A wide array of coach issues arose from these interviews (see 
Figure 11). 
9 Coach-athlete tension 
5 Difficulty with different coach 
11 Tension amongst coaching staff 
7 Coach not fulfilling role 
12 Non-supportive coaching attitude 
3 Untrustworthy coach 
10 Coach's differential treatment of athletes 
3 Coach not commanding respect 
1 Coach not practicing psychological skills 
5 Overbearing coach 
1 Coach acting differently in international arena 
1 Coach very demanding ~ Coaches r-1 No female coach 
3 Coach not understanding athlete 
1 Manipulative coach 
3 Coach's focus on team not on individual 
--1 Leadership 2 Coach's technical incompetence Issues 
6 Coach's attitude reo diet 
6 Non-supportive coach reo injury 
6 Coaches as poor communicators 
2 Lack of organization after resignation of 
national coach 
6 Inconsistent coaching style 
1 Coach making athlete feel more nervous H Coaching r-6 Unsuited coaching style to athlete Styles 
9 Different coaching styles 
Figure 11. Organizational Stress: Leadership issues (the number of athletes 
mentioning each raw theme is listed in the first column). 
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In view of the significance of the coach's role in an elite athlete's career, the 
relationship between athlete and coach is particularly important if the athlete is to 
attain hislher potential. In the present sample, it was not uncommon for athletes to 
train at their club with their personal coach, but to go to a specific training centre to 
train with the rest of the national squad prior to travelling to major international 
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competitions. One of the major sources of stress with regard to preparation for these 
competitions was the tension between coaching staff, notably between personal and 
national coaches. The following quote is an example of such friction: 
All the [athletes] had their own personal coaches, but obviously when 
they came together as a team at [a specific training centre], they were 
underneath the national coach which caused a lot of friction between 
individual coaches and the national coach. Sometimes they wanted 
their [athlete] to do one thing and the national coach wanted them to 
do another, but individual coaches know their [athlete] best because 
they work with them every day. I can't honestly say that there was 
anyone point in time where all the coaches got on, it just didn't 
happen. 
The effect of such friction amongst the coaching staff can be seen in the following 
quotes from a female athlete and a male athlete respectively: 
As much as you try not to let it affect you, you see the coaches arguing, 
what's to stop the girls from arguing too? .. It's just, it's there in the 
atmosphere. 
We were thinking, "Well, they're telling us that we shouldn't be doing 
this and that. .. and they're doing the same." We all discussed that ... 
after the meetings. We were saying, "Why are they telling us that we 
have to get on?" It came up in a meeting, Jack [an athlete] said it to 
Roger [a national coach], he said, "why are you lecturing us ... that we 
must stick together as a team, and you lot in the office can't agree on 
anything, and you're always arguing?" And they couldn't answer it. 
They couldn't say, "Well, we don't," because it was obvious ... I 
mean, we were looking at them and they weren't getting on, so why 
should we get on? 
It is fairly clear from these quotes that friction between coaching staff can rub off on 
the athletes and result in a poor group atmosphere. The following quote suggests that 
such friction is unlikely to be conducive to ideal preparation for a major international 
competition: 
Because James [a national coach] and Frank [a personal coach] didn't 
get on, then he [Frank] didn't get to go and they wouldn't even give 
him a pass to come to training ... I'd said that I'd do the World 
Championships as long as I didn't have to work with the other 
coaches, I'd work with my own coaches at [a specific training centre], 
which I did. And Frank did in fact get a pass so it was all right. It was 
a pain really. 
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Tension between coaches might simply be an artefact of conflicting personalities. 
However, it might also be caused by different approaches to coaching. The following 
quote suggests that coaches' divergent and headstrong views on coaching can be 
detrimental to athletes' preparation: 
There's different techniques ... and one coach would tell you one 
thing and the other would tell you, "no, don't do that, do this" and ... I 
remember crying at one point just because we didn't know what we 
were doing, because the coaches weren't communicating because they 
were obviously arguing about something. And they were telling you 
one thing and then the next [coach] would tell you another thing ... 
You forget which technique you're doing with which coach, and if 
you did it wrong then you'd get shouted at, and it would be like it was 
all your fault. And then you'd go, "well, so-and-so told me to do this" 
and then the coach would go, "well, is so-and-so your coach?" ... Who 
do you listen to? It's confusing; it's all about communication. 
A major international competition can be an intimidating experience for athletes as 
well as for the support staff. By behaving differently in this international arena, 
coaches can inadvertently detract from their athletes' preparation as this quote 
indicates: 
Coaches start acting a bit funny when they get into the international 
environment ... I think that they have to prove themselves to other 
coaches ... It's not helping you to become a better performer; it's all 
about themselves. 
Coaching Styles. The main coaching style issues were: inconsistent coaching 
style; coach making the athlete feel more nervous; unsuited coaching style to the 
athlete; and different coaching styles. 
As mentioned earlier, some of the athletes in this study trained at their club most of 
the time. If selected for a major international, they would then train at a national 
training centre with the rest of the selected athletes. Thus, for most of the year, these 
athletes are trained by their personal coach. However, when at national training, they 
are coached by a national coach. The quote below illustrates an athlete's frustration 
at being exposed to a different style of coaching in these instances: 
I'm the kind of person that if I get shouted at it makes me really not 
want to do it at all ... I'd do it ten times worse because someone 
shouted at me. I don't think coaches understand each individual 
performer enough. I suppose your own coach does, but your own 
coach isn't always with you at national training. You just have one 
coach and they just shout at everyone the same; it doesn't work for 
everyone the same. 
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Clearly, being exposed to different coaches increases the likelihood of being exposed 
to different coaching styles. However, the following quote suggests that an 
inconsistent coaching style with one coach can be equally frustrating: 
With Graham [a national coach] there was no respect at all ... that was 
his fault because he was so inconsistent. He wanted to be your best 
mate one day, and the next day he wanted to be this ruthless sort of 
leader, like, "do what I say or else," and the next day he'd be like, 
"oh, are you all right mate?" ... You didn't know where you were with 
Graham, he was up and down, up and down ... unbelievable. I mean 
he would be really friendly with you one day, and the next day he'd 
just bite your head off. Ifhe was a s**t with you all the time, then 
you'd know where you stand with him, but you didn't. Like you try 
and have a laugh with him, then you find out that he's in a bad mood 
and it's at your expense, he had a right go at you. 
Team Issues 
The full range of team issues is illustrated in Figure 12. The major team 
issues revealed were: team atmosphere; support network; and communication. 
Team Atmosphere. The major issue with respect to the team atmosphere was 
tension between the athletes. Team members are likely to have minor fall-outs when 
they spend long periods of time with each other in a typically tense atmosphere (e.g., 
preparing for one of the most important competitions of their career). Also, it might 
be difficult for new team members to integrate a team that has been together for a 
long period of time. The following quote is an example of how a new team member 
can affect the team atmosphere during a World Championships: 
It was just that our mind wasn't on what we were supposed to be 
concentrating on ... we were too busy thinking about things that were 
going on amongst ourselves ... We weren't focusing 100% ... and that 
1 
14 
3 
2 
6 
6 
2 
4 
4 
2 
4 
5 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
7 
6 
7 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
turned into a bad atmosphere with everyone. You could sense, you 
could feel it among us, even the coaches could ... They were saying to 
us, "come on, you've got to try it," and we went to the coaches so 
many times, we went to the physios and said, "look, you've got to do 
something about this, we can't cope with her" .. , I think our actual 
performance in the competition was created by our lack of 
concentration in training as well and everything that had been going 
on. 
Injured athlete affecting team atmosphere 
Tension between athletes 
Athlete's negative attitude affecting atmosphere 
New team member affecting atmosphere 
Lack of social cohesion H Team r-Separate groups within team AtmosQhere 
Athletes not training together 
Individuals focusing on self rather than on team 
Competing against each other affecting atmosphere 
General lack of support 
Inappropriate support from physiotherapist 
Inappropriate support from judges 
Lack of help from fellow athletes 
Inappropriate psychological support H Support 1-Delegation members' lack of knowledge Network 
Getting more support than you want 
Unapproachable director 
Lack of support after major operation 
Incompetent head of delegation 
Lack of awareness of people's roles H 
Perception of judges not fulfilling their role 
Individual roles within team 
---1 Roles r-Lack of role structure 
Difficulty fulfilling two roles (captain and player) 
Feeling obliged to help younger athletes 
Lack of communication reo financial issues 
Lack of communication reo organization of training 
Poor communication with judges 
Lack of communication between athletes 
Lack of communication reo each athlete's perspective 
Confusion reo meeting times ---1 Communication 
Increased sensitivity of team reo 
communication at competition 
Lack of access to information 
Lack of communication between athletes and 
administrators 
Feeling of no one to talk to 
Communication restrictions between men and women 
athletes 
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Team I 
Issues 
Figure 12. Organizational Stress: Team Issues (the number of athletes mentioning 
each raw theme is listed in the first column). 
Support Network. Support issues were most often related to a lack of support 
or inappropriate support on behalf of support team members. If the overriding aim of 
/ 
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the organization is for athletes to attain their potential at major competitions, it is not 
surprising that these athletes expect appropriate support from each support team 
member. If this support is inappropriate, athletes are likely to feel despondent as the 
following quote illustrates: 
She [a physiotherapist] was just absolutely useless, she'd leave notes 
on her door: "Back in three hours, I've gone shopping," things like 
that. And you've just come back from a training session and you need 
treatment and you'd see her having lunch and you'd say, "can I have 
some treatment?" and she'd go, "Yes, I've only got 20 minutes, 
because I'm going swimming afterwards." She was there [at the 
competition venue] on holiday, which didn't go down very well. 
Although a range of support issues was revealed in this study (e.g., psychological 
support, physiological support), support for injuries was the most widely mentioned 
issue. Serious injury can be a devastating experience for an athlete (cf. Evans & 
Hardy, 1995; Udry et aI., 1997) and if support is not forthcoming, athletes will likely 
feel isolated and used. The following quote is a female athlete's account of her 
feelings with regard to the lack of support following an operation three months prior 
to a World Championships: 
I was just falling deeper into this trap that I just couldn't get out [of]. 
And I think if I had been encouraged straight from ... coming out of 
hospital, "look, you've got the World Championships in three months, 
we want you in it, we really want you in it. You come up to [a specific 
training centre], you have all the rehab. you want, you have all the 
help you want, you train as much as you want," and I would have 
been there. But no, I was shoved back to my own little [club]. You 
then get, you're shut off, you don't know, you can't see what 
everyone else is doing ... you're sort of blind to everything and ... it's 
really hard to ... be determined when you're ... on your own. 
This quote is a potent reminder that squad members might well perceive that they are 
being treated as a disposable amenity if they do not receive appropriate support when 
they are injured (see also Udry et aI., 1997). 
Roles. The main issues to arise with respect to roles were: lack of awareness 
of people's roles; individual roles within the team; lack of role structure; difficulty 
fulfilling two roles; and pressure to help others. Being team captain and having to 
perfonn to one's potential was sometimes seen as a difficult task to fulfil as the 
following quote illustrates: 
I didn't like being team captain because I didn't really want any of 
that rush. I'd shout, "yeah, come on" like that, when I'm ready, not 
when I'm prompted, like, "the rest of the team are a bit quiet, I think 
I'll get them going." But then I'd think that my concentration was 
going a bit because I'm thinking of someone else. 
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Delegations that travel to major international competitions often comprise many 
people. It is likely that these people will be more readily accepted as part of the team 
if everyone else knows what they are there for. It is clear from some of the quotes in 
this study that this was sometimes not the case. The following quote demonstrates 
the degree to which some of the athletes were unaware of some of the delegation 
members' roles: 
I don't know what they do, they just always seem to be at 
competitions, really old people, they don't know what you do in the 
sport, they haven't got an idea about the training, they just think we're 
a bunch of little girls. 
Communication. The communication issues are listed in Figure 12. Although 
sound communication between athletes is clearly important for effective team 
building (cf. Yukelson, 1993, 1997), the present results emphasize the importance of 
communication throughout the organization as all the members of that organization 
strive towards a common goal. This is illustrated in the quote below: 
You can't sort of be united and everyone striving for one goal when 
everyone seems to be sort of split into different directions so that no 
one knows what's happening. You can never really peak as a nation ... 
try and get everything together, because no one knows what anyone 
else is doing. We don't know what they're doing, they don't know 
what we're doing. 
The following quote shows how poor communication between a coach and a 
manager not only affects those people, but can affect the whole team: 
Bill [a national coach] and Jim [a manager] didn't get on for a long 
time from the Sydney situation. They didn't talk so there was no 
l 
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communication between them as in what happens [at training]. Jim 
would give Bill more paperwork so Bill wouldn't be [at training] so 
that means we wouldn't get coached. We'd have a go at Bill for not 
being [at training], and then money became tight. .. and Jim would 
say, "some of them have got to go" and then life became difficult 
because they weren't talking. And because that became difficult we 
couldn't get on as a unit. 
Discussion 
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Before commencing a discussion of these results, the authors would like to 
make a number of points. First, organizational stress is by its very nature negative in 
content. Thus, the present study sought out that which was perceived to be negative. 
It most certainly is not a balanced view of the organization as a whole. Second, in 
just the same way that the experience of negative emotions does not necessarily have 
a detrimental effect upon performance (see, for example, Hardy et aI., 1996; 
Woodman & Hardy, 2001a), so it may be that the experience of some organizational 
stress could be tolerated or even beneficial to performance. Third, in view of the 
sensitive nature of organizational stress, we believe that the present organization has 
shown a great deal of foresight in allowing the present study to be conducted and 
presented in a scientific journal. Indeed, this study is the first step toward positive 
change and it would be a gross misinterpretation to suggest that this study is simply 
an indictment of the organization. Fourth, there have been many changes in this 
organization since the study was conducted. For example, a large number of national 
coaches have been appointed, and the selection criteria have been made much 
clearer. Fifth, after recognizing and addressing a number of the issues (e.g., selection 
criteria), the organization's directors are keen to continue addressing and resolving 
the issues presented here. 
The method employed in this study was designed to yield information on the 
organizational stress that athletes can experience as they prepare for major 
international competitions. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to 
investigate organizational stress within a sport organization. Because of its largely 
exploratory nature, a qualitative methodology was employed. The main sources of 
organizational stress that were identified were: selection; training environment; 
finances; nutrition; goals and expectations; coaches and coaching styles; team 
atmosphere; roles; support network; and communication. 
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Unlike business, medical, and military milieus for example, sport organizations (in 
the UK) may sometimes appoint team managers on the basis of loyalty to their sport 
rather than on their managerial skills. This can create a difficult working relationship 
between members of the executive board, senior technical staff, coaches, support 
staff, and performers. For example, an executive board often comprises former 
performers and coaches who normally have a good understanding of their sport but 
have no experience of managing an organization. Thus, amateur managers (e.g., 
former coaches) oversee professional senior technical staff, regional (often amateur) 
coaches, and national (professional) coaches. If managers are appointed based 
predominantly on their loyalty to the sport, then their lack of experience in managing 
large organizations might be detrimental to the sport organization. Indeed, the 
present results suggest that coaches, managers, and performance directors need to 
manage an array of complex skills, including: clear and transparent selection criteria; 
effective team-building strategies; coach education, particularly on sensitive issues 
(e.g., weight control); congruent pre-competition plans; and realistic goal setting. 
The results of the present project, taken together with those of previous studies 
(Gould, Eklund, & Jackson, 1992a, 1992b; Gould et aI., 1993a; Scanlan et aI., 1991), 
suggest that sport psychologists might have an important role to play in the stress 
management of members of the sport organizations in which they are involved. As 
practising sport psychologists, we need to ask ourselves the question: is a sport 
psychologist equipped with the necessary expertise to help a sporting organization 
with stress management strategies at the organizational level? Today, with most sport 
psychology courses biased heavily toward psychological skills training for athletes, 
we doubt it. Indeed, psychological skills training is unlikely to be particularly helpful 
in the resolution of many of the issues that have arisen in this project (e.g., poor 
communication within the organization). However, there are a number of ways in 
which sport psychologists might be able to help the team at an organizational level. 
For example, workshops on effective communication strategies could be carried out 
with coaches, managers, and athletes, using performance profiling (Butler, 1996) as a 
127 
catalyst to establish clearer and more open channels of communication between the 
various members of the organization. 
Dale and Wrisberg's (1996) study with a women's volleyball team illustrated the 
effectiveness of performance profiling techniques for improving communication 
between coaches and athletes within a team. As a result of the coach and the athletes 
using profiles over a competitive season, both agreed that there was a more open 
atmosphere for communication, and the athletes appreciated the increased input they 
had with regard to their competition goals and training. In light of the predominance 
of coaching issues in the present study and in a recent study of US Olympic teams 
(Gould, Guinan, Greenleaf, Medbery, & Peterson, 1999), Dale and Wrisberg's 
results suggest that performance profiling might prove to be a worthwhile method for 
improving communication between athletes and coaches. Also, if such techniques 
were used within the organization as a whole (managers, coaches, athletes, support 
staff, and administrators), one would hope to see an improvement in communication 
between members of the organization. Finally, coach education workshops on issues 
such as nutrition, the emotional response to injury, and appropriate goal-setting 
would likely be useful tools for increasing coaches' awareness of the potential 
difficulties that athletes can face. 
Over the last fifteen years, there has been a great deal of research on the effects of 
various types of leadership styles on: group cohesion (Gardner, Shields, Bredemeier, 
& Bostrom, 1996; Westre & Weiss, 1991); satisfaction (Chelladurai, 1984; Gordon, 
1988; Neil & Kirby, 1985; Riemer & Chelladurai, 1995; Weiss & Friedrichs, 1986); 
effectiveness (Salminen & Liukkonen, 1996; Serpa, Pataco, & Santos, 1991); and 
burnout in coaches (Dale & Weinberg, 1989). The present data support evidence that 
athletes' satisfaction is greater when their preferred style of leadership is matched by 
the leadership style exhibited by the coach (cf. Gordon, 1988). This, in itself, does 
not seem surprising. However, it has important implications for the structure of 
training and for the athlete who is exposed to a different style of coaching (e.g., a 
national coach) as he/she prepares for a major competition. While discrepancies 
between preferred and actual coaching behaviours have been documented in the 
literature (e.g., Riemer & Chelladurai, 1995), there are, to our knowledge, no 
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investigations into a coach's inconsistent coaching style over time, or the effects of 
being exposed to different coaches with their different coaching styles prior to a 
major competition. From the evidence of the present data, it seems likely that 
consistent coaching styles between- and within-coaches will be more conducive to an 
effective working relationship between coach and athlete. On a larger, national scale, 
the present results suggest that a clear and comprehensive national coaching 
program, which clearly defines and monitors good coaching practice, is desirable for 
attaining peak performance at the elite level. This would likely entail some form of 
quality-assurance as a requirement for coaches (e.g., a degree in coaching). 
Although the present study was an investigation of some of the organizational factors 
that might affect athletes' preparation, it suffers from two major limitations. One of 
the limitations of this study is the anonymous way in which the authors have chosen 
to report the data. The authors felt that this was necessary due to the sensitive nature 
of the data. However, such anonymity is not without its drawbacks. For example, in 
order to understand fully the athlete and hislher environment, the organization should 
ideally be treated within the context of the sport itself and its concomitant structure 
and culture. It is clear that anonymous reporting of the data precludes such an in-
depth discussion of the findings. Despite this limitation, the data reported here are 
sufficient evidence that organizational stress can be an important issue for elite 
athletes in their preparation for major international competitions such as World 
Championships and Olympic Games. 
The second major limitation of this study is that the participants were all athletes. If 
one were to conduct a more complete investigation of an organization, one would 
need to investigate organizational stress from different members' perspectives within 
that organization. A question that researchers need to address is: what are the sources 
of organizational stress for "non-performing" members of the organization (e.g., 
coaches, officials, managers, support team members, administrators)? Cote and 
associates' work on the organizational tasks of high-performance gymnastics coaches 
(Cote & Salmela, 1996; Cote, Salmela, & Russell, 1995a, 1995b) highlights the 
importance of coaches' being able to deal effectively with tasks that are not directly 
related to their coaching. In light of the present results, an investigation of coaches' 
organizational stress would certainly enhance our understanding of the sport 
organization from the coaches' perspective. 
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In their study of schools and school teachers, Cox et al. (1988) adopted a systems 
approach whereby they investigated stress and possible action strategies in senior 
school teachers. Most of the strategies suggested by the teachers in the Cox et al. 
study related to the school as an organization and not to the individual teacher. In 
their explanation of this systems approach, Cox et al. (1988) concluded: "Whatever 
the actual mechanism used, it is obvious that dealing with only the teacher, as an 
individual, was not seen as the way forward." (p. 360). With reference to the athletes 
interviewed in this study, we concur. Since stress is conceptualised as being a 
subjective psychological experience (McGrath, 1970), the present authors 
investigated organizational stress from the individual athlete's perspective. However, 
as Handy (1986) pointed out, "the root causes of stress are often far removed from 
the individual person or job and may be more appropriately conceptualised in 
societal or organizational terms." (p. 206). Consequently, theorists who are interested 
in developing models of stress in sport would do well to consider not only 
individuals' subjective experiences, but also the broader organizational, social, 
political, and cultural environment in which these individuals find themselves. 
Much research in sport psychology has focused on the individual and, to a lesser 
degree, on the performing team. While this research has clearly advanced our 
understanding of athletes' preparation for competition and the team dynamics 
involved, it most often overlooks the importance of the organizational setting within 
which the individual and the performing team are operating. In light of the present 
project, researchers cannot dismiss the importance of the organizational context if 
they are interested in understanding how an elite athlete's preparation for 
competition might affect hislher subsequent performance. Indeed, quotes such as the 
following one suggest that organizational stress may account for a significant 
percentage of performance variance. 
No one communicated with Bill [a national coach], they just ignored 
him ... In Egypt it was absolutely abysmal and it tore the team apart, 
and the team we should have beaten by 10-15 marks beat us by 10 
marks, so that's the result of what happened ... Everyone hated him 
and everyone sort of carried that on board, and I think that was a big 
problem. 
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To date, there is no quantitative evidence to suggest how much perfonnance variance 
might be accounted for by organizational stress in elite sport. This is likely to be a 
challenging and fruitful area for future researchers interested in how athletes' 
preparation for major competitions can affect subsequent perfonnance. 
At an applied level, the present results suggest that sport psychologists working with 
elite teams would do well not to limit themselves to the application of psychological 
skills training with athletes. Rather, sport psychologists will need to possess and use 
other skills if they are to address issues such as: increasing coaches' and managers' 
awareness of sensitive issues such as selection, injury, and weight control; helping 
coaches with effective coaching styles; and helping managers, directors, coaches, 
support staff, and athletes to communicate more effectively. At present, the most 
effective skills for addressing such issues remain unclear. Given the results of this 
study, this seems an avenue for research that will likely benefit applied sport 
psychologists, particularly those working with elite sports populations. 
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Chapter 6 
Summary, General Discussion, and Concluding Comments 
Introduction 
The purpose of this final chapter is to discuss and integrate the findings of the 
various papers that make up the thesis. The chapter comprises five main sections. 
The first section is a summary of the aims and major findings. The second section is 
a critical discussion of the main theoretical implications from the research presented. 
The third section presents the major applied implications from the studies' findings, 
and the fourth section outlines the strengths and limitations of the research project as 
a whole. Finally, recommendations for future research are offered. 
Summary 
Chapter 2 presented a critical appraisal of stress and anxiety research in sport. 
Throughout this chapter, a major focus was the relative merits of multidimensional 
anxiety theory and catastrophe models, the former being an additive theory, the latter 
being an interactive model. The standpoints of multidimensional anxiety theory 
(Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990) and catastrophe models (e.g., 
Hardy, 1990, 1996a) are not completely compatible for a number of reasons 
discussed in some detail in Chapter 2. One of the main differences between the two 
standpoints is the proposed effects of cognitive anxiety and self-confidence upon 
performance. For example, Martens et al. (1990) proposed that the effects of 
cognitive anxiety and self-confidence upon performance are independent. Despite 
these independent effects, cognitive anxiety and self-confidence are conceptualised 
as lying at opposite ends of a single continuum (Martens et aI., 1990). In contrast, 
within a butterfly catastrophe model framework, Hardy (1996a) has proposed that the 
effects of cognitive anxiety and self-confidence upon performance are interactive. In 
this way, it is argued that higher levels of self-confidence might serve a protective 
function against the potentially debilitating effects of cognitive anxiety under high 
levels of physiological arousal. Thus, from these two theoretical standpoints, there 
are three mutually exclusive views on the effects of cognitive anxiety and self-
confidence upon competitive sport performance: 
(a) Cognitive anxiety and self-confidence lie at the two extremes on the 
continuum of a single construct (Martens et aI., 1990). 
(b) Cognitive anxiety and self-confidence exert independent effects upon 
performance (Martens et aI., 1990). 
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(c) Cognitive anxiety and self-confidence interact such that high levels of 
cognitive anxiety combined with high levels of self-confidence are less likely 
to be detrimental to performance than high levels of cognitive anxiety 
combined with low levels of self-confidence (Hardy, 1996a). 
The aim of the first section of the thesis was to clarify this issue. This section 
comprised two studies. In the first, a meta-analysis was conducted in order to 
synthesise the research on the relationships between cognitive anxiety and 
performance, and between self-confidence and performance. This meta-analysis 
confirmed that cognitive anxiety and competitive performance are negatively related, 
and that self-confidence and performance are positively related. Furthermore, the 
results revealed that self-confidence was significantly more related to performance, 
thereby suggesting that cognitive anxiety and self-confidence exert somewhat 
independent effects upon performance. Thus, in relation to the conflicting views 
outlined above, the first view can be eliminated. In other words, cognitive anxiety 
and self-confidence do not lie at opposite ends on the continuum of a single 
construct. 
The aim of the second study was to determine whether self-confidence might act as a 
bias factor within a catastrophe model framework. This study employed an 
innovative segmental analysis. In this type of analysis, it is possible to determine the 
precise pointe s) along the somatic anxiety continuum (corresponding to the 
bifurcation set) where the maximum cognitive anxiety x somatic anxiety interaction 
effect size lies. The main question addressed in this study was: does self-confidence 
moderate the interactive effects of cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety upon 
performance? The results showed that the interaction between cognitive anxiety and 
somatic anxiety occurred at a higher level of somatic anxiety for the high self-
confidence condition as compared to the low self-confidence condition. This finding 
confirms the moderating role of self-confidence within a butterfly catastrophe model 
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framework. Although these results did not provide unequivocal support for all the 
features of a butterfly catastrophe model, they provided fairly unambiguous evidence 
for the interactive effect of cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence 
upon performance. Thus, in relation to the conflicting views described above, the 
second view can be eliminated as a possible explanation, and the third view appears 
the most promising for future research. That is, cognitive anxiety and self-confidence 
do not exert separate effects upon performance. Rather, their effects (together with 
those of somatic anxiety/physiological arousal) are interactive and more complex. 
One of the problems identified in the meta-analysis was the dearth of studies 
undertaken with elite performers. In fact, of the 42 studies included in the meta-
analysis, only one was conducted with international performers. One of the principal 
aims of conducting research in this area is to be able to generalise the research 
findings to other samples within the same population. However, if part of the 
population of interest (i.e., high-level performers) is not being investigated, such 
generalisations are likely to be tenuous, at best. At an applied level, this could be 
particularly problematic. For example, if an applied sport psychologist simply 
applies knowledge gleaned from relatively low-level performers without a sound 
understanding of the environment within which the high-level athlete is operating, 
he/she is likely to lose credibility by making ineffective and inappropriate 
suggestions (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996a). Previous research investigating high-
level performers' sources of stress (e.g., Gould, Jackson, & Finch, 1993a, 1993b; 
Scanlan, Stein, & Ravizza, 1991) has begun to unearth some of the organizational 
and occupational stressors in these settings. However, this research has typically not 
been set within a theoretical framework. Thus, the study presented in Chapter 5 was 
an attempt to investigate elite athletes' stress within an organizational framework. In 
delimiting the sources of stress to those related directly to the organization, it was felt 
that one would begin to better understand the impact of the organization upon elite 
performers. This interview-based study revealed a number of sources of 
organizational stress, in particular: selection; the training environment; finances; 
nutrition; injury; goals and expectations; coaches and coaching styles; the team 
atmosphere; roles; support networks; and communication. 
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Theoretical issues 
Many theoretical issues in stress and anxiety research were identified in the review 
chapter of this project. Some of these issues were addressed in the ensuing studies, 
and others remain to be satisfactorily resolved. The aim of this section is to discuss 
the main theoretical issues in light of the findings in this project. The section 
comprises three main headings: (1) the measurement of anxiety, (2) mechanisms 
underlying anxiety-performance relationships, and (3) alternative paradigms for 
stress and anxiety research. 
The measurement of anxiety 
Issues related to the measurement of anxiety were discussed and critically 
appraised in some detail in Chapter 2 (pp. 31-37). Consequently, they will not be 
revisited in depth here. However, in light of the findings in this research project, two 
measurement issues will be discussed in more detail: (1) the measurement of 
cognitive anxiety, and (2) the measurement of physiological indices of anxiety. 
The measurement of cognitive anxiety. The findings from the meta-analysis in 
Chapter 3 emphatically confirmed the degree to which researchers rely on the CSAI-
2 as a measure of cognitive anxiety (and self-confidence) in sport research. Of the 40 
studies providing a cognitive anxiety effect size estimate, 38 used the CSAI-2. The 
other two studies were conducted before the CSAI-2 was available (i.e., before 
1983). In light of the criticisms levelled at the CSAI-2 in Chapter 2, the near sine qua 
non status that the CSAI-2 appears to enjoy for anxiety researchers in sport could 
well represent an impediment to further understanding of anxiety-performance 
relationships. For example, in Chapter 2 it was argued that the cognitive anxiety 
items of the CSAI-2 could be interpreted differently, such that they might not be 
reflective of cognitive anxiety for some performers. Thus, given the reliance on the 
CSAI-2 as a measure of cognitive anxiety in sport, the call for further validation 
work on the CSAI-2 (or for a new measure of pre-competitive anxiety) appears more 
pressIng. 
The measurement of anxiety using physiological indices. It is now widely 
accepted that anxiety comprises at least two components: a mental component and a 
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physiological component. Typically, researchers have measured the physiological 
component of anxiety in one of two ways: (1) via somatic anxiety, that is, the 
perception of components of one's physiological arousal, or (2) via the direct 
measurement of aspects of physiological arousal (e.g., heart rate, skin conductance, 
adrenaline levels, etc.). At various points in this thesis (e.g., Chapters 2 and 4), a 
debate has centred on the relative merits of these two methods of measuring the 
physiological component of anxiety. It has been argued (e.g., Hardy, 1 996b) that 
direct measures of physiological arousal are more likely to advance our 
understanding of the potentially complex relationship between cognitive anxiety, 
physiological arousal, and performance. This is because physiological arousal can 
have both direct and indirect effects upon performance, whereas somatic anxiety can 
have only indirect effects. In the exploratory analysis investigating butterfly 
catastrophe models in Chapter 4, somatic anxiety was used as an approximation of 
physiological arousal. The justification for the use of an indirect measure in this 
study was based largely on the researchers' reluctance to impose unnecessary 
constraints in a field setting. 
As they are currently used, both indirect and direct measures of the physiological 
symptoms of anxiety have their advantages and limitations. Somatic anxiety has the 
advantage of being relatively non-intrusive in a field setting. Also, as measured in the 
CSAI-2 for example, somatic anxiety taps the perceptions of various indicators of 
anxiety (e.g., increased heart rate, skin conductance, muscular tension). The major 
drawback of a somatic anxiety measure is its indirect measurement of possible direct 
physiological effects (cf. Hardy, 1996b). Conversely, the principal advantage of 
direct measures of physiological arousal is that they allow researchers to measure 
directly the impact of physiological changes upon performance. However, such 
direct measures can be intrusive in a field setting and thus are normally limited to 
one indicator (e.g., heart rate). Also, although such indicators are accurate measures 
of physiological activity, they might be only crude indicators of the physiological 
symptoms of anxiety (cf. Lacey, 1967; Neiss, 1988). Given these considerations and 
the discussion presented in Chapter 2, direct measures of anxiety-induced 
physiological arousal (e.g., plasma adrenaline) appear to be the most fruitful, albeit 
challenging, direction for future anxiety-performance research in sport. 
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Mechanisms underlying anxiety-performance relationships 
The results from the meta-analysis confirmed the significant negative 
relationship between cognitive anxiety and competitive performance. However, the 
magnitude of this correlation was modest (r = -0.12), and the amount of performance 
variance accounted for by cognitive anxiety was small (in the region of 1.5%). 
Furthermore, the effect sizes were highly heterogeneous and 28% of the studies 
reported a positive relationship between cognitive anxiety and performance. Finally, 
the only significant moderator variable was the performers' sex. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that sport anxiety researchers are not consistently measuring 
those variables that moderate the relationship between cognitive anxiety and 
performance. 
This could well be an artefact of the fairly unsophisticated theoretical approach 
advocated by multidimensional anxiety theory. Based largely on theories of attention 
(e.g., Wine, 1971, 1980), multidimensional anxiety theory postulates that increases in 
cognitive anxiety will result in performance decrements. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, some models and theories postulate that increases in cognitive anxiety 
might help to maintain or to improve performance. These include: Humphreys and 
Revelle's (1984) information processing model, catastrophe models (Hardy & Fazey, 
1987), and processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). The conscious 
processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992) and the theory of ironic processes (Wegner, 
1989, 1997) have also offered alternative theoretical explanations for the effects of 
anxiety upon performance. In terms of possible moderator variables in the anxiety-
performance relationship, effort seems to be particularly worthy of more research 
attention. In simple terms, processing efficiency theory states that an increase in 
effort will allow a performer to maintain ( or improve) performance, albeit at a cost in 
terms of efficiency. However, conscious processing hypothesis and ironic effects 
theory both imply that performance will suffer because of misdirected effort, that is, 
effort not normally invested when performance is "automatic" (cf. Naatanen, 1973). 
Thus, one of the basic differences between the stance taken in processing efficiency 
theory and the stance taken in both conscious processing hypothesis and ironic 
effects theory is the nature and role of the effort invested. The effort depicted in 
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processing efficiency theory is appropriate and will facilitate perfonnance. The effort 
implied by conscious processing hypothesis and ironic effects theory is inappropriate 
and will debilitate perfonnance. In tenns of exploring the mechanisms underlying the 
anxiety-perfonnance relationship, both these approaches seem worthy of 
investigation. 
Researchers have provided support for processing efficiency theory (cf. Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992; Hardy & Jackson, 1996), conscious processing hypothesis (Hardy, 
Mullen, & Jones, 1996b; Masters, 1992; Mullen & Hardy, 2000), and ironic effects 
theory (Wegner, Ansfield, & Pilloff, 1998; Wegner, Broome, & Blumberg, 1997). 
Thus, it is likely that the approaches advocated by these theories all have some 
validity. For example, processing efficiency theory could dovetail conscious 
processing hypothesis fairly nicely (Hardy et aI., 1996b). More precisely, in 
processing efficiency theory, anxious perfonners are likely to invest more effort by 
allocating additional processing resources to the task. However, in allocating these 
extra resources, anxious perfonners might transfer task control from lower order, 
automatic subsystems to higher order, controlled subsystems (Eysenck, 1992; Hardy 
et aI., 1996b). Thus, in anxiety-inducing situations, as well as a quantitative shift in 
processing resources (i.e., an increase in effort), there might be a qualitative shift 
towards conscious processing (cf. Eysenck, 1992; Hardy et aI., 1996b). Furthennore, 
such conscious processing might reflect either a focus on cues that are nonnally 
automatic (Baumeister, 1984) or a focus on cues that are to be avoided (Wegner, 
1994). 
Despite the appeal of such links between these theories, it is unlikely that anyone of 
these theories can fully account for the behaviour of anxious perfonners under stress 
(cf. Hardy et aI., 1996b). For example, in attempting to clarify the results from a 
series of papers investigating the conscious processing hypothesis (e.g., Hardy et aI., 
1996b; Hardy, Mullen, & Martin, under review; Masters, 1992), Hardy and Mullen 
(2001) proposed that the potentially detrimental effects of anxiety upon perfonnance 
might also be viewed from an attentional threshold perspective. Such an argument is 
based upon the fact that anxiety leads to an attentional deficit in working memory 
(Eysenck, 1992; Wine, 1971, 1980). In this way, anxiety might take up a portion of 
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attentional capacity, and relevant cues (associated with conscious processing) might 
take up an additional portion of attentional capacity. The combination of these two 
processes might deplete attentional capacity beyond the threshold required for high-
level performance. A recent study by Mullen, Hardy, and Tattersall (in preparation) 
has provided some support for this attentional threshold hypothesis. In this study, 
golfers' putting performance was impaired in the high anxiety condition by both the 
shadowing (explicit task-relevant) and tone counting (task-irrelevant) conditions. 
Although more research is needed in this area, it does seem likely that some sort of 
attentional threshold exists. Furthermore, when they are anxious, performers are 
more likely to cross such a threshold (cf. Hardy & Mullen, 2001). 
Alternative paradigms for stress and anxiety research 
In various parts of this thesis, it has been argued that interactive paradigms 
are more likely to advance our understanding of the effects of stress and anxiety 
upon sport performance. The results of the butterfly catastrophe model study (in 
Chapter 4) support this argument. Although the catastrophe model is not a theory, it 
does provide a sound framework for investigating the interactive effects of cognitive 
anxiety, physiological arousal, and self-confidence upon performance. Hardy 
(l996b) provided a number of ways to test the various aspects of the model, and the 
analysis employed in Chapter 4 provides an additional method for investigating 
interactive effects within a catastrophe model framework. In light of the discussion in 
the previous section (mechanisms underlying anxiety-performance relationships), 
effort seems worthy of consideration as an asymmetry factor within such a 
framework (see Chapter 2, pp. 39-45, for further details). 
The study presented in the final empirical chapter represented an attempt to gain an 
understanding of organizational stress within an elite environment. As far as the 
present author is aware, this study was the first to investigate organizational stress in 
sport. One of the quotes from this study suggests that organizational stress might 
account for significant proportions of performance variance in high-level sport. 
However, to date, there is no quantitative evidence to support such a claim. 
Notwithstanding the argument presented earlier that more research needs to be 
conducted in elite settings, it seems unfair and unethical to conduct research on the 
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precise mechanisms underlying anxiety and performance in such settings. This is 
because the methods employed might be highly disruptive to performers' preparation 
whilst the research findings are unlikely to be of direct utility to those performers. 
However, the findings of Chapter 5 suggest that organizational stress research would 
be directly applicable and beneficial to elite performers, particularly if follow-up 
intervention studies were undertaken. Given the passionate nature of some of the 
quotes, one could argue that it would be unethical not to pursue this line of research 
in elite settings. Certainly, investigations of the stress-performance relationship from 
an organizational perspective are likely to be fruitful at both a theoretical and applied 
level. 
Applied implications 
As the applied implications of the theories and research findings were discussed at 
various points throughout the project, they will only be listed here. The major applied 
implications to arise from this research programme are: 
(1) Athletes who are anxious and confident might perform very well. With such 
athletes, anxiety reduction strategies should be used with some caution, if at 
all. 
(2) Athletes should learn and practise stress management strategies that target 
cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal separately. 
(3) Sport psychologists should help raise coaches' awareness of behaviours that 
are likely to diminish an athlete's self-confidence. 
(4) Sport psychologists working with high-level performers should be aware that 
their efforts might be better invested in organizational issues rather than 
solely the application of psychological skills training. 
(5) Sport psychologists should help increase coaches' and managers' awareness 
of the potential impact upon performers of issues such as: inappropriate 
selection procedures, injury, weight control, inappropriate coaching styles, a 
poor training environment, and poor communication. 
Research strengths and limitations 
The principal strength of this research project was its innovative approach to the 
study of stress and anxiety in sport. After clarification of the terms such as stress 
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anxiety, and arousal, the review chapter was an attempt to bring together current 
theories and models from sport psychology and mainstream psychology. The meta-
analysis was essentially two meta-analyses, synthesising the research findings of two 
relationships (cognitive anxiety - performance, and self-confidence - performance). 
This was principally to examine the relative impact of cognitive anxiety and self-
confidence upon performance. The results of the meta-analysis suggested that self-
confidence, compared to cognitive anxiety, was more strongly related to 
performance. Another aim of the meta-analysis was to elucidate the debate regarding 
the independence (or otherwise) of the effects of cognitive anxiety and self-
confidence upon performance. Comparisons between these two relationships 
provided support for the view that cognitive anxiety and self-confidence exert 
independent effects upon performance. The study presented in Chapter 4 was an 
exploratory investigation of the role of self-confidence within a butterfly catastrophe 
model framework. This involved an innovative segmental analysis, thus providing 
future researchers with a relatively simple method for testing higher-order 
catastrophe models. Finally, the study presented in the penultimate chapter was, to 
the best of the present author's knowledge, the first to investigate organizational 
stress in a sport organization. This study revealed a number of organizational issues 
that are likely to have a considerable impact upon performance at an elite level. The 
study also extended Carron's (1982) group dynamics framework to provide a 
theoretical basis for future organizational stress research. 
There were a number of specific limitations in this thesis. For example, in Chapter 4, 
a physiological indicator of anxiety (rather than somatic anxiety) would probably 
have been a better choice for measuring the asymmetry factor of the catastrophe 
model. Also, in Chapter 5, a more holistic approach to the study of organizational 
stress would have included different members of the organization rather than simply 
the performers. As these and other limitations associated specifically with each study 
were discussed in some detail in the respective chapters, they will not be revisited 
here. However, as a whole, this research project suffers one major limitation. 
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Ironically, it is the title of the project that best reflects this limitation. That is, as the 
present research programme was an attempt to investigate stress and anxiety from a 
number of different perspectives, it did not adhere to one systematic and coherent 
line of research. If such a line had been adopted, perhaps this thesis would have 
allowed further exploration of some of the issues, notably some of those outlined in 
the next section. 
Future research directions 
With reference to the findings from the present research project, there are a number 
of research directions that are worthy of further consideration. A more valid measure 
of anxiety (of cognitive anxiety in particular) is urgently needed. This is particularly 
important in light of the criticisms levelled at the CSAI-2 (see Chapter 2) and the 
degree to which researchers rely on this measure as a measure of competitive anxiety 
(see Chapter 3). Such has been the reliance on the CSAI-2 that (cognitive) anxiety 
research in competitive sport could almost be termed "concern" research. Such 
ambiguity is not likely to be helpful in understanding the effects of anxiety upon 
sport performance. 
Physiological arousal cannot be measured with a questionnaire. Thus, future research 
investigating the effects of cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal should 
measure physiological arousal both directly and indirectly. However, simply 
measuring exercise-related physiological arousal (e.g., heart rate) might not be the 
best way to measure anxiety-induced physiological arousal (Lacey, 1967; Neiss, 
1988). This is because similar physiological responses might be reflective of 
different emotional states. For example, elevated heart rate could be symptomatic of 
high levels of anxiety (e.g., prior to an important competition) or symptomatic of low 
levels of anxiety (e.g., during a training session). Consequently, physiological 
indicators that specifically reflect anxiety (e.g., plasma adrenaline, cortisol) should 
be explored in more detail. One obvious starting point for such research is the 
exploration of the differential effects of adrenaline and noradrenaline upon different 
aspects of performance (cf. Dimsdale & Moss, 1980; Fibiger & Singer, 1984; Hoch, 
Werle, & Weicker, 1988; Williams, Taggart, & Carruthers, 1978). Of course, in 
many sports, athletes might have high levels of anxiety-induced physiological 
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arousal and high levels of exercise-induced physiological arousal. The effect of this 
interaction upon performance might well be different to the effect of either type of 
physiological arousal alone. This is certainly worthy of future research. 
In light of the findings of previous research (e.g., Deffenbacher, 1977; Edwards & 
Hardy, 1996; Marafion, 1924; Schachter & Singer, 1962) and of the present research 
project (Chapter 4), there is fairly conclusive evidence that cognitive anxiety and 
physiological (or somatic anxiety) interact with each other. Thus, research examining 
their effects upon performance should employ an interactive framework (Hardy, 
1990; 1996a). At present, amongst those models and theories of anxiety and 
performance in sport, catastrophe models alone offer such a framework. 
Consequently, they are worthy of further research attention. As the validity of 
surface-fitting procedures remains to be elucidated (see Alexander, Herbert, DeShon, 
& Hanges; Cobb, 1978; Guastello, 1992), the two most obvious avenues for future 
researchers are: the exploration of the interaction between cognitive anxiety and 
physiological arousal using quadrant analysis techniques (Edwards & Hardy, 1996; 
Hardy, 1996b); tests of the hysteresis hypothesis (Hardy, 1996b; Hardy, Parfitt, & 
Pates, 1994); and segmental analyses for exploring bias factors in higher-order 
catastrophe models (Chapter 4). All of these approaches require only a basic level of 
understanding of analysis of variance and so are readily amenable to investigation. 
Another fairly straightforward method of investigating the interaction between 
cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal would be to use split-sample regression 
techniques. In using such techniques, one would expect the regression slope between 
cognitive anxiety and performance to be more positive under low levels of 
physiological arousal (the left side of the catastrophe model) than under high levels 
of physiological arousal (the right side of the model). 
The catastrophe models are not a theory. That is, they do not provide a theoretical 
explanation for the proposed effects of cognitive anxiety, physiological arousal, and 
self-confidence upon performance. Rather, they are an attempt to accurately model 
these effects (Hardy, 1999). Some theories do provide explanations that fit some of 
the predictions of the catastrophe model. These theories include: processing 
efficiency theory, the conscious processing hypothesis, and the theory of ironic 
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effects. For example, all of these theories could be incorporated into a catastrophe 
model framework to explain performance catastrophes under elevated cognitive 
anxiety. However, none of these theories would use physiological arousal as an 
asymmetry factor to explain these performance catastrophes. For example, in 
explaining the results of previous hysteresis studies (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; Hardy, 
Parfitt, & Pates, 1994), Hardy (1999) suggested that the asymmetry factor for the 
cusp catastrophe model might be better labelled "effort required". Thus, in terms of 
using a catastrophe framework to model the effects of anxiety upon performance, 
future researchers would do well to investigate effort required as an asymmetry 
factor (Hardy, 1999). Furthermore, effort required would be fairly easy to manipulate 
in either a laboratory setting or a field setting. 
Although organizational stress research in sport is in its infancy, the implications of 
the preliminary findings presented in Chapter 5 are potentially significant for elite 
sport. For example, the results suggest that sport psychologists would do well to 
invest a considerable proportion of their effort in assisting coaches and managers 
rather than limiting themselves to psychological skills training with athletes (cf. 
Hardy & Parfitt, 1994). An obvious lacuna of the study presented in Chapter 5 is the 
failure to investigate the sources of organizational stress from coaches' and 
managers' perspectives. This is an avenue for future research. In obtaining the 
perspectives of different members of an organization, researchers will begin to 
understand more fully the issues that underlie an elite athlete's preparation for major 
competitions. Also, the development of an organizational stress questionnaire is 
likely to be worthwhile in determining the magnitude of organizational stress effects 
upon the performance of elite athletes. 
Conclusion 
The aim in the present research project was to explore different approaches to the 
investigation of stress and anxiety in sport. The review chapter, the meta-analysis, 
and the catastrophe model study allowed some important conceptual issues to be 
addressed and largely resolved. In tum, these approaches and the study of 
organizational stress have brought up new questions that are likely to attract 
considerable research attention in the future. 
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Appendix A 
Statistical summary of the cognitive anxiety studies included in the meta-
analysis, with outliers (n = 4) removed. 
168 
Statistic Value (including assumed Value (excluding assumed r 
r = 0 results), n = 36 
Central tendency (r) 
Unweighted mean -0.09 
Weighted mean -0.13 
Significance tests 
Combined Stouffer Z (IZI-vn) 4.10,p < 0.001 
t-test for mean Zr 2.51, p < 0.01 
Variability (r) 
Maximum 
Quartile 3 (Q3) 
Median 
Quartile 1 (Ql) 
Minimum 
Q3-Ql 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Standard error (SDI-vn) 
Confidence intervals (r) 
90% 
95% 
990/0 
0.35 
0.03 
-0.07 
-0.21 
-0.52 
0.24 
0.21 
0.03 
-0.03 to -0.15 
-0.02 to -0.16 
-0.00 to -0.18 
= 0 results), n = 30 
-0.11 
-0.15 
4.49,p < 0.001 
2.55, p < 0.01 
0.35 
0.05 
-0.10 
-0.30 
-0.52 
0.35 
0.23 
0.04 
-0.04 to -0.18 
-0.03 to -0.19 
-0.00 to -0.22 
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AppendixB 
Statistical summary of the self-confidence studies included in the meta-analysis, 
with the outliers (n = 4) removed. 
Statistic Value (including assumed Value (excluding assumed r 
r = 0 results), n = 33 
Central tendency (r) 
Unweighted mean 0.25 
Weighted mean 0.26 
Significance tests 
Combined Stouffer Z ('i.Z/-Vn) 10.07,p < 0.001 
t-test for mean Zr 6.54, p < 0.001 
Variability (r) 
Maximum 
Quartile 3 (Q3) 
Median 
Quartile 1 (Ql) 
Minimum 
Q3-Ql 
Standard deviation (SD) 
Standard error (SDI-Vn) 
Confidence intervals (r) 
90% 
95% 
99% 
0.57 
0.42 
0.26 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.41 
0.20 
0.04 
0.20 to 0.31 
0.18 to 0.32 
0.16 to 0.34 
= 0 results), n = 28 
0.29 
0.30 
10.93,p < 0.001 
7.47,p < 0.001 
0.57 
0.43 
0.32 
0.08 
-0.02 
0.35 
0.19 
0.04 
0.23 to 0.35 
0.22 to 0.36 
0.20 to 0.38 
Appendix C 
Organizational Stress Interview Guide 
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During this interview, we are interested in your experience of international British 
[specific sport] and how you perceived certain organizational issues before and 
during major international competitions such as World Championships and Olympic 
Games. I will sometimes use the tenn "team" during this discussion; the team refers 
to all the athletes, coaches, personnel, and any other people that were involved in the 
competition as part of the British delegation. 
Could you tell me about the team's psychological preparation for these 
competitions? 
Could you tell me about your psychological preparation for these 
competitions? 
Could you tell me about the structure of training? 
Did the training sessions change as the competition approached? 
Could you tell me about the training scholarships and bursaries? 
Could you tell me about the selection process? 
Could you give me a feel for what your training was like during the lead up to 
the competition? 
team? 
Could you tell me what the training was like at the competition? 
Could you tell me about different people's roles within the team? 
Could you tell me about people's goals and expectations? 
Could you tell me about the team's goals and how they were decided? 
Could you tell me about people's diets? 
Could you tell me about the different coaches that were involved? 
Could you tell me about the different coaches' styles of coaching? 
What was the team atmosphere like as the competition approached? 
How happy would you say people were before going to the competition? 
.. ? 
How happy would you say people were at the competitlon. 
Could you tell me about different people's contributions to the team? 
Could you tell me about the support the athletes received from the rest of the 
Could you tell me about how injuries were dealt with in the team? 
Could you tell about the communication between people in the team? 
Is there anything that we haven't talked about that you are able to tell me 
about your experience of this organization? 
Prompts 
How did that work? 
How did people feel about that? 
What effect did that have? 
Could you enlarge a bit upon that for me please? 
Is there anything else you could tell me about [e.g., the selection process]? 
Could I just make sure I have got that right? [Recapitulate the participant's 
response to the question]. 
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